The April 2010 Nuclear Security Summit held in Washington drew attention to the emerging threat of nuclear terrorism, as well as the need to secure weapon-usable nuclear materials worldwide. [1] As argued by Levi (2008), "the diffusion of technology, the rise of extremist ideology, and the steady spread of nuclear materials conspire to make nuclear terrorism an increasingly worrying prospect". Article Two of the 2005 United Nations International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism defines nuclear terrorism as possession of radioactive material or making or possession of a device with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury; or with the intent to cause substantial damage to property or the environment. Nuclear terrorism also pertains to the use of any radioactive material or devices, use or damage of nuclear facility in a manner which releases or risks the release of radioactive material with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury; or with the intent to cause substantial damage to property or to the environment; or with the intent to compel a natural or legal person, an international organization or a State to do or refrain from doing an act.
UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon has identified nuclear terrorism as "one of the most serious threats of our time." [2] U.S. President Barrack Obama also said that "there is no graver danger to global security than the threat of nuclear terrorism, and no more immediate task for the international community than to address that threat." [3]
The risk of nuclear terrorism is not without justification. For the past decade, a number of cases have been documented on illicit trafficking of fissile materials; there have also been confirmed reports on theft of nuclear weapons. [4] Given the innumerable variables to be considered, it is difficult to determine with certainty how terrorist organizations can acquire fissile materials, whether they have the expertise and facilities to build nuclear bombs and radiation dispersal devices, or the timeframe during which nuclear terrorist activities may occur.
Statement of the Problem
"How does the risk of nuclear terrorism alter the landscape of international security, specifically, how does it relate to the question of deterrence and cooperation?"
This paper looks into the literature of nuclear terrorism and examines nuclear terrorism's implications for international security. This paper attempts to highlight the various factors to determine the risks of nuclear terrorism and provide a brief on the United Nation (UN) resolutions, treaties, instruments, arrangements and other initiatives established to effectively counter nuclear terrorism.
Objectives
This paper intends to contribute to the stream of knowledge on the risks of nuclear terrorism and implications for international security. It aims:
To gain an understanding about the highly controversial issues of nuclear proliferation and easy availability of fissile materials in the international system to various buyers;
To contribute to the understanding of the various assumptions surrounding nuclear terrorism and its odds;
To provide policy recommendations on possible ways of effectively address the nuclear terrorism risk.
Theoretical Framework
This research paper is grounded on the theory of Complex Interdependence by Keohane and Nye (1977). Complex Interdependence rejects the proposition on the centrality of states. Scholars of this school argue that "states are no longer the only actors or only communication channel. There exist other actors and associated channels, including government elites like bureaucrats; non governmental elites; transnational organizations, such as multinational corporations, banks and non-state actors". [5] Furthermore, complex interdependence posits that there is no hierarchy of issues, with nonmilitary issue areas not necessary subordinated to military interest. Finally, the theory has rendered the use or threat of military force less relevant and war more difficult to wage. This theory allows for the explanation of how various actors participate in world politics.
Analytical Framework
This research paper consists of three sections: First, is a brief discussion on the assumptions underlying the discourse on nuclear terrorism with focus on: (1) terrorists can acquire fissile materials from poorly secured nuclear stockpiles and the international nuclear black market; (2) technical information necessary to build functional nuclear weapon are widely available; (3) rogue states may transfer nuclear technology to terrorist organizations; and (4) smaller quantities of fissile materials may be used in the creation of dirty bombs or radiation dispersal devices. The second section will focus on the various multilateral initiatives established to effectively counter nuclear terrorism. Finally, the last section is a discussion of the risks of nuclear terrorism and its implications for international security.
Definition of Terms
The following definitions were based from the 2005 United Nation International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism [6] :
Nuclear Terrorism- possession of radioactive material or making or possessing a device with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury; or with the intent to cause substantial damage to property or the environment. Nuclear terrorism also refers to the use of radioactive material or devices, use or damage of nuclear facility in a manner which releases or risks the release of radioactive material with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury; or with the intent to cause substantial damage to property or to the environment; or with the intent to compel a natural or legal person, an international organization or a State to do or refrain from doing an act.
Intent- In criminal law, intention is one of the types of mens rea (guilty mind), that if accompanied by an actus reus (guilty act), constitutes a crime. [7] Intent in this paper refers to the conscious objective to engage in a certain conduct or to produce particular result.
State actors- are those actors that are acting on behalf of a governmental body. These include representatives of a state, members of government, the legislature or judiciary or officials or employees of a state or any other public authority or entity.
Non-state actors- are those actors that are not (representatives of) state, yet they operate at the international level and that are potentially relevant to international relations. [8] Non-state actors can be categorized as either: intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), epistemic communities (ECs) and other groups (including terrorist organizations, professional organizations, churches, etc).
Radioactive Materials- refer to the nuclear materials and other radioactive substances that contain nuclides which "under spontaneous disintegration (a process accompanied by emission of one or more types of ionizing radiation, such as alpha-, beta-, neutron particles and gamma rays)" and which owing to their radiological or fissile properties, cause death, serious bodily injury or substantial damage to property or to the environment.
Nuclear Materials- refers to "plutonium, except that with isotopic concentration exceeding 80 per cent in plutonium-238; uranium-233; uranium enriched in the isotope 235 or 233; uranium containing the mixture of isotopes as occurring in nature other than in the form of ore or ore residue; or any material containing one or more of the foregoing".
Fissile Materials- are composed of atoms that can be split by neutrons in a self-sustaining chain-reaction to release huge amounts of energy. [9] Fissile materials can sometimes be used interchangeably with nuclear materials.
Nuclear device- pertains to any nuclear explosive device; or any radioactive material dispersal or radiation-emitting device which may, owing to its radiological properties, cause death, serious bodily injury or substantial damage to property or to the environment.
Scope and Limitations
The limitation of this study stems from the unavailability and inaccessibility of the relevant materials on the subject matter. Furthermore, given the nature of the issue being studied heavy reliance will be on the secondary sources of information.
Methodology
Content-analysis of secondary data is used in this study. The data sources include journal articles, books on nuclear terrorism, working papers on nuclear security, communiqué and reports.
NUCLEAR TERRORISM
The discourse on nuclear terrorism can be divided into two frames: one highlights the possibility of a terrorist nuclear attack as grave, palpable and apocalyptic; while the other argues that popular wisdom on nuclear terrorism is significantly flawed, and the threat is very remote. The varying perspectives on the topic bring about differing initiatives to address the threat of nuclear terrorism. According to Evans and Kawaguchi (2009), there is a significant and continuing fear internationally of nuclear terrorism grounded on the assertion that there are terrorist actors in existence who "would, if they could, cause massive and indiscriminate havoc in almost any one of the world's major cities". [10] Allison (2008) argues that given current policies and practices, a nuclear terrorist attack that devastates one of the great cities in inevitable. Allison mentions that a conservative assessment of the possibility is 29 percent over a period of 10 years. [11]
Arguments in support of inevitability of the spread of nuclear terrorism centers on the following assumptions: (1) terrorists can acquire fissile materials from poorly secured nuclear stockpiles and the international nuclear black market; (2) technical information necessary to build functional nuclear weapon are widely available; (3) rogue states may transfer nuclear technology to terrorist organizations; (4) smaller quantities of fissile materials may be used in the creation of dirty bombs or radiation dispersal devices.
Assumption 1: Terrorists can acquire fissile materials from poorly secured nuclear stockpiles and the international nuclear black market.
The world's stockpile of fissile materials is estimated at 1600 metric tons of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and 500 metric tons of plutonium. [12] According to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), these fissile materials are located at 1131 facilities across the globe. Logic dictates that terrorists cannot make a nuclear bomb unless they have access to fissile materials. No highly enriched uranium or plutonium, no bomb. Fissile materials do not occur in nature, and are highly difficult to produce. It is thus imperative that nuclear arsenals and stockpiles be secured.
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)'s Illicit Trafficking Database (ITDB) provides for the most authoritative source of information about incidents of illicit trafficking and other unauthorized activities involving nuclear and radioactive materials. Trafficking encompasses "unauthorized acquisition, provision, possession, use, transfer, or disposal of nuclear material and other radioactive material, whether intentional or unintentional and with or without crossing international borders". [13] As of 31 December 2007 there are 1340 confirmed incidents of trafficking of nuclear materials. Of these 1340 confirmed incidents, 303 involved unauthorized possession and related criminal activity (i.e., illegal possession and movement of materials, attempts to sell or purchase, or use these illegally), 390 involved theft or loss of nuclear or other radioactive materials (such as 137Cs, 241Am, 90Sr, 60Co, 192Ir and other radioisotopes), 570 involved unauthorized activities, while the remaining 57 were undetermined incidents.
Some of the noteworthy incidents include: the discovery of a 4.4 ton of beryllium including 140 kg contaminated highly-enriched uranium (HEU) in a storage area of a bank in Vilnius, Lithuani; 16.9 gram HEU sample seized by police in Ceske Budejovice, Czech Republic; 10 grams of HEU confiscated at the Rousse Customs border in Bulgaria; approximately 170 grams of HEU illegally transported across the border of Sadahlo, Georgia; and 47.5 grams of HEU discovered on a piece of tube found amidst scrap metal in Hennigsdorf, Germany.
Matthew Bunn (2008) also argues that for years, Al Qaeda operatives have repeatedly made attempts to buy nuclear material for a nuclear bomb, or to recruit nuclear expertise. Shortly before the 9/11 attacks, CIA Director George Tenet reports that bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri met with two senior Pakistani nuclear scientist to discuss nuclear weapons. The two Pakistani scientists provided Al Qaeda with blueprint of a nuclear bomb design. [14] Prior the Al Qaeda, the Japanese terror cult Aum Shinrikyo tried to get nuclear weapons. [15]
There has been also considerable concern about the security of the tactical nuclear weapons in Russia. Some scholars argue that in Russia "there are tens of thousands of strategic nuclear weapons and components, thousands of small tactical nuclear weapons, and stores of fissile materials, which can be used to construct a crude nuclear bomb". [16] Tactical nuclear weapons (or nonstrategic weapons) are designed to be used in battlefield situations, in support of more military missions. Examples of tactical nuclear weapons are gravity bombs, short-range missiles, artillery shells, land minds, and torpedoes for anti-submarine warfare. Tactical nuclear weapons are not subject to the strategic offensive arms control agreements- 1970 Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) Agreements, Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START) Agreements, 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) and the New 2010 START Treaty. [17] With the collapse of the Soviet Union, there was fear that nuclear weapons became vulnerable to theft and misdirection, especially by impoverished and demoralized elements of the armed forces or members of the nuclear workforce.
These arguments supporting 'loose nukes' [18] were countered by Robin Frost. According to Frost (2005), most of the confirmed incidents of trafficking of fissile materials involved very small quantities, not enough to build a bomb. For example, the total amount for all IAEA confirmed-trafficking cases involving HEU from 1993 to 2003 was only 8.35 kg, two-thirds short of the 25kg of HEU required to create a basic bomb. [19] Frost further notes that there is no evidence to confirm the existence of an international nuclear materials black market. Most of the cases of nuclear theft and smuggling involved amateurs wanting to become rich. Russian nuclear weapons also appear to be under tight safeguards. There is no evidence from open-source materials indicating that a single tactical nuclear weapon got into the terrorist's hands.
Nonetheless, as recognized by Evans and Kawaguchi (2009), it is not impossible for fully assembled weapons and fissile materials to be acquired by terrorists groups "depending on the state of affairs in question, including the internal politics situation, the degree of corruption in civilian and military agencies, the general reliability of the security devices, and the means for protection and control over nuclear armaments and materials". [20]
Assumption 2: Technical information necessary to build functional nuclear weapon are widely available.
Assuming that terrorists were able to acquire fissile materials, the question remains whether they can build a functional nuclear weapon. Nuclear Physicist Theodore Taylor claims that creating a nuclear bomb is "very easy. Double underlined. Very easy". [21] The designs for simple nuclear weapons have been widely available in the internet. Evans and Kawaguchi (2009) argues that the know-how of creating a crude nuclear device of gun-type weapon used to bomb Hiroshima is accessible, and engineering requirements needed to put these together may not be beyond the capacity of a well-organized and funded terrorist group.
The fissile material required to build a gun-type design would be approximately 50 kg of weapon-grade highly enriched uranium (90 percent U-235); while 5kg of plutonium or 15 kg of HEU for an implosion-type weapon. The gun-type device is the most basic type of nuclear weapon. To ignite a nuclear explosion, the HEU projectile travels down the barrel to another piece of HEU at the other end of the tube. Most nuclear scientists believe that construction of a gun-type device would pose few technological barriers to technically competent terrorists. [22] The implosion-type weapon "involves the compression of a sub-critical sphere of fissile material- plutonium and/or HEU-achieving super-critically through the increasing the density of the material". [23] Implosion-type device requires more technical sophistication and expertise. Friedrich Steinhausler identified the technical requirements needed in building an implosion-type device. These include:
basic knowledge in physical and chemical properties of fissile materials; radiation and physics; and physical properties of explosive devices, particularly about shaped charges; and electronics;
access to workshop with advanced equipment, such as precision laser-interferometer, airbearing lathe, and artificial room ventilation with built-in air cleaner;
acquired a sufficient amount of nuclear weapons-grade material needed for building a crude nuclear device (about 25 kg of HEU, respectively, 8 kg of Pu), at least 50 kg of high explosives, and a supply of Krypton switches;
machining capabilities for the production of complex shapes (tolerance: about 10-10 m); and
ceramic (cerium sulfide) crucidles, electric furnace, argon-filled enclosure, Freon gas and vacuum pumps. [24]
There are some examples in the literature of attempts made by amateurs to design nuclear weapons without prior specialized knowledge on the field. The "Nth Country Experiment", a government sponsored experiment conducted in 1960s, revealed that ordinary PhD Physicists at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory are able to design a workable implosive-type weapon in less than three years. In 1977, an undergraduate at Princeton University, John Aristotle Phillips, was able to design an implosive-type bomb for a term paper using unclassified sources. According to Graham Allison (2004), Phillips based his work on publications such as Robert Serber's The Los Alamos Primer: The First Lectures on How to Build an Atomic Bomb. Phillips was allegedly able to design a "perfect terrorist weapon: a bomb the size of a beach ball, with a 10 kiloton yield and a price tag of US$ 2,000". [25] The US government later marked the term paper classified.
Former Manhattan Project [26] Scientist, Dr. J. Carson Mark points out that while schematic drawings for nuclear weapons are widely available, the "detailed design drawings that are essential before it is possible to plan the fabrication of actual parts are not available". He supports the notion that terrorists can build nuclear bombs, given "enough money, time and expertise, and some very specialized equipment, not to mention sufficient quantities of fissile materials". [27]
Assumption 3: Rogue states may transfer nuclear technology to terrorist organizations.
Rouge state is controversial term used to refer to states which threaten international security. Rouge states are usually authoritarian regimes that severely restrict human rights, sponsor terrorism and proliferate weapons of mass destruction. [28] Scholars of international relations points to the possibility of state-sponsored nuclear terrorism. They have identified the rogue states as maybe either directly aiding would-be nuclear terrorist or willfully neglecting its responsibilities to secure the nuclear weapons or weapons-usable nuclear material within its borders. The countries of concern are North Korea and Pakistan. North Korea is believed to possess some half-dozen nuclear explosive devices. Its provocative stance- first its purported threat in 2005 to transfer nuclear weapons, and its testing of long-range missile delivery systems in 2006- have lead many scholars to infer the need to deter possible nuclear transfers. The United States for example, implicitly threatened Pyongyang leaders with retaliation should terrorists use its stockpiles to organize an attack. [29] Levi (2008) made assertions that North Korea has been willing to sell a variety of sensitive technologies to other states, given the right price. However, there have been no documented ties between North Korea and terrorists groups. Evidence has yet to emerge that North Korea has used nuclear trading network to sell nuclear materials intentionally or inadvertently to terrorist organizations.
Question remains whether the government of Pakistan was complicit in Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan's transfers of nuclear technology to the weapons program of North Korea, Iran and Libya. Despite Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf's support on the U.S. led war on terror, including the ouster of Taliban's regime in Afghanistan, it seems like some of the elements of the Pakistani bureaucracy were opposed to this. [30] President Musharraf has been the target of two assassination plots last December 2003.
Assumption 4: Smaller quantities of fissile materials may be used in the creation of dirty bombs or radiation dispersal devices.
Terrorists seeking to tap the public's nuclear fear can exploit radioactive materials to make "dirty bombs". Dirty bomb or radiological weapon or radiological dispersal device (RDD), is a conventional explosive device that disperse radioactive materials. [31] A dirty bomb may cause serious body injuries or death depending on the amount of explosives and the nature and quantity of radioactive material used. No greater level of sophistication is needed to design, build and deliver dirty bombs. Radioactive materials are also widely available and can be found in the form of: unsealed radiopharmaceutical material; and sealed sources used in many medical, agricultural, industrial and research applications. According to the Argonne National Laboratory of the University of Chicago, there are seven to nine radioisotopes considered to be potentially useful in the creating a RDD. These include: (1) americium -241; californium-252; cesium-137; cobalt-60; iridium-192; plutonium-238; polonium-210; radium-226 and; strontium-90. One of the most significant documented cases involving the use of radioactive material by a terrorist group was on 1995 when Chechen separatists placed an RDD containing celsium-137 in a Moscow park. Fortunately, the bomb was never detonated.
Nonetheless, Frost (2005) argues that the economic, social and psychological effects of the dirty bombs are more serious than its physical or radiological effects. Furthermore, terrorists may find dirty bombs difficult to transport and deploy because they need to avoid radiological detection. The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism has already made substantial efforts to improve global radiological and nuclear device architecture, including installation of radiation detection equipments in major international ports and airports across the globe.
COUNTER NUCLEAR TERRORISM INITIATIVES
There has been numerous security measures established in response to the threat on nuclear terrorism. Most of them are in the form of United Nation resolutions, treaties, arrangements and other initiatives to effectively counter nuclear terrorism. These include Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and its Amendments (CPPNM); United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1373, 1540 and 1887; International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism; Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (CTR); Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism; Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI); and the Nuclear Security Summit.
The first three measures are legally binding international documents adopted under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.
The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and its Amendments (CPPNM). The CPPNM is the most legally binding international document on the physical protection of nuclear materials. It requires state to implement measures to the prevention, detection and punishment for offenses relating to nuclear materials. It also criminalized theft, misuse, or threat of misuse of nuclear materials and designate a point of contact for information should materials be stolen. The CPPNM was signed at Vienna and at New York on 1980. It came into force on 1987, and further amended in July 2005. The 2005 Amendment extends the scope to protection of domestic nuclear facilities and material in use, storage and during transport. The 2005 Amendment has not taken into effect because only 41 of the 142 state parties have ratified it. [32] Evans and Kawaguchi note that the major limitation of the amended CPPNM is its "lack of any peer review mechanisms". [33]
United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR): 1373, 1540 and 1887
Following the September 11 terrorist attacks, the United Nation Security Council passed Resolution 1373 (2001), a "wide-ranging, comprehensive resolution with steps and strategies to combat international terrorism". UNSCR 1373 focuses on "the threat posed by the possession of weapons and mass destruction by terrorist groups" including "illegal movement of nuclear, chemical, biological and other deadly materials". [34] UNSCR 1373 established the Security Council's Counter Terrorism Committee to monitor state compliance with the provisions of the resolution.
UNSCR 1540 (2004) is aimed at preventing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) terrorism by nonstate actors [35] . It bounds all UN member states to take and enforce measures against WMD proliferation, including effective laws which prohibit any nonstate actor to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transfer or use WMD; strict national and trans-shipment exports control; and strict reporting requirements. UNSCR 1540 requires state to criminalize various forms of non-state actor involvement in weapons of mass destruction and its related activities.
UNSCR 1887 (2009) reaffirms the threat of nuclear proliferation to global security and the need for more multilateral initiatives. UNSCR 1887 focuses on the need to improve the security of nuclear material to prevent nuclear terrorism and secure all vulnerable nuclear materials around the world within four years. [36]
The International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (Nuclear Terrorism Convention) was adopted by the UN General Assembly in April 2005. Nuclear Terrorism Convention is an international criminal law instrument that defines certain acts as criminal offenses. It also obliges states to criminalize the illicit possession or use of nuclear materials or devices by nonstate actors. Under the Nuclear Terrorism Convention, each state must enact laws to investigate possible offenses and to arrest, prosecute or extradite offenders. The Nuclear Terrorism Convention is signed by 115 states and ratified by 60. [37]
Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs (CTR) or Nunn-Lugar Programs refers to the series of programs initiated by the US Congress to help states of the former Soviet Union destroy their nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, for the express purpose of reducing the chance of nuclear materials falling into the hands of terrorist groups. CTR provides support financial assistance and expertise to decommission nuclear weapons stockpiles. [38]
Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) is a non-binding forum established by United States and Russia in October 2008. GICNT aims to "strengthen global capacity to prevent, detect, and respond to nuclear terrorism by conduction multilateral activities to strengthen the plans, policies, procedures and interoperability of partner nations". [39] As of 2010, the GICNT comprises of 82 member states and four official observers: IAEA, the European Union, INTERPOL and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is a US-led multinational initiative launched on May 2003 to increase international cooperation in interdicting shipments of weapons of mass destruction, delivery systems and related materials. As of January 2011, there are 97 countries participating countries. These participating nations endorse the PSI Statement of Interdiction principles, attend meetings and workshops with other states to improve their capacity to detect, intercept and break down terrorist activities. [40]
Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) is the largest summit focused on how to better safeguard fissile materials to prevent nuclear terrorism. The Summit is the largest gathering of the heads of state since the 1945 United Nations Conference on International Organization. NSS aims to solidify the foundation of the current nuclear security regime and a starting point for stronger nuclear security architecture. The achievements of the First NSS include: a communiqué highlighting the global importance of preventing nuclear terrorism; and a work plan focused on improving the various nuclear security measures. [41]
The following measures discussed were based in the principle of layered defence-in-depth, which initially focused on the protection of nuclear materials, later broadened to the detection of nuclear materials crossing national boundaries, recovery of smuggled items, and protection of nuclear facilities. [42]
IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
Analysts have long argued that the central pillar of Cold War deterrence strategy is largely irrelevant in addressing the risks of nuclear terrorism. The logic for Cold War deterrence elucidates that the possession of nuclear weapons can deter the prospect of confrontations in fear of immense retaliation. Terrorist organizations cannot be directly deterred because they do not have any good that can be held in threat of retaliation. Admiral Richard Mies, former commander-in-chief of US Strategic Command, further notes that "strategic deterrence, which worked well in bipolar framework of the Cold War, may not work as well in a multipolar world of unpredictable, asymmetric threats, and in some cases it may fail. How do we deter a threat that has no return address? How do we dissuade a threat that is faceless?" [43]
Given these horrific realities, individual states are encouraged to take further measures to strengthen the security of their nuclear materials and facilities. The threat of nuclear terrorism serves as an impetus to facilitate security cooperation among states both at the regional and global level. It is both a challenge and an opportunity for states to enhance coordination of efforts to effectively address this immediate danger.
Cooperative security may provide the necessary condition to enhance cooperation among actors in the international arena, in response to common evils like nuclear terrorism and climate change. Cooperative security is the "process whereby countries with common interests work jointly through agreed mechanisms to reduce tensions and suspicion, resolve or mitigate disputes, build confidence, enhance economic development prospects and maintain stability in their regions". [44]
CONCLUSION
Given the innumerable variables involved, it is difficult to determine likelihood of terrorist organization acquiring fissile materials, and building nuclear bombs or radiation dispersal devices. There are technological, financial, and strategic factors that should be taken into consideration in determining the possibility of nuclear terrorism. Despite these uncertainties, specific courses of actions are necessary to address even the slightest possibility of nuclear terrorism occurring. Individual states are encouraged to take further measures to strengthen the security of their nuclear materials and facilities. The threat of nuclear terrorism serves as a necessary impetus to facilitate security cooperation among states both at the regional and global level. It also presents as both a challenge and opportunity for states to enhance coordination of efforts to effectively address this immediate danger.
