The post Cold War period is generally characterised as a golden era for humanitarian intervention symbolized by successive operations in Kosovo, East Timor, Rwanda and more recently Darfur and Iraq. However, the nature of armed conflict has changed in the 1990s and has led to an increasing insecurity of humanitarian intervention. In addition, states become more and more reluctant to intervene in conflict zones and when they do, they fail to guarantee effectively the protection of humanitarian organisations such as NGOs or UN aid agencies. Simultaneously, non-state actors acquire prominence regarding the incapacity of states to deal with contemporary challenges. In that way, private military/security companies (PMSCs) proliferate and tend to play an increasing role in humanitarian intervention. According to Carlos Ortiz's definition PMSCs are 'legally established international firms offering services that involve the potential to exercise force in a systematic way and by military or paramilitary means, as well as the enhancement, the transfer, the facilitation, the deterrence, or the defusing of this potential, or the knowledge required to implement it, to clients' [1] . Therefore, the strategic and operational role of PMSCs includes support to agents of intervention at different scales such as intelligence services, trainings, audits, risk analysis, logistics and may also provide additional troops. The increasing use of PMSCs in conflict zones has led to debates about their roles, impact and responsibility in humanitarian intervention. Indeed, their employment raises legitimacy, legal and ethical concerns. Accordingly, in this paper, I will analyse the implications that PMSCs have for humanitarian intervention. First of all, I will establish the advantages providing. Secondly, I will analyse how PMSCs reshape security governance by challenging sovereignty and legitimacy of states. Then, I will demonstrate that the increasing role of PMSCs raises to legal and ethical concerns. In the last section, I will explore briefly the solutions proposed to regulate them. This paper concludes that despites the advantages providing by the privatisation of security, PMSCs constitute an additional means for humanitarian intervention that have to be regulated with compliance with the international humanitarian law.
WHY HIRING PMSCs?
First of all, it is important to contextualise the environment in which PMSCs proliferate and which indispensable advantages they provide for humanitarian intervention. The environment for aid agencies has become unstable and unsecure. This can be explained partly by the changing nature of armed conflicts. In fact, armed conflicts become more and more violent and humanitarian organisations are very vulnerable to this violence. Another explanation is that the boundary between military action and humanitarian assistance is sometimes vague and blurred. The presence of foreigners in conflict zones is usually perceived in a very negative way. According to No Relief Study, NGOs tend to leave conflict zones because there is no enough security guarantees [2] . Moreover, the context of the War on Terrorism altered the perception of humanitarian assistance and according to the terrorist organisation Al Qaeda aid agencies are considered as enemies. Indeed, in October 2003 Mullah Omar claimed that 'Western humanitarian organisations were the worst enemies of Islam' [3] . We can assume that the changing nature of conflict and the perception of humanitarian organisations lead to a need to guarantee effectively the security of agents of intervention. Therefore, the expertise of PMSCs in providing security has become increasingly prevalent for aid agencies.
Another factor that highly contributed of the development and multiplication of PMSCs is the dominance of Neo-Liberalism in the international political and economic systems in the post Cold War period. It implied privatization, free and opened markets, and therefore sought to improve the function of the commercial sector in influencing the political and economic priorities and duties of sovereign states. Consequently, states were deeply focused on their economic policies, opening themselves to worldwide trades and became more and more weak. As private business companies rose, PMSCs proliferated as well and sought to fulfil some missions that states are reluctant to undertake. In addition, states have to step aside and let alternative authorities influence politics (UN, NATO, EU), economy (regional economical organisations), and citizens' individual self-determination (emergence of citizen's communities). Let alone the new role and the type of soldier which has emerged with the transformation of the state. The soldier can now be a citizen soldier, a professional one or a private military contractor. According to Singer 'over 60 firms employ more than 20 000 private personnel carrying out military functions in Iraq' and 'such numbers mean that the private military industry has contributed more forces to Iraq than any other member of the U.S.-led coalition, being nearly equal to all the states excluding the U.S. combined' [4] . Therefore, Neo-Liberalism leads to the development of the private security sector and proliferation of PMSCs.
Moreover, economical and strategic factors both played a role in the increasing use of PMSCs. Outsourcing PMSCs is cheaper and may boost intervention capabilities. In that sense, Brooks and Chorev argue that employing PMSCs for humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping would be 'faster, cheaper and better' [5] . For instance, during the conflict in Sierra Leone, the majority of the personnel employing by PMSCs were national citizens who were paid according the average wage of the country. In addition, PMSCs are also cheaper because they realise economies of scale and use the experience of former soldiers. For example, in Iraq, the US employ private military contractors instead of hiring more citizen soldiers. Thus, according to Gaston PMSCs are used by powerful states as well as by weak states. For instance, in 1992, the government of Sierra Leone did not have to capabilities to fight the advancing of the rebels (the Revolutionary Unit Front), that is the reason why they contracted a PMSC as an additional means [6] . On the other hand, powerful states may hire PMSC as 'as force multipliers that allows states to purchase additional manpower and capabilities without incurring political costs or having to raise support for citizen participation' [7] as it is the case for the US in Iraq. Therefore it is strategic because it allows the state to undertake operations that the public will probably not tolerate or approve.
It is obvious that outsourcing PMSCs constitute an additional means for humanitarian intervention. Furthermore, hiring PMSC can be an advantage in the sense of it minimizes the cost of the intervention both in economical and human terms. However, the further section will demonstrate that behind these relative advantages, the increasing number of PMSCs in conflict zones raises to legitimate, legal and ethical concerns.
LEGITIMATE, LEGAL AND ETHICAL CONCERNS
The privatization of security and the globalization of private security are surely impacting global politics by shaping a new concept of state. PMSCs modify the practice of sovereignty, affecting states, the markets and societies because they are built and acting around the state system. The next section will demonstrate that PMSCs undermines democratic control and challenges the sovereignty of states, especially regarding the responsibility to protect and its accountability. Firstly, the use of PMSCs leads to legitimate concerns in the sense of it undermines democratic control. In fact, hiring PMSCs creates a gap between the public and the foreign policy. In Iraq, for instance, the US government outsourced private contractors instead of sending more troops. We saw previously that it allows the government to undertake action that may be severely criticized by the population. This leads to a problem of transparency. Indeed, private companies do not have the obligation to reveal all the information. In that sense, humanitarian operation abroad are not under the control of the state and the lack of transparency misinformed the public.
Furthermore, as a crucial and sensitive area of concern, security matters have always been under the exclusive patronage of the state and Weber defined the modern state by the possession of the 'monopoly of legitimate physical violence within a certain territory' [8] . However, privatization of security challenges the sovereignty of state and questions its traditional centrality. Leander and Van Munster [9] argue that the use of PMSCs reinforces neo-liberal governmentality [10] in contemporary security governance. The concept of governmentality introduced by Foucault means that the state progressively decentralizes its practices and activities. Therefore, the state gradually loose control and authority of the security field in the profit of private organisations. Leander and Van Munster contextualize this notion in Darfur and demonstrate that the development of private security in this conflict reshapes the role of state through its responsibilization which is considered as a key notion of governementality. In other words, it means that the responsibility of state is progressively placed at different entities such as PMSCs. In that way, it is interesting to analyze how the increasing role of PMSCs reshapes the principle of the responsibility to protect. This notion is defined by the Chapter VII of the UN Charter. It has for objective to prevent future situations like Rwanda or Kosovo and to make easier a consensus between sovereign states in order to respond quickly to humanitarian emergencies. The responsibility to protect is a moral principle that argues that 'each individual state has the responsibility to protect its population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity' [11] . In addition, the international community, and the UN in particular, have the responsibility to help preventing such violence and protecting the population. Thus, we can ask ourselves if the use of PMSCs may be considered as an additional means in the responsibility to protect?
Pattison rejects the use of PMSC in the responsibility to protect. His objection is deontological in the sense that he claims that financial gain represents an inappropriate incentive to intervene in humanitarian emergencies. The author points out ethical and morality concerns about the employment of PMSCs. Kantian thought focuses on the nature of the motivation and human should be treated as an end in themselves. In that sense, self-enrichment can be seen as a wrong and immoral motivation to undertake humanitarian intervention. Moreover, Baker and Pattinson claim that for intervening in humanitarian, it is necessary to have humanitarian intention. They both they reject the idea that 'the state is paying someone it is do what it is morally required to do itself' [12] . However, according to Realism, it has been argued that states intervene abroad only to pursue their own interests. For instance, in 1993, when France intervened in Rwanda we can assume that the French intervention was pursued in the French national interest. Indeed, the former President François Mitterrand wanted to 'restore the French influence in Rwanda' [13] and the civil war was seen as a good opportunity to do it. There was probably a humanitarian feeling as well, however the primary purpose was to protect French interests and maintain French influence in the area. Moreover, we can add that humanitarian is not a primary reason in the decision of intervention and according to the Realist approach, 'humanitarian intervention is imprudent because it does not serve the national interest' [14] . Thus, states are selective in where they intervene and when they do they are highly motivated by their own interests.
In that way, we can ask ourselves if the search of financial gains is less morally valuable than self-interests of states? The profit motivation can be problematic in the sense that if the risks are too high regarding the profit, PMSCs can be reluctant to intervene and can abandon their position when the situation become too critical for them Moreover, the private security sector is subject to the free market mechanisms, it means that contractors may leave if they receive an higher and better offer from a competing employers. Nevertheless, Pattison argues that 'the moral justifiability of an agent's intervention is its effectiveness'. It means that if the use of PMSCs is essential in terms of promoting stabilization and security and that their actions are effective, their employment is justifiable. Therefore, the intention of PMSCs for intervening in humanitarian may be wrong and leads to ethical and morality questions. However, their effectiveness still represent a fundamental advantage and it will be morally problematic to refuse or prohibit the additional values and efficiency that they provide for humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping.
Another fundamental critic that can be made about outsourcing PMSCs for humanitarian intervention is the question of accountability. PMSCs have been accused to violate the principle of jus in bello and to be outlaw. For instance, in 2007, Blackwater employees were accused of killing fourteen civilians in Baghdad in September 2007 while the company was guarding a U.S. embassy convoy in Baghdad's Nisoor Square. There were three different investigations on this failure and they all reached the same conclusion; the civilian deaths were unnecessary and unjustified. Thus, Betts reports that 'When an Iraqi is found to have committed murder, he is hung. When a U.S. soldier is found to have committed murder, he is charged and tried. When a private security contractor is found to have committed murder, nothing happens' [15] . Until nowadays, no Blackwater employees have been charged for this failure. It seems that there is a fundamental problem of accountability in the employment of private security contractors. In fact, PMSCs do not fit in the definition of mercenaries by the international law [16] . Furthermore, PMSCs generally operate in failed states, where there is no supreme authority to guarantee the effectiveness of law. The questions raised are the following: Should we apply the local law or the law of the states that contract PMSCs? Which entities may investigate, prosecute and potentially punish failures and crimes? There is obviously a loophole which has to be filled in order to avoid impunity. In that sense, Singer claims that 'for most of the world's governments, though, there are simply no applicable laws that regulate and define the jurisdictions under which PMSC operate. As one military lawyer succinctly puts it: "There is a dearth of doctrine, procedure, and policy' [17] .
SOLUTIONS OF REGULATION
The last section focuses on the regulation of PMSCs regarding international humanitarian law. As we said previously, PMSCs proliferated since 1990s, however it seems that international humanitarian law do not take enough seriously their roles and implications. Gaston argues that hiring PMSC may weaken international humanitarian law compliance [18] . Indeed, he claims that their independence from the states (because they are not an integrated part of armed forces) put them beyond the humanitarian law regulations. This lack of control may be seen as an advantage for states that employ them. In fact, in case of failure they are less likely to be responsible. In that sense, states are less likely to establish the same rigorous accountability that they use for their own armed forces. Consequently, it seems that states are not willing to prevent and control the use of PMSC.
However, the increasing importance of PMSCs in humanitarian intervention and the recent failure such as in Iraq reignited discussions about their control. It is fundamental that regulation should be enacted under international humanitarian law and that will help to prevent war crimes and help to prosecute effectively individuals who commit failures. Thus, we can summarize the potential solutions of regulation as following. Firstly, the ban of mercenaries may be extending to PMSCs because 'PMSCs are no more than modern mercenaries' [19] . This solution does not sound very plausible regarding the advantages that they provide. In addition, PMSCs should act in accordance to international law, and domestic law where they operate or/and the domestic law of the entities that employ them. This last solution implies that the contractor should be a credible actor who cares about his image and reputation and who obviously cares about international law and principles. Consequently, controlling the activities of PMSCs requires that the international community define their role conforming international humanitarian law. Among all the resolutions taken by the UN General Assembly during the past two decades regarding the ban of mercenaries that exclude PMSCs, a major step has been taken the 23rd November 2010 by the Third Committee with approving a draft on regulating private security companies (GA/SHC/4001) [20] . This draft [21] reaffirms that the employment of mercenaries, their financing and training have negative implications for all states and goes against the purposes and principles in the UN Charter. It urges the states to take legal measures to prevent and sanction the violation of human rights. However, we can denounce the dual approach taken by the UN. Indeed, States and the UN are hiring PMSCs more and more often to protect their borders, to strengthen UN Peacekeeping missions, or to assist in 'conflict-affected areas' [22] . According to Cockayne [23] , the UN must be aware of the risk of 'strategic incoherence' and make sure its policy will not be seen negatively. Therefore, a lack of regulation or a wrong control of the use of PMSCs may jeopardize the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention itself.
CONCLUSION
To conclude, states are more and more reluctant to get involved in humanitarian intervention and the UN missions lacks of effective troops to guarantee the security and protection of humanitarian agencies. In addition, NGOs do not have the expertise or mandate to be effective in humanitarian crisis. Consequently, there is a lack of willingness but also a lack of duty in humanitarian intervention that the private security sector seeks to fulfill. In that way, we can affirm that PMSCs perform where states fail. They provide the infrastructure, the logistic and security support that the UN and states fail to guarantee. Their further advantages are they are low cost and high profit. However, privatization of security epitomizes the erosion of sovereignty and state power. The progressive lose of control in the profit of PMSCs raises legitimate, legal and ethical concerns such as the lack of regulation in international humanitarian law and their incentives to intervene in conflict zones. It seems that PMSCs has become an indispensable part of humanitarian interventions, despite the controversy that they surrounded. Finally, we can say that PMSCs may supplement agents of intervention because they can be considered as an additional means to provide humanitarian assistance. Nevertheless, they cannot replace them because their role is sometimes blurred and their use should be regulate and comply with international humanitarian law.
