INTRODUCTION
1. Indonesia was yet another country affected by the insurgency during the last few decades. The insurgency in Indonesia was predominantly an ethnic based movement led by Aceh guerrilla had been their struggle from 1976 to 2005. Aceh is thought to be the place where Islam was first established in Southeast Asia and that has the highest number of Muslims comparing to the other parts of Indonesia.
2. Indonesia is geographically located in and Southeast Asia. It lies between latitudes 11°S and 6°N, and longitudes 95°E and 141°E. It is an archipelago, consists with 17,508 islands and among them about 6,000 is inhabited. Total land area of Indonesia is about 1,904,569 km2 and consist of 33 provinces with population over 238 million. Indonesia is the world's fourth populated country and it is a republic, with an elected legislature and president. The Capital city is Jakarta and the country shares its boundaries with Papua New Guinea, East Timor, and Malaysia.
3. It was under the Dutch rule for almost three and half centuries. Indonesia got its independence in 17 August 1945 and. Indonesia consists of hundreds of distinct native ethnic and linguistic groups. Javanese are the largest and politically dominant ethnic group. Religious freedom is recognized in the Indonesian constitution and Islam, Protestantism, Roman Catholicism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Confucianism are officially recognized by the government. The official national language of the country is Indonesian.
4. Aceh is a special region of Indonesia, located at the northern end of Sumatra. It is close to the Andaman and Nicobar Islands of India. Aceh was first known as Aceh Darussalam (1511-1959), Daerah Istimewa Aceh (1959-2001), Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam (2001-2009) and Aceh (2009-present) in different time periods in the history. Province covers a land area around 57,956 km and consists of four cities and nineteen administrative areas. Its capital is Banda Aceh. Relative to most parts of Indonesia, it is a religiously conservative area with Islam being the predominant with 97
per cent. Aceh has a history of political independence and fierce resistance to control by outsiders, including the Dutch colonists and the Indonesian government. This province has substantial natural resources, including oil and world largest natural gas reserves.
5. After the transfer of authority from Dutch Government to the Indonesian State in 1949, Aceh was amalgamated with the nearby province of North Sumatra, leading to resentment from many Acehnese due to ethnic differences between themselves and the Christian Batak people who dominate North Sumatra. This resentment resulted in a rebellion that led to yet another insurgency in post-colonial country in East Asia.
AIM
6. To analyze the lessons learnt in Aceh insurgency and make recommendation for future application in Counter Insurgency Operations.
BACK GROUND AND COMMENCEMENT OF THE CAMPAIGN
7. Aceh was one of the centers of a powerful trading empire during the 16 and 17 centuries and one of the earliest Islamic sultanates in Southeast Asia. People of Aceh have a long history of rebellion and resistance for external occupation. For 300 years, they thwarted the Dutch military efforts to "pacify" the region and incorporate Aceh into colonial empire. During the Indonesian war for independence with the Dutch in the late 1940s, Acehnese forces played a key military role. However, many Acehnese had a different and conservative Islamic inspired vision of a post-independence Indonesia than the mainly secularist leaders based in Java. Despite discontent about both the lack of autonomy for Aceh and about the non-Islamic character of Indonesia as a whole, the region became part of the unitary Republic of Indonesia in 1950.
8. A few years after independence, opposition to the constitutional and political character of the Indonesia, started to emerge in Aceh, reaching a peak when President Sukarno began to rally himself with the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) in the late 1950s. In 1953, a movement to overthrow the central government developed in Aceh, linking up with the so-called Dar'ul Islam rebellion, a diverse collection of insurrectionist
Islamic groups throughout parts of Sumatra, Sulawesi, and Java. The leaders of this rebellion groups had no intention of separating the region from Indonesia but envisaged it as an autonomous province. Differences and disputes with the central government that eventually made the central government to grant the Aceh province a Special Region status and giving control over education, religion and adat (customary) law.
9. However, benefits and powers of special region status were not fully implemented. Subsequent discovery of huge natural gas reserves in 1970s in the area and blatantly unequal distribution of revenues, which favors of the national government in Jakarta, contributed to the formation of GAM in 1976 and open resistance to the central government. Aceh's unique sense of identity, based on cultural, ethnic, economic lines, has reinforced a tradition of "separateness."
10. Aceh was relatively free of conflict for many years, but problems started again when President Suharto's new Order regime began to intensify centralized rule from Jakarta. Islamic organizations across Indonesia were subject to suspicion or outright repression and there was little room for local political action. Matters worsened when the discovery of large petroleum resources in northern Aceh brought an even tighter grip over the local economy and politics by outside elements.
11. Although the province experienced rapid economic growth from petroleum production, many Acehnese felt they received little benefit or were even worse off when they lost land and forest resources to make way for industrial, plantation, and forestry developments. Internal migration from other regions of the country were seen as taking most of the new jobs, while generals, politicians, and well-connected business people from Java was said to be skimmed off all the profits.
ACEH INSURGENCY
12. Free Aceh Movement or, Gerakin Aceh Merdeka (GAM) had been fighting for independence and Islamic state in Aceh from 1976 to 2005. The destruction caused by armed conflict and 2004 Tsunami brought both parties to a peace negotiation that paved the way to end the insurgency. The insurgency was led by Hasan di Tiro with the
strength of 90,000 militia and guerrilla fighters in the area. In this study, it was identified that number of causes from which GAM was based on gaining the popular support in the province. Following are the main causes of the insurgency:
a. Cultural differences.
b. Religious differences.
c. Unfulfilled expectations.
13. During the period, a more conservative form of Islam than that of the mainstream practice in most of Indonesia was widely practiced in Aceh. Also, President Suharto's government policy of promoting a unified Indonesian culture was unpopular among most of the Aceh people that made difference more widened with central. Further the geographical location of the province at the Western end of Indonesia made a widespread feeling in the province that leaders in distant Jakarta do not understand Aceh's problems and have little sympathy for the local needs and customs. On the other hand rising number of Javanese migrants to Aceh and perceived unfair distribution of income from Aceh's substantial natural resources caused the insurgents to gain more popularity in the province. Based on popular support for other perceived and eminent discriminative factors, the Free Aceh Movement could be identified in three phases.
PHASES OF THE CONFLICT
14. The Free Aceh Movement has gone through three stages as summarized below:
a. The first was at its birth in 1976 to the year 1979 which it was totally defeated by the government forces.
b. The second phase from 1989 to the early 90s when it received funding and training from foreign countries.
c. The third rise was a result of finally gaining widespread support throughout Aceh as a result of donations and extortion and a large group of potential soldiers who had lost relatives in the previous uprising.
THE FIRST PHASE
15. During the first phase, from 1976 to 1979, GAM was a small, tightly knit, ideologically driven organization of 70 men led by a well-educated elite comprising doctors, engineers, academics, and businessmen. By the end of 1979, Indonesian counter insurgency operations had all but crushed GAM. Its leaders were either in exile, imprisoned, or dead; its followers were dispersed and pushed underground.
16. Due to the then President Suharto's unpopular policies and unequal social and economic treatments, Hasan di Tiro formed the Free Aceh Movement on 4 th December 1976 and declared the Acehnese independence and identified him as the leader of the movement. The first phase of the movement was almost entirely unsuccessful as the government entirely neutralized the same by 1977.
17. The early GAM efforts were mainly directed at gain control over petroleum production and distribution which was the main industry in the province. GAM initially focused on local Exxon Mobil gas plant which belonged to American multinational oil and Gas Corporation. Same time GAM Commander Hasan Di Tiro had connections with the petroleum industry and he bid, via a tender process, to get a contract to build a gas pipeline which was beaten by the gas giant Bechtel. The Bechtel Corporation (Bechtel Group) is the largest construction and engineering company in the United States. The reason for this failure was a lack of popular support from both within Ache and from international sources. President Suharto was favored by countries such as America due to his anti communist policies during the Cold War period.
THE SECOND PHASE
18. The group renewed its activities in the 1989, apparently with financial support from Libya and Iran, with training for around 1,000 soldiers. This training from overseas meant that GAM soldiers were much more organized and better trained that of the previous insurgency. Government identifying the new threat, Aceh was declared as an "area of special military operations" (Daerah Operasi Militer) or DOM in 1989. Special counter insurgency troops were sent in and second phase of counter insurgency began. Villages that were suspected of harboring GAM operatives were reported to be burnt down and family members of suspected militants were kidnapped and tortured. Amnesty International called the military response "shock therapy" and it was believed that 7000 human rights abuse incidents were reported during DOM. GAM forces have also been accused of Human Rights abuses. Extra judicial executions of suspected military informants and targeting of civilian infrastructure such as schools have both been attributed to GAM operations.
19. In 1996 the Indonesian government announced the end of GAM as the counter-insurgency operations had effectively destroyed GAM as a guerilla force. At the end of the insurgency, surviving GAM members were forced to hide in Malaysia.
THE THIRD PHASE
20. After the fall of President Suharto's administration in 1998 and the decision of his successor President Jusuf Habibie to withdraw troops from Aceh as part of democratic reform gave space for GAM to re-establish itself again in the Aceh. GAM started to recruiting youths by exploiting discrimination of Acehnese by Indonesian military. Increasing violence begun by GAM rebels against government officials and Japanese residents in 1999. They obtained weapons by smuggling from Thailand. This uprising led to an increase in military presence. Troop numbers are believed to have risen during the rule of Megawati Sukarnoputri. In 2001-02 the combination of military and police forces in Aceh had grown to about 30,000. During one year time this number jumped to 50,000 operating in what the International Crisis group called, "a virtual legal vacuum". The security crackdowns during this time resulted in several thousand civilian deaths estimated to be around 15000.
21. The Indonesian government launched a large offensive in Aceh against the GAM in 2003-2004 and observed some success. The 2003-2004 Indonesian offensive in Aceh against the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) separatists was launched on 19th May 2003 and lasted nearly one year. It followed a two-week ultimatum to GAM to accept special autonomy under Indonesian rule. It was one of the Indonesian military's largest campaigns since, 1975 invasion of East Timor. It severely disabled the rebel movement, and along with the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake with tsunami brought the 30 year conflict in Aceh to an end forcing both parties to negotiate on mutual understanding and nation rebuilding.
ORGANISATION
22. Organizational Structure of the GAM can be stated as follows:
a. Top leadership.
b. Midlevel leadership.
c. Troops.
d. Members.
e. Support base in Aceh.
23. As GAM sees itself as the sole legitimate representative of the Acehnese people it has sought to establish governmental institutions. The first cabinet, set up by Hasan di Tiro during his time in Aceh from 1976 to 1979, was composed as follows:
a. Teungku Hasan di Tiro: wali negara, defense minister, and supreme
Commander.
b. Dr. Muchtar Hasbi: vice-president; minister of internal affairs.
c. Tengku Muhamad Usman Lampoih Awe: minister of finance.
d. Tengku Haji Iljas Leube: minister of justice.
e. Dr. Husaini M. Hasan: minister of education and information.
f. Dr. Zaini Abdullah: minister of health.
g. Dr. Zubir Mahmud: minister of social affairs.
h. Dr. Asnawi Ali: minister of public works and industry.
i. Amir Ishak: minister of communications.
j. Amir Rashid Mahmud: minister of trade.
k. Malik Mahmud: minister of state.
FUND RAISING
23. This movement had three main sources of collecting funds. They are as follows:
a. kidnapping, Crime and drugs. Young women dating with Indonesian soldiers students believed to be TNI informers, 49 journalists accused of biased reporting, and village heads in need of being either local legislators, businessmen, oil workers.
b. Foreign donations. From countries like Libya, Iran, and some of EU countries.
c. Taxation. From all element of socity, merchants, contractors, Scholl teachers.
GROWTH OF MILITARY FORCE
24. The GAM growth to a large insurgent organization. In 1976 when GAM was established it comprised only 70 guerrilla fighters. In 2003 it had guerrilla army of 30,000 and a reserve of almost the whole population of Aceh. In addition they had locally trained about 30,000 carders including a few hundred women. According to di Tiro among these 30,000, an estimated 5,000 GAM guerrilla were trained in Libya between 1986 and 1989. In Libya at the end of each course there was a graduation ceremony in Tripoli at which Libyan officials like President Muammar Gadhafi were present.
ARMS USED
25. There weapons were a mixture of rakitan (home made) and standard firearms. Domestically, arms were captured, stolen, or purchased from the TNI and the police. In 2001 they had following weapons:
a. 1,000 to 1,500 modern firearms, according to the observers.
b. Few grenade launchers.
c. Fewer rocket-propelled grenade launchers.
d. One or two 60 mm mortars.
26. These weapons were spread unevenly over GAM s territory. Most of these arms concentrated in the traditional GAM areas of, North Aceh, East Aceh Pidie. Following are the indication of link to the International arms smuggling by GAM:
a. In May 2001, Thai police intercepted an arms shipment intended for Aceh consisting of 15,500 bullets, 16 kilo-grams of TNT explosive, 60 grenades, and 48 landmines packed in wooden boxes.
b. In July 2002 Thai police seized a boat carrying arms on its way to Aceh. The weapons consisted of 68 AK-47s, 5 RPD machine guns, 221chains of AK-47 bullets, and 67 boxes of AK-47 bullets.69 Moreover, this was the second weapons seizure within a month. In the first one Thai police found 6 rocket-propelled grenades, 2 M-67 grenades, and about600 AK-47 bullets. While accurate numbers are difficult to obtain these seizures as well as weapons captured provide a glimpse into GAMs arsenal.
STRATEGY, TACTICS AND TARGETS
27. GAM's strategy is one of guerrilla warfare, making use of its superior knowledge of the terrain and the population to counterbalance its lack of real military capacity. In many ways AGAM/TNA has had the operational advantage of being able to fight elusively and choosing the place and time of engagement.
28. The aim of GAM's strategy is to make Aceh ungovernable in order to make Indonesia pay the highest price possible for retention of this territory.
29 GAM's operations have focused on five distinct targets in Aceh as follows:
a. Indonesian political structures.
b. The state education system.
c. The economy.
d. The Javanese.
e. The Indonesian security forces.
ATTACKS AGAINST SECURITY FORCES
30. According to police figures, 53 policemen were killed from July to December 1999 and many more were injured. The police spokesman, Inspector-General Didi Widayadi, stated that the casualties between March 12 and April 12, 2001, included 33 military personnel and 36 police killed as well as 128military personnel and 132 police injured.98 According to the TNI, between June 2000 and April 2001 some 50 soldiers were killed while 206 were injured and 8 were listed as missing. In fact, despite its own losses, GAM continued to inflict significant loss on the security apparatus soldiers were killed and another 136 wounded between May 2001 and April 2002.
TACTICS USED BY ACEH INSURGENTS
31. Hasan di Tiro described a range of GAM tactics in the late 1970s "attacking the enemy posts that are obnoxious to us", ambushing troops, planting bombs and launching grenades near military installations, executing off-duty security personnel, disrupting "enemy communication lines," and intercepting and destroying Indonesian military vehicles.
32. They over come their lack of firepower and training somewhat through its extensive net work of informers with good communications able to provide intelligence and early warning of the movements of the police and TNI . They employed squad and platoon-sized groups (10-30 people). As one GAM operational commander explained: "When they advance, were treating; when they leave, we return. When they grow tired or weak or careless, we attack". Another guerrilla fighter has told that "We don't have to win the war, we only have to stop them from winning".
33 As one of the leader Amni bin Marzuki and Kamaruzzaman explained in December 2001:Our operations are defensive, but this includes preemptive attack. If we have information that a post is going to be attacked, we attack first. We mainly resort to ambush and hit-and-run. We can't fight a frontal war. They have better equipment and more ammunition. We only have some Kalashnikovs and M-16s but we have to use ammunition from Pindad. It has also relied on regular ambushes of convoys, raids on military posts and complexes, and attacks on individual police and soldiers.
34. From a military perspective there is no way for us to defeat them or for them to defeat us. We want to tie down as many of their troops as possible in Aceh. We want them to spend more money on this operation. We want to exhaust them financially. This is the idea of GAM high rank members.
35. In 1986 Libya agreed to give paramilitary training to the movement. During 2003 membership increased and expanded the control 70 to 80 percent of province including local government through their shadow civil structure.
MAJOR MILITARY OPERATIONS CONDUCTED BY GOVERNMENT FORCES
36. In 1990 Indonesia launched its Jaring Merah (Red Net) counterinsurgency operations to deal with the renewed challenge. The whole period from 1989 until 1998 became known as DOM and was characterized by heavy handed military reprisals against villages believed to provide logistical help or sanctuary to the insurgents.
a. Leadership was safe in exile where it continued to make its case for independence.
b. A significant number of GAM members including military commanders found safe haven in neighboring Malaysia where GAM continued to exist as an insurgent movement among the refugees and supported by the Acehnese Diasporas.
c. The DOM experience gave rise to a whole new generation of GAM.
37 1990s, the official nature of security operations in Aceh changed from that of a military offensive to a campaign to restore security and public order (Operasi Keamanan dan Ketertiban Masyarakat;Kamtibmas) led by the police. The military also conducted Operasi territorial.
38. By early January 1999, Indonesian security forces had launched anew security device called Operasi Wibawa (Operation Authority). Jakarta replaced this operation with successive operations code-named Operasi Sadar Rencong (Operation Rencong Awareness) I, II, and III until the end of 2000.
39. Between January and April 2001, another operation called Operasi Cinta Meunasah (Operation Love the Mosque) was launched. All these successive operations were primarily meant to function as a police campaign to restore security and public order.
40. President Abdurrahman Wahid. issued Inpres 4/2001 consisted of a six-point plan intended to address the problem in Aceh in a comprehensive way. As a consequence of Inpres 4/2001, a new Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Penegakan Hukum or OKPH (Operation for Restoring Security and Upholding the Law) was launched. Security Recovery Operation was (Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan; Opslihkam), launched in April 2001.
41. On May 19, 2003. The government, through Presidential Decree (Kepres)28/2003, decided to impose martial law across Aceh and begin what it calls Operasi Terpadu (Integrated Operation) in the province. With the failure of peace talks in Tokyo, Operasi Terpadu was officially launched on May 19, 2003. Operasi Terpadu aims to crush the separatist movement in Aceh. The government declared that the political goal of Operasi Terpadu is to resolve the Aceh problem by attaining two specific objectives: to eradicate GAM and to curb Acehnese support for independence by "winning the hearts and minds of the people."
42. According to Major General Endang Suwarya, the martial law administrator, "we have also occupied their [GAM] strategic bases, destroyed their command system and facilities." By the end of the first six months of Operasi Terpadu, the military claimed to have killed 1,106 rebels, arrested 1,544, forced 504 others to surrender, and seized 488weapons (approximately 30 percent of GAM's estimated weaponry). With these results, the military believes that after six months of intensive campaigning it has reduced GAM's strength by 55 percent. The military also claims that only 273 out of 6,000 villages are not under the control of security forces. During that period, however, some 395 civilians died due to the conflict and 159 others were wounded. Despite the significant reduction in GAM's military strength, the military admits that it has not made significant progress in capturing or killing GAM's leaders. The TNI has killed or captured only 37 out of 140 GAM leaders, mostly the minor ones. The key leaders such asMuzakkir Manaf (GAM commander), Darwis Jeunib (commander of Jeunib), SofyanDawood (GAM spokesman), and Ishak Daud (commanderof Peurelak) remain at large.
ANALYSIS OF THE CONFLICT
POLITICAL PRIMACY AND POLITICAL AIM
43. When it is studied the struggle lasted for several decades in Aceh, it can be observed that the importance of the existing government political primacy and political aim affect on the insurgency. In the three phases of GAM's struggle, the organization remained devoted to the political goal of independence for Aceh even though Islam formed a part of the ideology of the GAM with Acehnese identity and character it is not a religiously focused organization. During the study, we found that the motivations behind the root causes that led the conflict drag over three decades are the demand for access to the wealth generated from Aceh's natural resources and the desire for the human right violations committed by the Indonesian Army during subsequent actions in order to eliminate the insurgency in the Aceh.
44. The existing government during the period did not much politically focused on this matter to solve it with political means rather than military means. But it required more than just a military offensives designed to eliminate the insurgency. It shows that how military operation without clear strategy affects in developing the insurgency as this progressed for three phases for three decades. Having understood the importance of this, the existing government took necessary action to have peace talks with the GAM in late nineties. The first dialog between GAM and then Indonesian government began during the presidency of Abdurrahman Wahid. Official talks began in 2000, facilitated by a Swiss NGO despite the worsening of the situation in Aceh the negotiators agreed to a break in the violence aimed at reaching a political solution to the conflict. Also prior to the 2000 peace talks, existing governments had passed a series of special autonomy laws, in attempt to bring the conflict to a halt but it had a little effect in the situation. Megawati Sukarnoputri's government began new round of talks in 2002 failed in which the national government declared martial law in Aceh and increased military operations. In this context it can be concluded that the existing governments had not have a political primacy and a clear political aim.
SEPARATING THE INSURGENCY FROM HIS SUPPORT
45. In counter insurgency operations, separating the insurgency from his support another important factor to be taken by the military means so that it can defeat the insurgents by winning the hearts and minds of the people. In Aceh military had taken a different course. They treat all the Acehnese as potential members of GAM till the time they prove them selves. They also conducted a brutal counterinsurgency campaign with no regard for human right. The campaign can be significantly divided in to four characteristics. First, the military launch "shock therapy" which means a campaign of terror designed to spread out fear in the population and make them withdraw support for the GAM. The government was able to achieve it but the consequences were devastating the Acehnese.
46. Thousands of Acehnese became the victims of summary execution, arbitrary arrest, torture, rape and disappearance. The worst part of the government military strategy was the dumping of unidentified corpses at roadsides and public markets, mostly shot in the heads. Second, the military's strategy was to mobilize civilians in the form of village militias to support the counter insurgency operations. Thousands of villagers have been forced to participate in the hunt for GAM members. Third, the most common of this strategy was the recruitment of local people to serve as the militia's spies and informers. This resulted in spread out the suspicion, created the tensions and generated conflicts among the Acehnese. In facts the period was marked by a serious of killing of informants to the military. Fourth, the military also conducted Operasi Teritorial (Territorial Operations) that included Operasi Bhakti in which the army administered rural development and infrastructure programs. This operation intended to win the hearts of the people and that was centered in areas where GAM had a strong presence.
NEUTRALIZING THE INSURGENT
47. When it is analyzed the Operasi Territorial which was initiated by the military while conducting the offensive operation in 1990, it seemed that the programs were well supported by the people, even though villagers had often been forced to participate in these program which resulted in separating the insurgents and also deployed thousands of troops in counterinsurgency offensive aimed at neutralizing the GAM. Moreover, the government and the military labeled GAM as a "gang of peace disturbers" whose act consisting of robbery, killing of school children and other acts intended to create fear and disturb the people. Subsequently it was launched the offensive operation "Operasi Terpadu" which was introduced as its objectives, structure and strategy consisting with four major elements: a military operation to restore security and order, a humanitarian operation, a law enforcement operation and an operation to restore the functions of the bureaucracy. How ever it is evident from outset that the military campaign as the main components of the operation. The government imposed the martial law in Aceh and same time launched fully scale military offensive against the GAM from which the military managed to reduce the strength of GAM. By 1992 Indonesian forces succeeded in their primary objective of neutralizing the military threat posed by the GAM to a considerable extent.
LONGER TERM POST INSURGENCY PLANING
48. Due to the massive destruction received in terms of both men and resources from the military campaign conducted by the Indonesian forces and the Tsunami in December 2004, both sides declared a cease-fire and re-initiated to resolve the conflict. The peace talks were facilitated by a Finland based NGO and led by former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari. That resulted in Signing a peace agreement on 15 August 2005. Under the agreement, Aceh would receive special autonomy under Republic of Indonesia and non organic government troops would be withdrawn from the province leaving 2500 soldiers and disarming of GAM. As part of the agreement, the European Union deployed 300 observers whose mission expired on 15 December 2006 after the local elections. Further Acehnese are allowed to establish local political parties to represent their own interest. The most important point to be considered is the protesting by the human rights advocates who demand that previous human rights violations in the province needed to be addressed which has become the most controversial fact in this regard as it seems that the government is not going to address on the matter yet.
49. On the other hand, no attempt been observed to made to address the root causes of the insurgency which create condition for the Acehnese would again have no other choice than seeking redress of their regionalist grievances by use of arms. It also requires the creation of conditions that would make the idea of independence unattractive to the population at large. Past experience shows that a military operation without a clear exit strategy is bound to prompt yet another cycle of insurgency. This exit strategy should need not only a comprehensive plan for immediate rehabilitation and reconstruction but also long-term policy packages aimed at initiating local governance reform, developing Aceh's economy, restoring a sense of justice among the Acehnese, and promoting democracy in the province. Only then can we expect the cycle of insurgency and violence in Aceh to end.
INTELIGENCE AND INFORMATION
50. Due to the actions of Government military forces during previous stages popular support was not towards the Government forces. Instead of wining the hearts and minds military cultivates the anger among the Aceh people about them . This led to make it difficult to Government forces to acquaire information and intelligence. Since the insurgent from the same nationality they were able to protect them selves easily.
COORDINATED GOVERNMENT MACHINERY
51. Different governments address the issue in different forms. But predominantly it was observed that all the governments' lack of coordinated Government machinery. Most of the times in 1990s military defeated the GAM very early. But, there was no coordinated government machinery to exploit the situation. If it was there third stage would not emerged. Therefore it can stated that during this campaign planning
ROOTCUASES TO THE CONFLICT
52. The following issues have historically been viewed as important factors contributing to the conflict. Those factors are reflecting the order in which they first had a major impact on conflict dynamics and important sustaining factors, which were not important early on, but are crucial today.
a. Islam. Historically, the place of Islam was one important contributing factor to the conflict. In the 1950s, a major goal of Darul Islam was implementation of Islamic law, shari'ah. Early in the GAM revolt, some GAM materials stressed Islamic demands. Today, Islam plays only a secondary role. GAM says that it does not aim at an Islamic state, while the GOI has moved to shore up Islamic support by allowing the implementation of aspects of shari'ah.
b. Natural resources. The development of the Arun fields into one of the world's largest sources of natural gas was an important factor in the emergence of GAM in the 1970s. Most of the gas revenues were absorbed by the central government, relatively few local people were employed in the industry, and local communities were adversely affected by land alienation, pollution and the negative effects of cooperative development. Among other natural resources in the province, timber was also important, not so much as a source of grievance but rather as a source of financing for both the rebel movement and, especially, the TNI, which is believed to derive substantial revenues from legal and illegal logging.
c. Human Rights. The human rights abuses committed by the TNI have been a major contributing factor to the conflict. Abuses have greatly deepened alienation with Jakarta and helped to generate support for the insurgency. A key turning point was the so-called DOM (Military Operations Zone) period from 1990 to 1998 when approximately 3000 persons were killed and when torture, disappearance and rape became common. After the fall of Suharto, the GOI recognized that abuses had taken place, and promised to investigate them, punish perpetrators and compensate victims. When these things did not happen satisfactorily, they prompted a hardening of attitudes in the Acehnese public. For example, some younger generation student and other civil society activists initially used the demand for an independence referendum merely
as a bargaining chip to pressure Jakarta for human rights trials, but when this did not occur and the TNI reverted to its old methods, they became committed supporters of independence. GAM propaganda places great emphasis on human rights abuses, and many of GAM's guerrilla recruits are reportedly young men whose family members were themselves victims.
d. Governance problems. Corruption and ineffectiveness in both civilian government institutions and the military have frequently been identified as major contributing factors to the conflict. One Bank Indonesia survey in 2001 identified Aceh as the "most corrupt" province in Indonesia. In recent years, Aceh has been rocked by a series of corruption scandals, the best publicized of which resulted in the jailing for ten years of the governor Abdullah Puteh.
d. Structural poverty. In the 1970s, Aceh had one of the lowest poverty rates in the country and relatively strong social indicators. The impact of protracted conflict, especially since 1998, now means that Aceh's figures are among the country's worst. For instance, in recent years, local government officials have said that 54% of the population lived below the poverty line and that 1.2 million people in the province lived in unsuitable housing. Poverty and related social problems perpetuate the conflict by deepening generalized grievances in the population. The increasing numbers of unemployed men were recruited into GAM's guerrilla army.
LESSONS LEARNT
53. Counter insurgency operations carried out in the Aceh have thought many lessons to the world in countering the modern day insurgency, covering the aspects of purpose, dynamics, and consequences of counter insurgency operations conducted in Aceh since 1990.
54. There have been many deviations from the accepted principles of countering the insurgency that has led to the controversies. Despite the fact that the problem in Aceh is political and an armed insurgency, the counter insurgency operation carried out in the Aceh, often deviated from the principles of counterinsurgency, especially during the period of DOM (1990-98) when the military conducted Operation Red Net to eliminate the rebels.
55. Instead of winning Acehnese hearts and minds, the military planted seeds of hatred among the general population through brutal suppression and excessive use of force. Indeed, the human rights abuses committed by military personnel during this period have deepened Acehnese resentment against the central government. The counterinsurgency operation in Aceh in the 1990s also shows that a prolonged military offensive easily led to abuses that perpetuated, rather than eradicated, the aspiration for independence.
56. Part of the problem was the absence of a clear exit strategy after the military objective of the mission was accomplished. Military gains were not followed by reconstruction measures that would have restored normalcy in the province and improved living conditions. During the DOM period, the military had actually managed to restore order and by 1992 had undermined the military strength of the rebels. But, on the pretext that the province was not entirely secure, Operation Red Net continued until 1998. Aceh's status as a military operations zone was not lifted until the fall of Suharto's regime.
57. Not only were there hardly any significant improvements in the social and economic conditions of the province, but the state's hegemonic presence in Aceh, in the form of military ascendancy, had reinforced public resentment against the state itself, especially against the military. Nor have public perceptions that Aceh has been the victim of excessive exploitation by the central government been adequately addressed by Jakarta. When the resentment gained new momentum with the collapse of the military-backed Suharto regime, it soon resurfaced in the form of armed insurgency.
58. The military operation, which began on May 19, 2003, had the same fate. Attainment of the political objective of Operasi Terpadu-curbing Acehnese support for independence and resolving the Aceh problem was only possible when the government succeeds in winning the hearts and minds of the people and this requires a clear military exit strategy and socio-economic reconstruction.
59. The mistake of military operations in the 1990s, which continued indefinitely, should not be repeated. Once the military objective of Operasi Terpadu was achieved, civilian authority should be restored in Aceh. A prolonged military operation, while it might deal a further blow to GAM's military strength, might also prolong resentment toward central rule from Jakarta. Although Operasi Terpadu was able to undermine the military strength of the rebels, it was not sufficient to resolve the problem of Aceh. Despite the government's good intentions, this operation was unlikely to meet its ultimate goal of resolving the Aceh problem once and for all.
60. A comprehensive resolution of Aceh's insurgency problem required more than just a military offensive designed to crush GAM. It also required the creation of conditions that would make the idea of independence unattractive to the population at large. Past experience shows that a military operation without a clear exit strategy is bound to prompt yet another cycle of rebellion. This exit strategy should entail not only a comprehensive plan for immediate rehabilitation and reconstruction but also long-term policy packages aimed at initiating local governance reform, developing Aceh's economy, restoring a sense of justice among the Acehnese, and promoting democracy in the province.
CONCLUSION
61. The Aceh conflict was one of the long lasted rebellion movement in Asia. When the memorandum of understanding between the Government of Indonesia and GAM was finally signed on 15 August 2005 in Helsinki, Finland, The agreement brought an end to the nearly thirty years of bloody armed conflict that claimed 15.000 lives, thousands of displaced and impacted the whole country economically, politically as well. Many believed that GAM had to be eliminated by employing military operations. However, it was evident that the military options were ineffective to eliminate rebellion. Instead, the military abuses have only increased the GAM's public support. The Helsinki peace agreement appeared as a better chance to put an end to the separatist conflict in Aceh. This settlement has so far worked well. However, lessons learned from this conflict will be beneficial for any government and the military in handling conflicts.
62. The lessons learned from the past suggest that military operations were not the answer since the fundamental causes of the Acehnese grievances were not properly solved. On the other hand, GAM.
63. Leaders must understand that their efforts to separate from the Republic of Indonesia by any fashion, either democratic or non democratic means that an armed rebellion will fail. In other way, no single country supported GAM's demand for independence. Therefore, GAM leaders must be realize and work within the democratic state of Indonesia. So, it is clear that the 2005 Helsinki peace agreement was the best solution for the Aceh problem.
64. Some believe that military operations under the 2003 martial law succeeded in reducing GAM's military strength, and thus forced GAM to the negotiation table. One of the common perceptions was that the military operations made GAM leaders more willing to negotiate after the Tsunami. But, past experience suggests that military operations against GAM only forced the rebels to temporarily retreat, and GAM had an ability to make another comeback with greater popular support. The massive demonstration in Banda Aceh in 1999 showed us that the Acehnese supported GAM's idea for total independence through a referendum, or in other words, if the military once again defeated GAM militarily, there would be no guarantee that GAM would not reemerge later in time. In fact, the GAM leader Hasan Tiro is living in exile, making it difficult to defeat GAM militarily.
65. The main fact to win the conflict, the government and especially the military has to win the hearts and minds of the people. The military apparently ignored the fact that the excessive use of force could switch the preferences of the population. Many Acehnese considered the Indonesian army as the enemy since the military operations damaged the civil life. It was clear that military operations were not the solution for the Aceh conflict since the military was unable to win the people's hearts and minds. The root causes of the conflict were not military matters, but economic, social, and political as well as various injustice policies. Moreover, the government and especially the military must remember that military measures cannot stand alone. They have to be combined with other actions such as law enforcement, humanitarian aid, strengthening local government and economic improvement to address the Acehnese grievances.
RECOMMENDATIONS
66. The study derived following recommendations:
Wining heart and mind of the local population.
b. The ground troop of the government forces should be well disciplined and adhered to rules and regulation of the ops.
c. The government should be able to identify and separate the insurgents from the population.
d. The government should plan the op according to HR and establishment a good relationship with foreign media and country.
e. The government should stop any outside interference spec arms smuggling to the conflict area.
f. Propaganda and psychological operations should be able to portray positively all the op in order to protect the good image of the govt.
g. Distribution of wealth should be equal and parity in order to balance the level of the development to avoid any dissatisfaction among locals towards federal govt.
h. Any insurgency should be identified and prevent at the early stage.
i. Demobilization of the combatants under the terms of the agreement will need to be rehabilitating by targeted programs to provide them with meaningful employment and also to resuscitate the victim village's economy more broadly.
