21. For anybody to formalise a concrete strategy to counter the Naxal issue, it becomes essential to understand the threat caused by the Naxal movement in the present scenario. Having seen the history behind the escalation of conflict it is now pertinent to study its characteristic evolution over the past decade.
Timeline of the Emerging Violence Fuelled By Naxalite-Maoist insurgency
22. Having started in May 1967 in Naxalbari village in North Bengal, the Naxalite movement has come a long way to its present status. Some of the landmarks in the genesis of the movement have already been discussed. Now we will dwell upon its rise in the last decade.
23. Year 2002. The year 2002 saw a major surge of Naxal activity in the state of Andhra Pradesh. As a result of a ban imposed on Maoists by the Andhra Pradesh Government, the People's War Group (PWG) intensified its activities by conducting a series of attacks against politicians, business owners, landlords, and the state police. The state government responded in a razor-sharp manner by tightening security measures, arresting suspected PWG members and by organised attacks on the Naxals by the "Green Tigers". In line with the orders issued by the state government, police forces enjoyed virtual impunity in carrying out operations against the PWG rebels leading to their consequent elimination during encounters. The Maoist Communist Center rebels and the PWG also intensified their armed campaign against the security forces. [18]
24. Year 2003. The conflict in the state of Andhra Pradesh intensified as both the Naxalite rebel groups aka the PWG and the state police, stepped up their activity. An assassination attempt made by the PWG in the month of October on Chief Minister Naidu enunciated the spate of activity by the PWG and their tactics of drawing attention of the state towards their cause by attacking the political and the administrative machinery. [19]
25. Year 2004. Even as a three-month cease-fire was announced in late June, the eventual failed negotiations between the government and the PWG yielded sporadic, low-intensity fighting for most of the year. Attacks on police and politicians, believed to be a handiwork of the PWG, accounted for the maximum incidents and deaths. [20]
26. Year 2005. As a result of the breakdown of the peace talks between the state government of Andhra Pradesh and the Maoists, violent clashes ensued between the rebels versus the state police and paramilitary. Rebels continued to indulge in low-intensity guerrilla tactics against politicians, bureaucrats, security forces and paramilitary forces. The Maoist rebels launched large scale attacks against government targets which included a jail break wherein approximately 350 prisoners including jailed rebels were freed. There were a total of 12 states including major parts of South, Central and North India which reported incidents of sporadic violence by Naxals. [21]
27. Year 2006. In addition to regular attacks on government and police targets, the Maoist also indulged in landmine explosions thereby affecting railways and truck convoys as well as a few civilians. There were many deaths as a result of clashes between state police and rebels. Fighting in various states was different, depending on the response of the security and police force. Andhra Pradesh, was one state where the security forces were partially successful in maintaining law and order and to an extent combating Maoist rebels. An increase in violence was noticed in Chhattisgarh.
28. Year 2007. Although clashes between Naxalites and government security forces continued throughout the year, however, the trend of hostilities shifted focus from Andhra Pradesh to Chattisgarh where a majority of violence related incidents initiated by the Maoists were noticed. This was reinforced by an attack on a the Chhattisgarh police station by over 400 Naxalites. The ferocity of their attacks had increased as aws evident from this attack wherein they seized arms of the police force and killed many policemen. This significant increase in violence also wedged the civilian mindset between joining the Maoist insurgency or supporting the Salwa Judum. There were also reports of anti-SEZ movements such as the Bhoomi Uchched Pratirodh Committee in Nandigram (West Bengal) joining hands with the Naxalites to keep the police at bay. [22]
29. Year 2008. In 2008, the impact of the ongoing fighting between Naxals and the security forces was felt by the local population. Out of the states affected by the conflict, Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand were the worst hit. A positive point for Chhattisgarh was that there was a recognisable reduction in fatal casualties in comparison to the year 2007. Andhra Pradesh was another positive story wherein, the state which had seen the maximum Maoist activity a few years ago, saw a major shift in balance with better security and a corresponding drop in fatal casualties. However, unfortunate as it may appear, even though conditions have a noticeable upswing in Chhattisgarh and Andhra Pradesh, the Maoists seem to have shifted focus of their operations to the states of Orissa, Jharkhand and Bihar where conditions have hit rock bottom. [23]
27. Year 2009. In September 2009, Prime Minister of India Dr Manmohan Singh said that, "Maoists have garnered growing appeal amongst large sections of Indian society, including tribal communities, the rural poor as well as sections of the intelligentsia and the youth." He added, "Dealing with left-wing extremism requires a nuanced strategy - a holistic approach. It cannot be treated simply as a law and order problem." The threat of Maoist insurgency continued to rise as incidents of violence saw an upswing. By June 2009, India witnessed 1,128 incidents of violence caused by Naxal related conflict. A number of counter-insurgency operations were launched by the government leading to many successes. The death toll for the year rose to 998. [24]
28. Year 2010. In the month of February 2010, 24 paramilitary personnel belonging to the Eastern Frontier Rifles were killed in an attack on Silda camp. As stated by the Maoists, this was the beginning of "Operation Peace Hunt", a counter to "Operation Green Hunt" launched by the government against Naxalites. [25] Another major series of attacks was carried out by Naxalite rebels on security force convoys in Dantewada district on 06 April 2010. In these attacks, 76 security personnel were killed and 50 were wounded. The attack resulted in the biggest loss of life suffered by security forces ever since a large-scale offensive was launched against the rebels. [26] Another 44 persons including civilians and Special Police Officers (SPOs) were killed in a landmine explosion on a bus in Dantewada district on 17 May 2010. [27] On 28 May 2010, Maoists were responsible for the derailment of a Kolkata-Mumbai train leading to the death of 150 persons. Reports verified that Naxal rebels were responsible for the sabotage which caused the disaster. In an ambush at Narayanpur in Chhatisgarh on 30 June 2010, 26 CRPF personnel were killed while several others were injured. There were simultaneous attacks carried out by approximately 200 Maoists rebels on a police station at Rajpur and a police outpost at Baghaila in Bihar on 10 Jul 2010, where nine persons, including five policemen, were killed and an equal number wounded. On 15 Jul 2010, five police personnel were killed in an IED attack in Latehar.
Human toll
29. The first combat deaths related to Naxal insurgency occurred in 1980. Since then, the four worst-affected states have been those of Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and Orissa. In these states, from January 2006 to August 2009, approximately 2,212 people have lost their lives with due to Naxal related attacks. [28] In 2009 alone, approximately 1,100 people are reported to have lost their live of which 600 were civilians, 300 were security personnel and 200 were reported to be rebels. [29] The total number of persons displaced due to Naxal violence exceeded 40,000 in 2006. [30] A study conducted by the Institute of Peace and Conflict studies states that, "Naxal groups have recruited children in different capacities and exposed them to injury nd death." However, similar accusations have also been reported against the state-sponsored Salwa Judum and Special Police officers (SPOs) assisting the government security forces. [31] We have now seen the broad timelines of Naxal violence as it has spread across the Indian State. Having been acquainted with the timelines , it is essential to gauge the harm this violence has caused to the Indian public and an apt way of doing this would include a comparative study of the death toll of Naxals , civilians and security forces kiled in this period.
30. Deaths related to violence. The data being presented below is as per a study carried out and statistics evolved by the Ministry of Home Affairs. The number of casualties for the past decade covering the period from 1999 to 2008, are as shown in the table below:- [32]
Year
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
No of incidents
1246
1179
1208
1465
1597
1533
1608
1509
1565
1591
SF killed
96
98
125
100
105
100
153
157
236
231
Civilians killed
502
452
439
382
410
466
524
521
460
490
Naxalites killed
261
254
182
141
211
87
225
274
141
199
Total Killed
859
804
746
623
726
653
902
952
837
920
Nax/SF Killed ratio
2.71
2.59
1.45
1.41
2.0
0.87
1.47
1.74
0.59
0.86
(Data collected from government report on casualty estimates)
The Future
31. The People's War Group(PWG) and the Maoist Communist Centre (MCC), two major components of the Naxal movement in India, merged on 21 March 2004. Ever since, the Naxal movement has seen a remarkable increase. This unified party was re-christened as the Communist Party of India (Maoist). The merger of the PWG and the MCCI, in addition to augmenting a support base for the movement, has characterised it as a pan-Indian revolutionary group. Earstwhile plans of the Naxals' to build a Compact Revolutionary Zone (CRZ) are likely to get a impetus with this unification. According to analysts, the aim of the CRZ is to eventually for a zone of liberation, spanning the heart of India from the Indo-Nepal border to the Dandakaranya Region.
32. The growth of the Naxal threat has been on a steady rise for the last forty years. With their ideologies appealing to a large section of the underprivileged and the oppressed, with a sound organisation in place whose members are ready for sacrifice to further their cause at the drop of a hat and with comprehensive farsighted plans of seizing political power through means of an armed rebellion, the Naxal strength cannot be undermined. Their strength also should not be measured by the numbers holding arms or by the number of incidents occuring, whereas it lies in the numbers who have been given military training which far exceeds the estimated cadre strength holding arms. The Naxal cadres bring forth a vivid display of strong will and resolve for their purpose. Major disturbances to the functioning of the government framework in the future are on the cards and least the problem is controlled and snipped in its present state, the Naxal issue may well lead to destabalising the entire nation.
Military Potential
33. With the acquisition of sophisticated weapons and proficiency in the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), the Naxals potential for violence has considerably increased. Through their various raids and attacks on police and security forces, smuggling, from groups like the NSCN(IM) and ULFA and also obtaining some weapons from Nepal, the Naxalites have built a cache of arms. It is said that as on 2009, they are in possession of at least 6,500 regular weapons including AK 47 rifles, SLRs and INSAS rifles.
34. Another disturbing trend which has added to the intricacy of the problem is the reported nexus of Naxalite groups with the other extremist organizations. These include a few ex-LTTE cadres who are said to have given the PWG cadres training in the handling weapons and IEDs. Reports of an alliance with the NSCN (IM) for support to each others' cause also exist. A few Naxals' are also reported to have acquired arms training under guidance from ULFA. It has been established and known that the CPI (Maoist) has close ties with the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist).
35. All the above facts prove beyond doubt that the Naxals, besides being enjoying considerable cadre strength are also trained in handling weapons and fabrication of IED's. Their alliances / ties with other extremist armed wings in the country cannot be over seen and are testimony to their Military potential. In line with their ever increasing Military potential, to be noted is the changing nature of Naxal violence over the recent years. From minor and isolated attacks, the configuration of Naxal attacks has seen a sea change, graduating to large scale and well organized attacks on the government machinery. [33]
Economic Effect
35. Extortion money amounting to hundreds of crores of rupees is collected every year by Maoists which is in turn utilised to fund both their armed struggle as well as their so called efforts to supplement the institution of the Indian State. The well known presence of Maoist mineral-resource rich regions of Jharkhand, Chhatisgarh, Orissa, West Bengal and Bihar puts in jeopardy India's plan to capitalise on these resources. A glaring example is the US $ 32 billion project in Orissa by the world's largest steel maker, POSCO, which is yet to start as it was delayed due to agitations and protests fuelled by the Naxals.
36. Government sources have in various dailies projected that the recent up-swing of Naxalism in regions rich in iron ore, coal and bauxite has stalled upcoming projects worth US $ 80 billion. These projects would have resulted in a quantum jump in the steel production of the country (likely to have doubled). Despite the governments' reassurance of additional forces, intelligence and other adequate support for the state government to counter any such protests there was no positive result. The ongoing conflict between Naxals and the Security Forces has also prevented Indian steel majors such as Arcelor Mittal and NMDC Ltd in expanding their existing projects in the resource rich belt. It has been stated by Business and Investment experts that "the high level of risk linked to persuing business in Naxal-infested regions will deter investment and in case such circumstances continue, they will hamper India's growth rate in the future."
Disturbing Trends
36. The disturbing features of the movement are:-
(a) Its spread over a large geographical area.
(b) The increase in potential for violence by the Naxals.
(c) The unification of PWG and MCC.
(d) The Naxal plan for a Red Corridor or the CRZ as a liberated zone.
(e) The Naxal nexus with other extremist groups.
37. In the words of Mr AK Verma, "As of now a 'red corridor' from Pashupati to Tirupati remains an empty dream for the Naxal ideologues. However, If the existing plans of a counter strategy to the Naxal problem by the governmant fail, it may well be a reality. A few sectors, included in the conceptualised red corridor, have Naxals already prevailing over them. It is also not to be lost sight of that uncontrolled Internal Security problems have the potential of destabilising external security as well. Therefore, failure can exact an unacceptable cost. CPI (Maoist) have ideological allies in similar groups in neighboring as well as some other countries of the world but there is little evidence to conclude that Maoists have received material support from any one of them. Chinese small arms do manage to reach them through illegal agencies and as yet there is little evidence of the involvement of any official agency." [34] In the coming future, if Chinese and Indian rivalries escalate to a higher level, it cannot be ruled out that the former will leverage Maoists rebellion to fuel conflict in the nation. Therefore this perspective of the Naxal problem is also pertinent and cannot be lost sight of. [35] Having dwelled into the threat perspective of the Naxal movement and seen its various effects, it is now pertinent to study the various National Stategy Options which emerge from the same so as to tackle the Naxal problem in a comprehensive manner.
