The island is the third largest island in the Mediterranean Sea in regard of its surface area, where it is after Sicily and Sardinia. It is legally a part of metropolitan France. In spite of the fact that Corsica is located 170 km far from Nice (one of régions of France), it is a peripheral region (which is away 850 km from the céntre) and closer to Sardinia than to the coast of France ( a part of Italy). Transportation costs are particularly high and the main way of transportation is maritime. The environmental and climate beauties are the major having, especially for the tourism incomes.
ii. Population
It has a population about 260,000, the lowest population rate in France. Corsica has been suffering from a demographic deficit because of a decline from early 1900s to 1950s in which the island lost more than one third of its population. On the other hand, it took some migrations from North Africa and Southern Europe about %10. Interestingly, a "Corsican diaspora" live in continental France approximately 500 thousand people, which is bigger than the islands own population number.
iii. Economy
The unemployment rate is three or four percentage points and GDP per capita 30% below the national average in Corsica. 5 by the way, Corsica becomes one of the most under-developed regions of France. The Corsican economy is based on agriculture and animal husbandry sectors. 6 The Corsican tourist industry, which was developed only at the end of the 1960s, generated significant resistance among those who feared that rapid and unplanned development of tourism would lead to the "balearisation" of the island and the loss of its specific identity, because most of the qualified people come from outside of the island. The whole Corsican economy relies heavily on tourism which accounts for 15% of GDP. Apart from all these factors, Corsica receives approximately 7 billion French Francs aid in every year as they are both the EU and France joint funds. Since 1988, Corsica also takes EU structural funds. But, in 1999, Corsica would no longer be eligible to take funds as its GDP had marginally passed over 75% of French national average. The Corsican politicians proclaimed that it should not be underestimated that the challenges faced by all insular regions, regardless of their income, and accompanying special measures.
Language, Culture and Identity
Corsican (Corsu), which is closer to the Italian language rather than French, has been recognized by France as a distinguished language. However, French is the only official language in Corsica, as on the rest of French territory. According to a survey in 1982, 96% of the island's inhabitants of Corsican origin understand Corsican and 86% regularly speak the language.7 Corsican is used on a voluntary basis by teachers at pre-primary level. At the primary level, it can be taught three hours a week. Various attempts have been made to teach some subjects through Corsican. Since Corsican has not an official status, its administrative and legal role is minimal. It can hardly ever be used in terms of the administration and in courts if the officials also speak Corsican. However, there is no way when seeking public employment.
Current Institutional Arrangements,
The current institutional arrangement of Corsica derives from the 1991 "Special Statute" (Olivesi 1991).8 Corsica is a collectivité territoriale9- a special administrative entity combining elements from both the Départements d'Outre-mer (DOM) and the Territoires d'Outremer (TOM) (Hintjens, Loughlin and Olivesi 1995). The Corsican Assembly10 has 51 members who are elected for six years in a two-round proportional election. In an attempt to make it more stable, a 5% threshold was set for reaching the second round as well as a special bonus of seats to the electoral list with the most votes. The Assembly has no legislative powers whatsoever; it functions as a deliberative body and may be consulted by the French Prime Minister on draft laws or decrees on matters which directly affect the island. Unlike in the TOM, consultation of the Corsican Assembly is not obligatory. The Executive Council is composed of seven "ministers" selected from the Assembly (and who must therefore resign from it); it is headed by a "president". The consultative Economic, Social and Cultural Council is tasked with assisting in setting Corsica's own medium-term objectives for economic, social and cultural development as well as the means needed for reaching these objectives. One such means is the arrangement between the State and the region.
In addition to the regional structures, Corsica is divided into two departments: Haute-Corse and Corse-du-Sud. The division of competencies between the region and the departments is not always clear, leading to overlapping and inefficiency; it also makes Corsica an over-administrated region with the highest number of elected officials per capita in France.
Corsica and Europe
Corsicans voted against the EU Treaty in the referendum of 20 September 1992, which was interesting since we take into account that Corsica has been taking the special EU funding. Furthermore, other French regions with a strong identity had voted in favour in line with a general phenomenon of pro-EU sentiment from regions which see it as an opportunity to by-pass the national capitals. Corsica is involved in several international co-operation networks linking island regions such as IMEDOC11 (Islands of the Western Mediterranean).
IV. ORIGINS OF THE CONFLICT AND STATE RESPONSES
B. Corsica
What is the "Corsican Question"?
the actions of a minority of Corsicans are seen as an expression of the will of the majority, as exemplified by a statement in 1996 by former Prime Minister Raymond Barre: if Corsicans want to be independent, then let them! ("S'ils veulent l'indépendance, qu'ils la prennent!"). However, this is not the main demand of Corsicans: only about 6-7% of the Corsican population favour independence,18
The Corsican Question is also perceived as a problem of political corruption and nationalist straying from the original ideals towards Mafia-style racketeering. Corsica's problems have often been attributed to its specific social and cultural characteristics. In Corsica itself, these problems are seen as a consequence of the refusal of the French State to take the island's specificity into account. But the Corsican Question is also a product of its specific history or, more exactly, a product of the particular relations between Corsica and the French State. Several features will be highlighted (Briquet 1998):
- major reorganisation of the agricultural sector, without bringing any benefits to the local population (1957 Programme d'Action régionale de la Corse) but rather to the settlers from Algeria after 1962.
- A state policy of development of tourism perceived as a violation of the territory and as colonial exploitation.
- An economy highly subsidised by the French State; the public sector is the main source of employment. This is a contradictory model: state intervention ensures the modernisation of society but this in turn leads to increasing expectations which the state cannot fulfil.
- local political actors have fought militant nationalism because it attacks the power of the clans. In contrast to other regions of Europe, the nationalist movement has not been a part of official political life.
- Successive statutes have reinforced the power of the local élite and their control over resources.
Emergence of the "Corsican Question" and State Responses19
Historical Background
Between 1347 - 1729, The Genoese had ruled the island (it was interrupted only by a short time occupation by forces of a Franco-Ottoman alliance in the Invasion of Corsica in 1553).
In 1729, the Corsican Revolution for independence began. After 26 years of struggle, the independent Corsican Republic was formed in 1755 under leadership of Pasquale Paoli and remained sovereign until 1769. But the Corsican Republic was unable to eject the Genoese from the major coastal cities.
Following French losses in the Seven Years War, Corsica was purchased secretly by France from the Republic of Genoa in 1764. After an announcement and brief war in 1768-69 Corsican resistance was largely ended at the Battle of Punto Novo.
Despite triggering the Corsican Crisis in Britain, no foreign military support came for the Corsicans.
in 1770, Corsica was incorporated into France, marking the end of Corsican sovereignty.
Today, however, from the date ended Corsican independence, national feelings still run high.
iv. "Final phase" (late 1960s until today): marked by the attempt of various movements to force the French government to recognise the specificity of the island rather than trying to forcibly assimilate it. (Hintjens, Loughlin and Olivesi 1995: 121):
The origins of the Corsican nationalist movement can also be traced to the failure of the formation of regionalist parties in Corsica (Olivesi 1998). One of the important moments in the history of the nationalist movement was the publication in 1974 of a document called "Autonomia" by the ARC ("Action régionaliste corse", later renamed "Action pour la renaissance de la Corse") led by the charismatic Edmond Simeoni. From that moment on, demands for a special status and the constitutional recognition of the Corsican people were closely linked. The turning point occurred on 21 August 1975, when the peaceful occupation of a wine cellar of a "pied noir" settler in Aléria by ARC militants turned into tragedy as the cellar was stormed by the gendarmes and two of them were killed.
The FLNC was formed in 19762 with the goals of Corsican secession from France and the transfer of Corsican prisoners held on the mainland to prisons on the island. In order to achieve these goals, the movement resorted to violent tactics, namely attacks against individuals and infrastructure both in Corsica and in mainland France. From what was once one underground separatist movement, internal differences over the years led the organization to splinter into a number of smaller groups. Currently, the three major groups are the FLNC, the "October 22" FLNC, and Armata Corsica.With a few hundred members, the FLNC-UC is perceived as the largest of the groups, and operates in the northern part of the island
The socialist victory in 1981 marked a new phase of in the French Government's policy towards Corsica, in strong opposition to the heavy-handed approaches of previous governments. In keeping with a promise made to Corsicans in Ajaccio by future President François Mitterrand, Corsica received a special statute on 2 March 1982.20 Although Interior Minister Gaston Deferre had announced that it would be similar to those of Sicily and Sardinia, the final result was much less significant in the form of a simple law. The attenuation of the statute was also due to pressure from one of the political clans in Corsica, the left-wing MRG.21 Although the term Corsican people had to be stricken from the final text, for the first time the specificity of Corsica as well as its cultural identity, language and traditions were accepted. The measures introduced by the 1982 law were dissipated by decentralisation in the whole of France one year later, as well as by developments in the French overseas territories.22 Corsica's institutions were similar to those given to other regions with the exception that Corsica's elected body was called Assemblée de Corse / Corsican Assembly rather than regional council; also, two consultative councils on economic, social and cultural matters were established. The Corsican Assembly had no legislative powers and could only solicit the Prime Minister who was not obliged to follow the advice of the Assembly (Hintjens, Loughlin and Olivesi 1995: 124).23
In 1990, renewed debates over Corsica led to a new attempt to lay the institutional foundations for the development of Corsica while respecting its special identity (Olivesi 1991
The assassination of the French Prefect in Corsica, Claude Erignac, on 6 February 1998 marked a turning point in the history of Corsican nationalism. Deeply shocked, thousands of ordinary Corsicans, with women at the forefront, took to the streets in the days following the assassination to voice their protest- a reaction considered unusual in a region where a major tradition is that of omerta (law of silence).
3. Evaluation of the French Government's Policies towards Corsica until 1999
The response of the French State to the problems in Corsica can be characterised as a policy of "double diplomacy": negotiating with the main Corsican political actors while at the same time dealing with clandestine movements and playing one against the other. Negotiations (overt or secret) have alternated with periods of open repression.
Containment of the Conflict
Violence was on the increase from 1971 to 1998, although not on the same scale as in other conflict regions in Europe. Nationalists grew politically from 1982 to 1992, and were again on the rise in 1998 and 1999 following a period of electoral decline. In the 1999 regional elections (Loughlin and Daftary 1999: 61), the separatist nationalist votes totalled 19.61% in the first round (not including the 3.85% for the UPC autonomists). The only nationalist movement to make it to the second rote of voting, Corsica Nazione, obtained 16.77% (against 9.85% in 1998).
b. Preservation and Promotion of the Minority Identity
Rather, demands have been taken up by various political, nationalist and civil society actors because of their mobilising potential. Recognition of these demands and institutional measures proposed by the Government result in fights over credit for these concessions so that reform actually leads to increased conflict between various political interest groups.
c. Political and Institutional Stability
In the 1998 and 1999 regional elections, there were as many as five nationalist lists. The traditional left managed a semblance of unity, with a coalition "gauche plurielle" list while the right presented as many as five lists in 1998. Prime Minister Jospin was able to initiate a process of dialogue and joint consultations with Corsican deputies culminating in an original compromise proposal on 20 July 2000 which, once elaborated, will serve as the foundation for limited autonomy in Corsica.
C. The "Matignon Process"
1. Increasing Demands for Autonomy in Corsica and Beginning of Nationalist "Reconciliation"
The two main proposals which emerged from a working group of the Corsican Assembly established in April 1999 were a revision of the 1991 Special Statute with a view to devolve legislative powers and the abolishment of the two administrative departments of North and South Corsica (Annex1). A few days prior to a planned visit to Corsica by the Prime Minister, José Rossi publicly called for autonomy for Corsica.39 At the same time, the nationalist movement had been undergoing significant changes during 1998-1999. The reconciliation process was threatened as early as June 1999 by a newly created and heavily armed clandestine group Armata Corsa which claimed responsibility for the "preventive murder" of a hired hand acting for rival nationalist factions.
2. The "Jospin Method"
In 2000, former Prime Minister Lionel Jospin agreed to grant increased autonomy to Corsica.
The proposed autonomy for Corsica would have included greater protection for the Corsican language, whose practice and teaching, like other regional or minority languages in France, had in the past been discouraged.
3. The "Nationalist Method"
The nationalists have pursued a double strategy of engaging in political negotiations while also using the threat of violence. On the political side, they presented five major short-term demands: strict application of the law on protection of the Corsican coastline; protection of the wild areas in Corsica; total cessation of "inquisition-style" practices of the French administration and justice system; an end to the "de-Corsification" of jobs;44 and the re-grouping of all "political prisoners" near Bastia, Corsica. It is very interesting to note that the recognition of the "peuple corse" was no longer a main nationalist demand, as institutional preoccupations became the main subject of discussions.
2003 referandum
A major event occurred in 2003 when Paris called for a referendum in Corsica, asking the locals for their opinion on what their future should be. The referendum asked Corsican voters whether they would accept a new territorial assembly and an executive body that would manage more of the island's affairs. Referendum to allow more autonomy within Corsica:
-Establishment of a single territorial assembly and eliminating the current structure of two regional councils.
-The territorial assembly would consist of 81 seats and would manage isues such as its economy, energy consumption, transporation and regional aid policies.
C:\Users\loki\Desktop\conflict\corsica conflict\election.pngResource: http://www.electionguide.org/results.php?ID=954
At the state level
At a domestic level, the latest referendum has clearly shown that most Corsicans, even though they have their own identity, also want to remain part of France, even if it is not for sentimental reasons, but for economic aid coming from the mainland.
Separatism thus comes only from a few hundred Corsicans, most of them with criminal backgrounds, compared to the couple of million who wish otherwise.
From that perspective, if the French government agrees to secession, they will be essentially acceding to the demands of a small group of individuals (most of them common criminals) and not respecting the wishes of the entire Corse population.
Regional and int'l level
any kind of secession or increase in regional autonomy in Corsica would give to the rest of France and Europe.
The European subcontinent is disturbed by small secession movements, even though the two major ones, the ETA and the IRA, are in route to a peaceful solution.
France has other separatist groups besides the one in Corse, like for example groups in Brittany. In addition there are similar separatist sentiments in the region like the League of the North in Italy, as well as different groups in the Balkans like in Kosovo. Such groups may use the situation and settlements in other countries as reasons to continue their struggle, thinking that "their time for success is near."
Other "frozen" conflicts that could see a resolution of Corsica as an example to follow would be in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Chechnya, and Transnistria. The breakaway of East Timor from Indonesia, for example, probably raised the spirits of separatist movements worldwide, including those in Corsica.
Therefore, Paris policymakers need to be cautious of how much autonomy, if full or partial, is given to the island, as this could open a Pandora's box of problems elsewhere in the country and in Europe.
In conlusion
It seems quite clear that, even though the majority of the Corsicans want to remain part
of France, it would be necessary to give the island some kind of self-autonomy. This would
be necessary in order for the mainland to save funds instead of continuously dumping them
in an island that has not shown signs of significant development in the last decades, in spite
of all the financial aid it receives. Tied to greater self-autonomy is the necessity to do a
major crackdown on the island in order to arrest Corse separatist leaders. It is clear that
the FLNC and its splinter groups have lost whatever support of the population they once enjoyed, so the moment is ripe for the capture of these leaders, who, in spite of whatever
"noble" goals they may have, are also criminals that must be brought to justice.
The "Corse Question" is far from a textbook case where a region or province, including
the local population, wish to secede from a state. What complicates the situation is
the divorce between the Corsican population and the separatists. The latter, along with
policymakers in Paris, want to separate France and Corsica (to what degree is still a
disagreement nevertheless) but the Corsican people wish to maintain strong ties with the
mainland. France, being as unique as it is, has the awkward situation where both the
government and a group of separatists (most of them criminals in disguise who run the
island with a "mafia-style" system) want a similar objective, and it is the civilian population
that resists it.
