Diplomacy, an ever-present solution to the problems of a nation, can both help nations avoid war and it helps nations terminate conflict. In a prime example of diplomacy at work, the Paris Peace Accords were an attempt to negotiate a peaceful end to the Vietnam War. The goals of the Accords were to get American prisoners of war (POWs) out of Vietnam and end the Vietnam War by withdrawing peacefully from Vietnam. Henry Kissinger and Le Duc Tho, representing America and North Vietnam, respectively, came to a deal in January 1973 when they signed the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam on January 27, 1973 (Asselin, 177, 203). Although this agreement ended America's involvement in Vietnam, historians still debate whether this was a victory for the American side. Even though the treaty allowed America to withdraw from Vietnam peacefully, which was a diplomatic success; North Vietnam eventually won the war, violating the treaty, thus possibly making the Paris Peace Accords a failure for America, yet a success for North Vietnam.
The year was 1968, the Vietnam War continued to rage on, America was facing anti-war protests at home, and America had grown desperate for peace. Nixon, who was becoming ever more tired of the seemingly endless war every day, has drawn his last straw. Achievements were rare; Operation Rolling Thunder had ended on March 31, 1968 and Americans desired even more advancement to lift their spirits (Asselin, 5). This halt of the bombing was a major achievement for the Americans and gave them initial hope, which was lacking for the majority of the war. Peace talks did not go well from 1968-1971 even though both sides made some key steps. The Tet Mau Than was an offensive attack by North Vietnam, which broke a military stalemate that had existed since 1965 (Asselin, 4, 5). The urban warfare and shock waves that the attack generated forced both parties to realize that a military victory would be extremely difficult, if not impossible under the current or even foreseeable circumstances (Asselin, 5). This caused the sides to turn to diplomacy, and although diplomatic talks were attempted, the negotiators made little progress in the attempt for peace.
These diplomatic efforts showed signs of progress in early 1972. In Washington, Kissinger urged Nixon to change his strategy by using a relations campaign. Hanoi launched the Spring Offensive on March 30, 1972, and as a result, Washington "ordered massive B-52 bombings" (Asselin, 38-39). A new proposal offered several items, including both a military settlement and a political settlement. If Hanoi accepted the military settlement only, then a prisoner release, a cease-fire, and a withdrawal of American and other allied forces would take place, yet the Saigon regime would remain in place. If Hanoi accepted the political settlement as well, then the election provisions would kick in and PAVN forces would have to parallel the American withdrawal (Asselin, 33). Negotiations between Kissinger and Tho resumed on May 2, 1972 (Kissinger, 262). Kissinger said that the "meeting with... Tho was brutal"(262). Tho went on the offensive immediately, stating that the US had "interrupted the private meetings", quite extraordinary one as one could think "given the record of Hanoi's canceling the November 20 meeting on three days' notice" (Kissinger, 263). The meeting "consisted of nothing more than Hanoi's reading its public position... without explanation" (Kissinger, 265).
Hanoi also wanted to exploit "contradictions" within the society of America and between other nations and America over the United States' involvement in Vietnam (Asselin, 56). Kissinger and Le Duc Tho secretly met for the fourteenth time. Tho proposed that the DRVN and United States create an agreement after which a cease-fire could take place. Kissinger also had a proposition saying that America "wanted equitable peace, and only the intransigence and duplicity of Tho's government [was standing] in the way" (Asselin, 57). A new Ten Points Proposal was introduced by both sides in the fourteenth meeting of Kissinger and Tho. The position seems in Tho's favor as cities in South Vietnam had fallen earlier (Asselin, 60). After a few more meetings, Kissinger and Tho "agreed… [to] end the war on October 15" (Asselin, 71). Over this time, the negotiators cleared several roadblocks, breaking the stalemate, and thus making a settlement seem imminent (Asselin, 77).
In October, North Vietnam still wanted US forces out of Vietnam, yet they wanted to have more victory in struggles with South Vietnam (Asselin, 79). On 8 October, another meeting started (Asselin, 80). Each side disclosed new ideas (Kissinger, 326). The meeting broke up briefly, but when the meeting resumed, Tho "turned immediately to his green folders" (Kissinger, 327). He suggested creating a concise proposal (Kissinger, 327). 3 days later, after a 16-hour session of intense bargaining, the most intense of the talks, the negotiators reached a tentative agreement, with 18 articles and 9 chapters (Asselin, 81). A meeting on October 17 would be necessary to eliminate any uncertainty (Asselin, 85).
