The investigation assesses the significance of the Germans strategic flaws and how they contributed to their defeat at the battle of Stalingrad. In order to judge the significance of these flaws, the investigation will evaluate the errors and weaknesses in Hitler's military decisions during the battle, as well as the unpreparedness of the German Army prior to the conflict. Two sources that will be used in this investigation: Stalingrad: the Turning Point by Geoffrey Jukes is examined for an overall view of the war, as well as the German and Russian military tactics. Enemy at the Gates by William Craig is a compilation of private papers and journals of the German commanders; these can be used to widen the reader's understanding of the reasons behind the Germans' military decisions. These sources will be evaluated for their origins, purposes, values and limitations.
B. Summary of Evidence
Two years into the Second World War, "the German Army no longer had the strength and resources for a renewed offensive" (Jukes 6) as they had previously during the initial invasion of Russia in 1941. Hitler's next plan of action was to conquer the Caucasus oil fields in pursuit of oil, in order to power the German tanks and artillery. This plan was known as Operation Blue. Initially, the plan did not involve the invasion of Stalingrad (Craig 8), however Hitler himself insisted that it was necessary. One of the main reasons Hitler wanted to seize Stalingrad was because the city's name had symbolic value to the Russian leader of the time, Stalin. Conquering "the city of Stalin" (Jukes 6) would have a heavy impact on the morale of the Red Army.
Hence, the Germany Army was divided into two separate divisions. One group would capture the Caucasus oil fields and the second group would be responsible for conquering Stalingrad. The group that set off towards Stalingrad arrived at the city in mid-July and originally consisted of about one million men. The attack started off with a heavy air raid, with around 1000 bombs being dropped on the city during the summer and fall of 1942 (Bergström 72). This was followed by continuous artillery bombardment of the city. In a matter of days the city was in ruins. Weeks later, "the Germans held most of Stalingrad" (Cassidy 230) and remained on the offensive until mid-November. Then to the complete surprise of the unsuspecting Germans "the counter offensive was launched on November 19th" (Jukes 7). After only 5 days, the Russians had created a complete encirclement of the city and what was left of the German Army at Stalingrad was now trapped inside the kessel.
"Stalin [...] had managed to conceal not only the strength of the Russian reserves but [also] the severity of the Russian winter" (11). The Germans' attempts at sending in supplies by air were insufficient, leaving those inside the encirclement severely unprepared for the Russian winter and "without any winter clothing, the men suffered cruelly from the cold" (Lederrey 101). Nonetheless, Hitler did not allow any sort of attempt to break out of the encirclement (Jukes 7) because in doing so, he saw this as a surrender to the Russians, which was a sign of weakness. Instead Hitler sent more divisions to help break the encirclement. These divisions were met by the Red Army and defeated before they even got to Stalingrad.
Even though it seemed to be "an almost hopeless situation" (Cassidy 222) for the Germans, it was Hitler's egotistical attitude that allowed him to believe that the German Army was invincible. "Hitler would permit no withdrawal" (Jukes 7) and he was willing to sacrifice the quarter of a million men trapped inside the kessel, before he even considered the possibility of a German surrender. However, on January 31st ,1943, General Freidrich von Paulus surrendered to the Russians; to Hitler, this was considered a huge embarrassment, but for Stalin and Russia, it was an important victory.
Word Count: 489
C. Evaluation of Sources
Stalingrad: the Turning Point by Geoffrey Jukes was written in 1968 and it is a synopsis of the actions that took place before and during the battle of Stalingrad. It also provides insight to the strategic decisions of both the Russians and the Germans. British military historian and strategist, Sir Basil Liddell Hart, comments on the author's extensive knowledge of Russian sources, especially the six-volume history of the Great Patriotic War of the USSR, which allows him to accurately portray the battle (7). Although, the fact that his main source was a revised account, published during the period when Khrushchev was leading the Soviet Union, can be considered one of its limitations. This is because it tends "to over-emphasize, his [Khrushchev's] influence on the Stalingrad struggle while belittling that of Stalin" (7). This distorts the overall image of the history by unfairly criticising Stalin's role in the battle.
Enemy at the Gates by William Craig is a non-fiction novel about two men from opposing armies, who encounter one another throughout the battle. The plot of the story is a compilation of actual historical evidence from multiple first hand accounts from the battle. This is a valued source because it contains actual memoirs and journals from soldiers of both sides, as well as various private papers from the generals involved in the battle. Although the book tries to be historically accurate by using historical records and investigations, its purpose as a novel is to entertain. So, although the historical accuracy presented in primary memoirs and journals can be very precise, the author may disregard certain aspects of the war if they are not relevant to the story. For example, the largest neglect of historical accuracy is that the novel fails to depict the battle as the major turning point of the war. Moreover, it also insufficiently portrays the suffering of the soldiers during the Russian Winter of 1942.
Word Count: 315
D. Analysis
There is much evidence to prove that the Germans had serious flaws in their strategy at the Battle of Stalingrad. For example, before the battle had even begun, the Germans were running low on supplies and needed more in order to continue their invasion of Russia. "The German Army no longer had the strength and resources for a renewed offensive [...], but Hitler was unwilling to stay on the defensive" (Jukes 6). Although the Russians cunningly lured the German Army deep into Russia, stretching the limits of the German supply lines, Hitler should have known that the Germans did not have the ammunition to continue at full strength. Yet he ignored this dilemma and allowed the German Army to continue with their offensive attack, deeper into Russia.
The Russian winter was terribly more severe than any other weather that the Germans had ever encountered. They were not prepared for such extreme conditions because they did not possess the appropriate attire for their predicament. In the August of 1942, even before the winter, the German General Staff had warned Hitler "that it would be impossible to hold the line of the Don as a defensive flank during the winter"
(7). Nonetheless, Hitler, in his passion to conquer Stalingrad, ignored the warnings from the German officers.
The original plan called solely for the capture of the Caucasus oil fields but then Hitler made the decision to conquer Stalingrad at the same time. And so "the Germans made the fatal mistake of dividing their forces" (Cassidy 224). Just as in the first World War, the splitting of the army weakened both groups, but Hitler's belief in the superiority of Germany, impaired his logic and hence he decided to take both areas simultaneously.
By the 14th of October, from the perspective of the Russians, the Germans seemed effortlessly in control. However UK military strategist, Geoffrey Jukes, believed that the Germans were quickly losing men and their impatience and irritation was mounting as the battle dragged on longer (Jukes 7). This left the Germans vulnerable because they were not expecting a Russian counterattack. The Russians had launched a well-planned counterattack which proved to be effective. This attack, in addition to the lapse in concentration by the Germans contributed to the German defeat at Stalingrad. This allowed the Russians to gain momentum and offensive control.
With the Russians surrounding what was left of the German Army, the Germans were put into an unfamiliar position and were forced to create defensive tactics. Hitler had to make a decision quickly. His immediate plan of action proved to be fatal to many of the German soldiers trapped inside the kessel. Hitler would not allow anyone to escape. (7) After the Germans' attempt at sending supplies to the trapped soldiers had failed and seeing as the remaining German Army was easily outnumbered by the Russian reinforcements, the possibility of a German victory was highly unlikely. Yet Hitler selfishly ignored this fact and did not give up, which, in the end, cost Germany many unnecessary casualties.
There were many specific flaws in the Germans' tactics at the battle of Stalingrad but overall there was also a re-occurring mistake within them. Throughout the entire battle and much of the war, the Germans were overconfident and underestimated Russia as well as their other opponents. This confidence caused them to underestimate the power of the Russians reserves and also impaired their preparedness of the Russian winter. In the end, this over-confidence was one of the factors leading to the mistakes made in the German tactics which proved to be a significant cause for Germany's inability to capture Stalingrad.
Word Count: 596
Conclusion
The Germans made many critical mistakes at the battle of Stalingrad. Altogether these mistakes allowed the Russians to create a strong offensive strategy, which would punish the Germans for their lack of supplies and preparation. The Germans went into the battle with an insufficient amount of artillery, supplies and clothing that were essential in order to survive temperatures of the Russian winter. This was because their
over-confidence led them to believe that the battle would be over before the winter. This over-confidence allowed them to think that only one half of the originally planned army could conquer Stalingrad. This weakened the German offensive which gave the Russians time to defend and devise a counterattack. In addition, Hitler did not allow any sort of break out of the encirclement, leading to the unnecessary deaths of many German soldiers and in turn diminishing Germany's already slim chance of victory. Collectively, many mistakes were made by the German Army and this allowed Russia the opportunity to regain Stalingrad and gain momentum in World War Two.
Word Count: 172
Total Word Count: 1713
