Without a doubt, the overpowering conflict that dominated American minds and media of the latter half of the twentieth century was the Cold War. It controlled the American mind and mass media and became the frame of reference for any discussion on the Indochina peninsula. However, the whole story may only be found outside that restrictive frame. In actuality, the United States fought in a spade of smaller conflicts- ones no less important. Because of the Vietnam War and the resulting Communist influences, the continental states of Southeast Asia grew exponentially in their importance because of their strategic value in the larger war of ideologies. These wars expanded beyond their intended and humble beginnings; Cambodia and Laos may have initially begun as containment missions, but these two states gathered extended importance as they fit into the master plan of the Cold War.
Superpowers of the world descended upon these states to play their own games, oftentimes conducting diplomatic relations concerning the states without the states involved, in homage to a situation eerily similar to the Congress of Vienna, post-Napoleon. Cambodia and Laos became pawns in the global debate over ideology, and the resulting impact dealt to them was a devastating blow that crippled regional development for decades to come. Revolution and warfare became the norm, as cultures by then accustomed not to compromise but to repression and aggression provided no other alternatives.
In desperate attempts to stem the perceived dangerous influences of the opposing superpower, both first and second world giants meddled unnecessarily in overt and covert operations in Southeast Asia during the Cold War; while initially undertaken in Vietnam, these actions rapidly spread out greatly influenced the various war movements in the bordering states of Cambodia and Laos.
Setting the Scene for Conflict: Pre-War Tensions
In the mid-twentieth century, Laos and Cambodia were states still influenced remarkably by French colonial influence. Only scant years earlier had French colonization in the Indochina peninsula been an ever-present force in daily life (Hardy 16). In addition, while French forces were ostensibly withdrawing, the process was a long and drawn-out one, characterized notably by hesitations and broken promises. There was an understandable hatred of European colonization in this region, a fact mirrored across the globe- the same sentiments had led to a similar series of withdrawals across most of the colonized world, and Southeast Asia was no exception.
As the French withdrew, competing ideologies fought for the support of the people, trying to gain a foothold in nascent governments. Unfortunately, the French colonizers heavily supported the democratic factions, and along with the opposition to the French came opposition to those democratic movements. In Cambodia, this meant that budding democratic campaigns often floundered before they were underway, as history and association hindered their growth (Hardy 20). In its place, the Viet Minh increasingly dominated the Cambodian countryside, much to the chagrin of King Sihanouk, a French-installed leader. The countryside cells often partook in guerilla warfare intended to aid Communists in Vietnam, providing supplies and hiding guerilla warriors as the conflicts in Vietnam became stronger (Hardy 22). Washington grew increasingly nervous and anxious as its desire to bolster its chances in the ever-pressing and ever-important Vietnam War battled with its desire to stay out of yet another conflict.
In Laos, a similar chain of events was set into motion, though on a far lesser scale. Laos mirrored Cambodia's dislike of democratic factions, a fact that did nothing to augment its already lackluster situation. Communist guerilla groups similarly invaded the Laotian countryside, putting it at odds with the public democratic groups in the urban areas. However, unlike Cambodia, which geographically has a number of advantages, Laos is landlocked. Consequently, Laos was particularly vulnerable and unstable- perfect fertile conditions for war.
Cambodia under Sihanouk
After French forces had withdrawn from Cambodia and granted her independence in 1953, the country was left with its hereditary king- King Sihanouk. Unfortunately for democratic interests, he had fought tirelessly against French Indochina presence in Cambodia, rallying international support for independence from French imperialism and sovereignty for his own state ("Cambodia: Unorthodox"). However, Sihanouk also emphasized his displeasure at being forced to take such steps towards independence without French support; in a message to '"French friends,' said he: 'I am anguished at having to break off relations with France.' All the nations of Asia have obtained full independence except for the three Associated States [of Indo-China]. I am convinced that Cambodia can become a great nation only if it attains total independence.'" This type of appeasement would become the norm in much of the foreign policy that shaped his legacy.
Sihanouk proved to the Western world that he was not just another puppet leader who could be controlled with vaguely worded threats and promises of supplies and aid. Sihanouk quickly proved himself to be a pragmatic leader, moving Cambodia further away from the clutches of the first world (Tully 125). As he realized that taking sides in an escalating global conflict could only end badly for Cambodia.
Instead, Sihanouk took steps to ensure that Cambodia would retain its sovereignty during the Cold War (Tully 126). Sihanouk committed Cambodia to joining Nehru's neutralist bloc, a term given to states that made it a policy to take aid from both first and second world countries. They would practice neither ideology and take no sides. Cambodia also accepted the United States' offer of military supply and aid; however, he made it clear that this offer should not come with expectations attached, and should the Soviets offer him a similar deal, he would gladly take it ("Cambodia: Government").
Of course, democratic leaders were not pleased with Sihanouk's refusal to join the first-world countries, continually asserting that Cambodia, as a product of French colonization on the Indochina peninsula and a relatively stable government, should be a democratic bastion. The United States believed that with growing Communist sentiment in the region, a democratic presence on the peninsula was necessary but a given right, and America was willing to stoop to almost any level to claim its 'right'. American leaders began playing a game of the 'carrot-and-the-stick' in trying to influence the Cambodian government. First with bribes, and then with threats, the United States was shameless in trying to influence Sihanouk (Tully 133). When the United States realized that their current acts of persuasion and coercion were not effective in the least, they switched to more aggressive and covert attempts to try to wrestle Cambodia into submission.
The United States turned to clandestine proxy acts in order to change the tide against the slow deterioration of democratic support in Cambodia (Tully 134). These acts were followed by an overt and offensive bombing campaign against the Viet Minh camps in north Cambodia. The United States hoped that by destroying pockets of Communism, Sihanouk would eventually see the error of his ways and return to supporting democracy and fighting Communism in the north (Tully 149)
However, the United States did not foresee the extent to which they had alienated Sihanouk from the democratic cause. Fearful for the future of his country and continually dedicated to keeping Cambodia out of the larger regional conflicts that had devastated his neighbors, Sihanouk turned to Communist leaders in the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China for aid in stalling American interference (Tully 149). In defiance of first world wishes, Sihanouk became increasingly aligned with the second world in order to stave off the increasingly aggressive attacks by the United States.
Sihanouk allowed Communist bases and supply lines to run through eastern Cambodia. In return, Communist forces bought Cambodian grain at an inflated profit, injecting capital into the economy (Tully 151). Gradually, Sihanouk began to accept Communist ideals in order to maintain friendship across trading lines. As Communist ties and aid continued in spades, a pattern of political repression spread across Cambodia, angering many democratic activists. This anger eventually morphed into a fully developed coup d'état, one that unseated Sihanouk for a succession of worsening despots and civil war.
Driven to Communism by the well-intentioned but misdirected democrats of the first world and only repeatedly pushed and prodded by the second world, Cambodia devolved from an independent and neutral state to dependent and red one. The actions of both the first and second worlds led to an unstoppable chain that resulted in the Cambodian Civil War and destroyed a potentially stable regime, inflicting strife and ravaging a state. These dismal circumstances would leave the door open for despotic regimes to flourish, delegating Cambodia to a miserable existence for its next chapter of history.
The Laotian Civil War
In Laos, the state of affairs in 1953 did not escalate to a civil war; rather, events commenced with a civil war that was caused by the withdrawal of French authority. Though officially termed the Laotian Civil War, it is known more colloquially as the "Secret War," in reference to the absurd level of proxy involvement by the superpowers of the world- and in particular, the immense amount of aid the American CIA provided to the democratic factions (Dommen).
Though no external power ever officially entered the war, the presence of United States, Vietnam, and Soviet forces provided the main impetus for a large deal of the fighting, and the aid and aggravation they supplied ensured that the war lasted for far longer than it would have otherwise.
After the French began the initial post-colonization withdrawal from Laos, Communist forces almost immediately began their offense, in hopes of striking the state while it was weakest. As a result, the French became embroiled in a conflict they had hoped to leave behind, as they felt they had an obligation to ensure that Communist forces did not overtake Laos (Hardy 24).
After rounds of conflicts, the French were eventually defeated, leading to, for the moment, a brief period of respite between the fighting as the first world struggled with how to respond and the second world with how to keep this victory (Dommen). The United States could not let the Viet Minh claim Laos as a victory; at this point, America subscribed almost completely to the containment theory, and the nation believed it had an obligation to stop the spread of the "fever" of Communism.
While the United States was actively fighting and involved in the conflict for a while, both Kennedy and Khrushchev eventually signed a "Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos" in Geneva- in which both parties agreed to completely withdraw military force in order to secure a 'neutral and independent Laos' (Leary). Ostensibly, the matter was finished. However, the United States still harbored a strong desire to stem the tide of communism across the peninsula. The United States needed to play a balancing game in order to satisfy both needs, and through a series of technicalities, America was able to do so.
Thus, the determination was made that the United States would fight as "civilians" (Dommen). This meant that the Central Intelligence Agency would take point in the Laotian incursion; members of the CIA were not commissioned military, but rather members of yet another bureaucratic division of the United States government- officially, at least. That is not to say, however, that members of the US military did not fight in Laos. Contrarily, they were involved myriad times (Secord 56). Instead, members of the military were simply reassigned to CIA posts in advisory positions; from there, they would partake in direct fighting and the heavy training of guerilla troops (Secord 61).
While the Soviet Union seemed to ignore the US interference for a time, in 1971, it launched a major offense on Laos. This seemed to renew Viet Minh belief that the situation in Laos was not futile (Dommen). With the United States overextended in one too many theatres of war, and the Viet Minh sufficiently assured that Communist control of Laos was necessary to its own state security, the United States was, in short time, defeated, and a Communist government installed.
While this paper has mainly addressed the Laotian Civil War in terms of outside first and second world influences, the Laotian Civil War was fundamentally a civil war between two warring internal state factions. However, because of the strategic geographic importance of Laos, the conflict between the communist Pathet Lao and the democratic Royal Lao Army quickly became a conflict greater than an internal conflict. As was the case in many conflicts during the Cold War, the situation quickly escalated into a proxy war.
The civil war may have had modest beginnings, but its endings were far from that. Both opposing movements were fueled by the meddling superpowers of the world: masters who did not deign to scrutinize the minutiae of the lives and futures they were changing. In any other period, such a war might not have occurred; the Laotian Civil War had the unlucky fortune of happening in a period charged with tension and strife. Its geographical vulnerability trapped it in a cycle of war that allowed greater powers to do with Laos as they pleased; it is only because of the Vietnam and US interest in the future of Laos did the Laotian Civil War last as long as it did or as bloodily as it did.
In Conclusion: Reflecting Back
As these wars took on a larger importance, they also became estranged from their original identity, fitting some other niche that was, in the eyes of superpowers, inarguably more important than their original.
Cambodia's struggles under Sihanouk became emblematic of the games favored by superpowers, which saw the world as a chessboard, and individual states pawns to do with as they pleased. The Laotian Civil War deviated from its original struggle of power between internal factions, embodying the bloody conflict happening across the globe- on a much smaller and much more concentrated scale. Proxy wars allowed superpowers to remain diplomatically cordial while fighting for influence.
Superpowers partook in a form of diplomacy that failed to consider the parties involved, generally both ignorant and uncaring of the damning futures to which they were consigning these states. In the furor of the debate over democracy and communism, the world lost sight of the smaller pieces of the puzzle, deciding instead to aim for success in the larger scale, whatever the cost. While that may have benefited their own ends, this approach certainly failed those states that it concerned most. The Indochina peninsula is decades behind the rest of Asia developmentally and still strife with long-ingrained political tension.
Cambodia and Laos became symbols of something more to the rest of world- important only in their status within the three-world system. However, such a preoccupation distorted a regional conflict into a multigenerational one, damning a region and its people to a future trite with war and discord, despots and genocide.
