Changing Security Equation. In this ever transforming world, the term security has undergone a mutation. The definition of security in the post cold war era is no longer limited to military specific concerns or based on a strategic balance. Even the national security of a country no longer encompasses merely the protection of territorial integrity of a country's borders and independence of its people. Gone are the times when inimical actions by a nation incited a direct response. Today, the equation is much more complex. The emerging threats today, are proxy wars, low intensity conflicts, infiltration, drug trafficking, gun running, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, global terrorism, piracy, environmental / pollution control and natural disasters.
THREAT PERCEPTION
2. Having described in detail the core concerns which make the Indian Ocean Region the most critical and thus militarily alive activity hub, it is now attempted to particularize these activities, and the proportion of threat that they offer. Very broadly, the threat to India's maritime interests and security in the Indian Ocean can be categorised into the following: -
(a) Military threats.
(b) Non Military threats.
Military Threats
3. There has been considerable militarization in the region in the past decade, especially at sea. Iran and Singapore now operate submarines, and Malaysia will soon join this list. The ships operated by these navies are now larger and more sophisticated. Anti-ship missiles such as the Exocet and Harpoon and aircraft such as the F-16 and F-18 and Mirage are available in many navies, including some smaller ones. [1]
4. Military threats may be posed by individual states or more predominantly from a combination of two or more naval powers. The threat from countries in the region can be grouped as those from: -
(a) Extra Regional Presence
(b) Regional Connivances
(b) Littoral Countries
Extra Regional Presence
5. The United States of America. The focus of global strategic concerns has shifted from Europe to the Asia-Pacific. The United States has established capabilities here that are neither temporary nor transient. With China identified as its only potential major competitor by 2025, the United States needs to be a dominant player in Asia, politically, militarily, and economically. Control over the region's energy-from production levels and prices to distribution-is essential to this dominance, and the "democratization" of Iraq must be seen in this context, as well. The war on terrorism also is related to this region, as a large number of radical Islamic terrorist groups are located here and draw sustenance from formal and informal institutions.
6. China. China's rising defence budget and military modernisation do not leave any doubts about its regional objectives. It is an ambitious power out to acquire capabilities to dominate regional affairs and stake its claim as the rightful regional force. China's naval surge into the Indian Ocean, aimed at consolidating the military posture in support of its maritime interests is thus a major strategic priority. A Chinese Top Secret memorandum explained PLA's strategic plans to control the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean under the new doctrine of 'High Sea Defence'. It was stated that 'China can no longer accept the Indian Ocean as only the ocean of the Indians'. [2] Towards this it has begun encircling the Malacca straits as also India which it perceives as a containment force by wooing Myanmar, establishing itself in Sri Lanka, acquiring rights to a submarine base in Mauritius and assisting Pakistan in the development of Gwadar deep sea port. These advances together with its plans to build aircraft carriers and acquire an offensive blue water capability by 2015 are indications that the Chinese Dragon would possess the capability to flex its muscles in the IOR shortly thereafter. The report by the Chinese Naval Military Academic Institute, titled 'The Navy by the Year 2000', talks about China's reach being equal to that of the US by the year 2050 [3] . Very broadly, the Chinese interests in the region could be spelled out as follows:-
(a) Surveillance.
(b) Counter to US threat by creating a counter balance.
(c) Containment of India.
(d) To maintain a Second Strike Capability.
(e) Uninterrupted food supply. China is currently facing a growing imbalance between her needs for a large variety of material resources and her ability to provide them domestically. China presently supports 22% of the world's population on seven percent of her arable land. This situation can only get worse when her population reaches 1.5 billion by 2020. The annual requirement of food grain would outstrip her production of 285 million tonnes [4] . It will therefore be essential for China to secure food supplies from abroad thereby relying more heavily on the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean which are rich in fish stocks.
(f) Oil Supply. In the last ten years China's energy needs have risen over 50%. A recent analysis by the London based 'Center for Global Energy Studies', shows that China's demand for oil will increase to 6 million barrels per day by 2005, however her domestic production was not likely to increase beyond the current rate of 3.3 million barrels per day [5] . This therefore implies that if her economic growth is to be sustained, China will have to import the deficit oil by sea, thereby significantly increasing the importance of safeguarding these supply lines.
7. France. The most important French territory in the Indian Ocean is the Reunion Island, where the French maintain a sizable force (Army and Air Force). French forces are also stationed at Djibouti on the Southern outlet of the Red Sea and Mayotte islands, in the Comoro group of islands. In addition to these, France also controls other islands in the Mozambique Channel viz. Europa, Bassasda India, Juan de Nova and Glorieuses islands archipelago. The most significant factor for the presence of the French is to keep the SLOC's vital to the French economy open in this region.
8. Pakistan. Pakistan is and will continue to remain a source of trouble for India. Geographically it sits astride the critical energy lifelines from Persian Gulf to India. Its capability to interdict India's vital energy lifelines has been and will continue to be a security bugbear for India. Pakistani Navy's basic maritime strategy is based on the concept of 'Sea Denial'. This strategy would not seek a surface action but pose a consistent threat through submarines and aircraft. Despite recent developments that have lowered the threshold of discord, it is unlikely that Pakistan's hostility with India will disappear, as its causes are quite fundamental. Given a continuing confrontationist posture, it is essential that Indian military capability maintain a decisive edge. This will not, of course, neutralize the militancy ongoing in Kashmir; however, in the new environment in which Pakistan has to answer for indiscretions from aiding terrorism to proliferating nuclear technology, it is unlikely that it will be allowed a free rein. Here, the Indo-U.S. relationship has a part to play to ensure Pakistan's role in the sponsorship of insurgency is restricted, if not ended. [6]
9. Regional 'Connivances'.
(a) China - Myanmar Nexus. China has been given access to naval facilities at the mouth of the river Irrawady to build the naval base at Hiang Gyi Island. The existing bases at Siltwe near the Bangladesh border and Merque on the Thailand border are also being built with Chinese assistance [7] . They have also signed an accord in Jun 97 for development of a new channel connecting Irrawady river with the southwest region of China along the Chinese No 320 National road. This will give China direct access to the Indian Ocean. The refueling rights provided to Chinese warships will enable her to deploy her forces rapidly in the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean region. The naval facilities at Coco islands are being upgraded to install signal stations to monitor Indian missile tests being conducted between Orissa and the Andaman's. The import of oil by the Chinese by 2020 will be around 2.7 million barrels [8] and this would have to pass through the Malacca Straits, and the importance of ensuring that the Malacca Straits, remains open during times of tension is what China is interested in. The closure of this strait effectively cuts off China from the Indian Ocean and South Asia. Therefore it is imperative that China has another outlet open to the Indian Ocean Region for strategic reasons. The Irrawady river is navigable upto Bhamo which is 37 miles from the border. The ports near this river can be used to support her forces in the Indian Ocean as also an oil discharge point for all Chinese tankers in the future [9] . Chinese leaders have been indicating through their speeches and writings that they no longer consider Myanmar to be a buffer state between China and India. The post Mao leaders in China see Myanmar as their own extension into the Southern Hemisphere. A three-member team from the IDSA, led by Jasjit Singh, the director, visited Myanmar in 1994 and concluded that China may be expected to have a 'permanent presence' in the Bay of Bengal for the next ten years [10] .
(b) China - Pakistan Nexus. In an attempt to negate India's influence in the Indian Ocean Region, China has been trying to establish closer ties with some of the Littoral states through the medium of supply of military hardware. It has not only accrued in economic gains for China but has also bound these nations into an interdependent relationship with Beijing. In this context Pakistan emerges as the greatest beneficiary of Chinese military hardware exports. China began supplying military hardware to Pakistan in a big way immediately after the 1965 Indo-Pak conflict, wherein both China and Pakistan signed a ten-year memorandum of understanding on defence matters. This included procurement of weapons, production, research and development and transfer of military related technology. Pakistan has received 1500 tanks, 350 fighter aircrafts and 30 naval vessels with missiles. Lately it has also been alleged to have received 500 ring magnets for her Uranium enrichment programme. [11]
(c) The PLA Navy did not take part in the 1962 war between India and China, however in future this will not be so. The PLA Navy will take an active part in future wars from the Myanmar port / bases. In case Pakistan colludes with China any future conflict will open up two fronts for India to fight on. Hence the possibility of any of India's neighbors providing base facilities to China is detrimental to her national interests.
Maritime Threats from other Littoral States
10. Growing Navies of the IOR Littorals. The Indian Ocean Rim countries are becoming more and more aware of their interests and the importance of the EEZ, especially with depleting resources overland. Most of the countries in the region are underdeveloped or developing. Their naval forces are mostly coastal and have recently undergone a quantum jump in the force level, with the aim of protecting their maritime interests. Some relatively potent of these navies are covered in the subsequent paragraphs.
(a) Myanmar. Next to India, Myanmar has the largest coastline in the Indian Ocean, making it a small but significant and strategically located Littoral in the Bay of Bengal. India has the second largest boundary with Myanmar and at present there are no boundary disputes. The only irritants between the two are issues of human rights violation, cross border terrorism and drug trafficking, apart from the China-Myanmar nexus covered earlier in this chapter. [12]
(b) Thailand. The importance of Andaman and Nicobar Islands will increase phenomenally if the canal across the Isthmus of Kra materialises. This will enable India to set up a free port on the lines of Hongkong in these islands, hence Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia may lay claims to some of these islands.
(c) Bangladesh. Overlapping claims and other resources disputes can become burdensome and irritating as India and Bangladesh lay more emphasis on exploration of offshore hydrocarbon deposits and fishing in the future. The conflict lies in the choice of method being used for the lateral definition of the continental shelf around the Ganges delta. The Indian claim is based on the principal of equi-distance, whereas Bangladesh prefers to have a ten fathom baseline for measuring the 200 nautical mile EEZ, thus enclosing hundreds of square miles of the continental shelf within its internal waters [13] . It is also important to note that Bangladesh is an importer of military hardware from China.
11. Maritime threats could also originate from other littoral states in our region. If however, our capabilities can take into account the Chinese and Pakistani Navy, they will also be able to cater for threats posed from any other littoral state. The likelihood of threats from such a quarter, however, is low.
Non-Military Threats
12. Piracy. This is the single greatest menace to modern shipping. The region around the Malacca straits has the highest concentration of shipping and experiences the highest rate of piracy in the world today. Piracy and the hijacking of ships increasingly are being used for the smuggling of narcotics, and in turn, this supplies money for arms and explosives which are used for terrorism. Much of this activity takes place in the Indian Ocean area, which is not surprising considering the two major drug-producing areas of the world, the Golden Triangle and the Golden Crescent, are located on either side of our country.
13. Poaching. Every year, the Indian Navy and Coast Guard apprehend about 30 - 40 foreign trawlers especially Chinese and Taiwanese, operating from Singapore, catching fish in the Bay of Bengal. Some of these smugglers are also engaged in barter trade with the Andaman and Nicobar islands. Some trawlers have also been collecting intelligence data, important from India's point of view [14] . The Indian Coast Guard had captured three Chinese trawlers in the southern waters of the Bay of Bengal, in Aug 94. One of these trawlers, Yen Su Han 104, was equipped with modern electronic gear [15] .
CONCLUSION
14. India shares maritime boundaries with seven countries. It is easier to work out boundary agreements when resources have not been discovered, but once they are, it is almost certain that conflict potential will increase. India has major security concerns in the region that require interfaces with countries both external to the area and littoral to it. Maritime power must be an essential ingredient of these interfaces, in peacetime as much as in times of conflict. [16]
