Judge, Naoumova, and Koutzevol (2003) study the corporate governance and firm performance in Russia and hypotheses about the board structure-firm performance relationship within Russia. They used survey data. In December, 2002, surveys were personally distributed to 116 Russian managers from the three centrally located industrial regions of Russia (e.g.,Tartarstan, Bashkortostan and Moscow regions) although the sample size was slightly small. They found that significant inter-correlation between organizational sizes and proportion of insiders suggesting that the larger the organization, the less likely that insiders dominate the board's composition. While this relationship was interesting, it could pose a potential problem of multicollinearity. In conclusion they found a negative relationship between ''informal'' CEO duality and firm performance. This finding is extraordinary given the 1996 Russian Federal law which prohibits the CEO from also serving as board chair. Also, we found that the more vigorously the firm pursues a retrenchment strategy, the more negative the relationship between proportion of inside directors and firm performance. Overall, these findings suggest that effective corporate governance may be essential to firm performance in Russia. Although, their unique findings, some consideration must be taken. Generalize the sample of this study may or may not apply to transition economies outside of Russia. Further suggested additional research in this area of knowledge is highly recommended in order to test these findings in firms boardroom dynamics yielded important and interesting insights. They also recommended that more independent variable needs to be encouraged within the Russian economy, and perhaps in all transition economies. Because their independent variable only explain about 21% of the depend variables.
Erickson, Park, Reising, and Shin (2005) study the board composition and firm value under concentrated ownership in Canadian evidence. The purpose of their study is to examine the relation between board composition and firm value in the presence of significant ownership concentration using publicly traded Canadian firms over the 1993-1997 periods. They found that that greater board independence does not have a positive influence on firm value and that poorly performing firms increase the proportion of outside directors in subsequent periods. This may result from firms acting to appease unhappy investors by adding outside directors. They also found that directors from financial institutions can provide monitoring benefits, and found negative effect of dual class common stock on firm value is mitigated by board independence, the participation of officers from financial institutions and audit committee independence. They strongly suggested that sound governance practices can enhance firm value in countries with high ownership concentration even in the presence of strong minority shareholder protection.
Omran , Bolbol , Fatheldin (2008) study the corporate governance and firm performance in Arab equity markets does ownership concentration matter. This study is attempted to determinants of ownership attention; the effect of ownership attention on firms' performance and market measures, after controlling for the endogenetic of ownership attention through the use of country and firm characteristics as helpful variables, and the effects of ownership identity and block holdings. The sample size of this study is 304 companies from dissimilar sector of the economy, and from a group of middle east countries especially from Arab country (Egypt, Jordan, Oman and Tunisia).
Furthermore, they appointed comprehensive statistics description about the firms' corporate ownership, identity, and their performance and the market measurement. Furthermore, the authors indicated that the following conclusions and policy recommendations could be summed up from the analysis:
1. Ownership concentration in Arab corporations seems to be negatively associated with legal protection.
2. Notwithstanding the desirability of less concentrated ownership, it does not seem to have a significant effect on Arab firms' profitability and performance measures.
3. Q-ratios tend to be positively related to concentrated ownership, presence of block holders, and conflation of CEO and chairperson positions.
4. Large-size firms and firms operating in a less open economic environment have higher profitability and performance measures than other firms.
5. The identity of owners matters more than the concentration of ownership. Particularly important in this regard is the negative association of individual investors with performance measures in financial institutions, a result that could be explained by the tendency of individual owners to manage banks' assets recklessly in the absence of checks and oversight by other major owners.
Therefore, the broad conclusion of their study that emerges is that ownership concentration is an endogenous response to poor legal protection of investors, but seems to have no significant effect on firms' performance (Omran , Bolbol , Fatheldin 2008).
Bhagat , and Bolton (2008) study about the corporate governance and firm performance.
This study attempt to explore how the corporate governance measured and further exploration and the researcher trying to explore what is the relation among corporate governance and performance. The objective of this study is to examine the relation between corporate governance, corporate performance, corporate capital structure, and corporate ownership structure. This study contributed and adds meaningful to the body of knowledge as well as the practitioner side which is highlight within three finding.
Firstly, they found that better governance as measured by (Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 2003, and Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell, Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell, 2004).They also found that CEO-Chair separation is significantly positively correlated with better contemporaneous and subsequent operating performance.
Secondly, none of the governance measures are correlated with future stock market performance, unlike what have been claimed in GIM and BCF. Thirdly, by given not good firm performance, the probability of disciplinary management turnover is positively correlated with stock ownership of board members, as well as the board independence. Thus, better governed firms as measured by the GIM and BCF indices are less likely to experience disciplinary management turnover in spite of their poor performance.
