The question of whether Kaiser Wilhelm II can be considered a primary cause of the First World War is a complicated one, as it involves consideration not only of the personality of this infamously temperamental monarch, but also the question of how his character intersected with the policies and institutions of his states as well as larger events in European politics. This paper will argue the thesis - with reference to a comparison and contrast of a number of historians' views on the Kaiser and his government - that while Wilhelm II was not a primary cause of the First World War, it was instead the structure of the German state which was significant in contributing to the outbreak of the Great War. As will be seen, while historians studying the government of Germany under the Kaiser differ radically in their views of the importance of Wilhelm II, there is considerable agreement that we need to make a subtle but significant distinction between "personality" and "structure" in Germany's government if we are to more completely understand role of Kaiser Wilhelm II in the years leading to the outbreak of the Great War.
The Contradictions of the Kaiserreich under Wilhelm II
In reading European histories of the years leading up to the outbreak of the First World War in 1914, one cannot ignore the somewhat absurd figure of Kaiser Wilhelm II inserting himself in crisis after crisis, issuing angry declarations and ultimatums, and generally making the always unstable arrangement of Europe's power balance all the more unstable. This leaves readers with the puzzling q uestion of why such an individual should have had so much power? It may be argued that the answer to this question is important, for this is not simply a matter of someone inheriting great power. Germany, on the eve of the Great War, was the leading economic and military power in Europe; yet this same country had been led for decades by the singularly incompetent Wilhelm II.
John Rohl, perhaps the most eminent historian writing on the topic of Germany under Wilhelm II, notes that this seeming contradiction puzzled many observers of the time. The editor of the Social Democratic newspaper Vorwarts, writing during the Weimar Republic after the apocalypse of the Great War, observed that "the German Kaiserreich had been the most economically successful and the best administered but the worst governed country in Europe before 1914" (Rohl 2) [1] . It is important for us to understand that the Kaiser's Germany was not simply a military superpower, but it was considered the most advanced country in Europe in terms of social services for the population, education, and science. As one historian reminds us, Germany under Wilhelm II was the dynamo of Europe. Its economic and military power were
pre-eminent; German science and technology, education, and municipal administration were the envy of the world; and its avant-garde artists reflected the ferment in European culture.
(Retallack "Introduction" 1) [2]
At the same time, however, we can find prominent Germans under Wilhelm II expressing the feeling that Germany, in the words of Max Weber writing before 1914, was being governed by a "herd of lunatics" (Rohl 2) [3] . Even figures at the heart of the German government, such as Friedrich von Holstein, considered the Kaiser's government an "operetta regime" (Rohl 2)3.
It may be argued that this central paradox or contradiction of Germany under Wilhelm II leads many historians to distinguish between the "personality" of the monarch, and the "structural" aspects of the German state, that enabled his personality to play such a significant, and even disastrous, role in contributing to the outbreak of World War I. In this view, while Wilhelm may have been an "operetta" buffoon or an idiot, he cannot be said to have responsibility for the outbreak of the First World War. Instead, he was operating within a system of government that carried, at its core, a fundamental flaw in its executive functioning.
Historiographic Dispute: The Kaiser's Personal Rule
In reading historians' analyses of Kaiser Wilhelm II, one is struck by radical contradictions between them with regard to the power of Wilhelm as a monarch. Some argue that the "Kaiser's personality dominated German political life" and that "Wilhelm's contempt for the Reichstag" and his "considerable psychological problems" were to shape German history because of his near-absolute power as Kaiser (Whitfield 89) [4] . Historians who express this view cite German sources from the turn of the twentieth century who assert that "there is no stronger force in the Germany of today than Kaiserdom" and that "the Kaiser is his own Reich Chancellor. All the important political decisions of the past twelve years have been made by him" (Whitfield 89)4.
It should be noted that other historians differ radically on this point, arguing that Wilhelm II did not actually impose his personality upon Germany. In the words of one historian: "It was not Wilhelm II who imposed his will on government policy during this period, but the traditional oligarchies in conjunction with the autonomous forces of an authoritarian polycracy" (Retallack Germany 92) [5] . This view is interesting as it serves to explain what von Holstein referred to at the time as Wilhelm's "operetta" government. It may be that von Holstein, a life-long civil servant, was expressing contempt for Kaiser Wilhelm II's well-known ignorance of the operation of the German state.
Consider, as an example, the military of Germany under the Kaiser. While it would be understandable that the Kaiser would have little time for economics or health care policy, he considered himself a military man and surrounded himself with a military entourage from the outset of his rule (Mombauer & Deist 3) [6] . Yet historians have frequently pointed to his "infamous order" of August 1, 1914 to send his troops east as an example of his profound ignorance of policy and plans even in a sphere of his choosing:
According to his own conviction, only the Kaiser had responsibility for co-ordinating the political actions of the Reich's executive, and yet he failed totally in this role... he was completely unaware of the army's strategic plans (which at that time included no contingency plan for a deployment to the east). Unaware of the details of German war planning, and even having been deliberately kept in the dark about some of its details, he nonetheless reserved for himself the right to give such orders.
(Mombauer & Deist 3)6
Thus, on the one hand, there are historians who argue that Wilhelm II exercised near-absolute authority over the German state, while on the other there are historians who contend that he was a largely figurehead monarch - who had little interest in even broad military plans, let alone the details of economic policy - whose state operated largely without any input from him, with key decisions regarding policy and planning even being kept from him.
Upon initial reading, it seems surprising that historians can differ so widely upon the role of Kaiser Wilhelm in Germany and, by extension, in European politics contributing to the outbreak of the First World War. However, the historian John Rohl may be seen to offer an explanation for this difference - somewhat reconciling these two extreme views of Kaiser Wilhelm II - when he argues that we need to separate the propaganda from the reality of Wilhelm's rule. Rohl contends that:
When contemporaries spoke critically of his "personal rule", they were expressing disapproval of his too frequent and too sudden interference in the affairs of state, of the emphasis he placed on his Divine Right, which was perceived as an insult to the nation.... Wilhelm II might have dreamed of establishing absolute rule for himself, but it remained no more than a dream.
(Rohl 3) [7]
While Rohl does not dismiss how Kaiser Wilhelm's speeches and odd personality had a negative impact on Germany and her foreign policy, he nonetheless contends that it would be a mistake to focus too much attention on the deeds and misdeeds of Wilhelm II. The frequent use of the concept of the Kaiser's "personal rule" - as made commonly by members of his court or politicians to suit their own agendas - has caused, in Rohl's view, "so much misunderstanding" among historians in the present day that it would be better it we avoided a focus on the personality of Wilhelm altogether (Rohl 3) [8] .
A Structural Explanation: The Kaiser and Responsibility for War
While Wilhelm the somewhat absurd man cannot be considered a primary cause of the First World War, the unusual executive office of the Kaiser within the complex web of power that was the German state can - with somewhat more legitimacy - be considered a primary cause of the Great War in the view of some historians. In this "structural" explanation, Kaiser Wilhelm II's office lay at the centre of a dynamically shifting web of power, with the key components being the military, the Reichstag, the Bundesrat, Staatsministerium, the Foreign Office and the somewhat autonomous south German governments (Hull 208) [9] . These key power bases within the German state were continually struggling for dominance, with the Kaiser balanced somewhat awkwardly in the middle.
One of the problems with this structure is that it was often unclear who had responsibility for what. Consider, for example, foreign policy. Logically, this would be under the control of the Foreign Office, which would be under the Chancellor and the Kaiser. However, in practice it was never that simple, for military and naval attaches operated essentially independently of the mission chief of the embassy where they were located. The mission chief could instruct the attaché in diplomatic affairs, but was unable to punish him, and in general the attaché responded to the orders of their military superiors. Yet these attaches had significant impact upon Germany's relations with other European powers during this period and their reports home would be read and circulated not only within the Foreign Office, by also by the military and the Kaiser. As military attaches, they were forbidden to discuss politics in their reports, with a significant exception "when such observations were inextricably mixed with the military content" (Hull 210) [10] . Of course, this exception proved to be the rule that allowed these attaches to comment upon such sensitive topics as the threat posed by British naval policies.
All of these different power centres in the Kaiser's Germany were continually struggling for power in a constitutional system in which there were significant overlaps between all parties, with the Kaiser at the heart of the system. From this perspective, while Kaiser Wilhelm was undeniably an important figure in Germany, Wilhelm's personality can cause us to overlook the power structure of Germany at that time - the administration that built and ran the greatest economic powerhouse in Europe - and its role in contributing to the outbreak of the First World War. An excellent example of this can be seen in the case of Germany's naval build-up in the years before the Great War.
Kaiser Wilhelm II's fascination with naval power is well-known. Germany had traditionally been a land power, and Wilhelm II was the first Kaiser to even mention the navy (Epkenhans 14) [11] . The Kaiser devoted considerable energies to building up his navy, which increased from 18 iron-clads and 18 cruisers in 1888 to - 25 years later - some 60 capital ships, 40 cruisers, 144 torpedo boats and 72 submarines in 1913 (Epkenhans 14)11. Yet Wilhelm never had a clear strategic plan for his navy and his enthusiasm for it was mocked - by Grand Admiral Tirpitz, who built this navy - as being like a child's passion for a "mechanical toy" (Epkenhans 15)11.
The significance of Wilhelm's obsession with increasing the size of his navy is that it was seen by everyone in Europe as a direct threat to Great Britain which, as an island empire, was understandably sensitive to potential challenges that risked cutting its sea lane traffic to colonies. While Britain had been somewhat isolated from Continental politics, the Kaiser's naval build-up policies increased its anxiety and willingness to seek allies against Germany. Thus, by needlessly threatening Britain, it may be argued Kaiser Wilhelm contributed to the outbreak of the Great War and the alliance of France, Britain and Russia against him.
While this may seem to reinforce the "personality" explanation of German policy during this period, historians argue that the Kaiser's success in getting the German state to spend vast amounts of money on a navy was not so much due to Wilhelm's abilities but that he was supported by shifting powers in Germany at the time: "It seems unlikely that Wilhelm II would have been successful, if the importance of enlarging the navy had not been realized by a steadily increasing number of people" (Epkenhans 21) [12] . While Germany was a modern industrial power, its political system and social order were pre-modern with the Junkers class and old agrarian elites having disproportionate control over the bureaucracy and the military. These groups were uneasy at the increase in Germany's population and rising democratic voices at home, and believed if Germany obtained colonies overseas this could serve as a sort of "safety valve" for conservative Germany. A navy was a critical component of any such overseas imperial ambition, and so the Kaiser's love for his "mechanical toys" was backed and funded by aristocratic elites who cared little for ships or colonies but wished the preservation of the existing order (Epkenhans 23) [13] .
Conclusion
In this analysis, we can see that while Kaiser Wilhelm was an important figure in Germany, he cannot be considered a primary cause of the Great War. While there are historians who see a "personality" explanation - focused on Wilhelm - as being a major causal factor leading to the outbreak of war, other historians point out that Wilhelm was significant historically solely because he was at the centre of the best administered, economic power in Europe. In this analysis, it was the structure of this well-administered German state and the executive office of the Kaiser - and how different elements of the state structure supported policies leading to war - that is a stronger candidate as a primary cause of the Great War.
