QJBR is widely known for their use of terrorist tactics. Their influence is believed to have spread throughout the Middle East, North Africa, and Europe. It is believed they receive their funding and materials from several sources within these regions. This allows them to coordinate large scale attacks against coalition forces, Iraqi forces, and the local population. To effectively combat the QJBR, several limiting factors will need to be considered during the operational planning cycle. Intelligence personnel will need to be the subject matter experts on QJBR tactics and techniques and the operational environment. With this knowledge, intelligence personnel can better advise the commander on means to combat the QJBR. Knowledge of the limiting factors will also be crucial in the commander's decision making process.
Study of the Tanzim Qaidat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn Insurgent Organization
The actual strength of QJBR is unknown at this time. It is estimated that the group had 1000 core members in 2005 and as many as 10,000 full and part-time fighters at its peak.[2] The majority of the fighters are displaced Iraqi's and the rest are foreign fighters from other Arab nations.
Though QJBR operations are mainly Iraqi-based, they have created an extensive logistical network throughout the Middle East, North Africa, and Europe. It is believed that QJBR receives funds from donors in the Middle East and Europe, local sympathizers in Iraq, and a variety of businesses and criminal activities.[2] These donors are probably motivated to support the Jihad and not for the notoriety of being affiliated with any specific terrorist organization. It is unclear if QJBR receives aid or backing from any other country outside of Iraq, as many have denounced the group and its tactics publicly. Despite the efforts of the coalition, no solid evidence has been presented to back the theory that Iran is supporting or funding any of the Iraqi insurgencies, to include QJBR.
QJBR has taken responsibility for many of the attacks against US forces, the Iraqi infrastructure, and fulfilled its promise to target the Shi'a population. Their tactics have included vehicle born improvised explosive devices, assassination, targeting of relief agencies, suicide bombings, kidnappings and publicized beheadings. The QJBR has been linked to several other terrorist activities since 2003, including the failed Millennium plot aimed against the United States and Jordanian targets in late 1999. The group has also taken responsibility for the bombings in predominantly Shi'a market places and most notably the March attack during the Shi'a holiday of Ashura, killing over 180 people.
Goals
The stated goals of QJBR are to force a complete withdrawal of all U.S-led forces from Iraq. To establish a pure Islamic state, by toppling the Iraqi interim government and assassinating all collaborators with the occupation. Al-Zarqawi, a Sunni Muslim, wanted to marginalize the Shi'a population and defeat its militias.[3] Before his death, al-Zarqawi presented a four stage plan that included the above mentioned goals. He also wished to spread the conflict to Iraq's secular neighbors and engage in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Sharm al-Sheik bombings in Egypt and other countries outside of Iraq were attributed to QJBR affiliated groups, consistent with al-Zarqawi's stated plans.
Leaders
The most notable leader of QJBR is Abu-Musab al-Zarqawi. A Sunni Muslim, Al-Zarqawi was the founder and leader of QJBR, until his death on 7 June 2006. During his leadership, the QJBR was known to target the Shi'a population. Al-Zarqawi called for targeting Shi'a neighborhoods, holy sites, and celebrations.
On 11 June 2006 an Egyptian, Abu Ayyub al-Masri, was appointed as the head of QJBR. Al-Masri was a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, Egyptian Islamic Jihad, and attended bin-Laden's al-Farouk training camp. He became an expert in explosives, most notably truck and roadside bombs, which are still used in Iraq. Al-Masri was killed by US and Iraqi forces on 18 April 2010.
It is undetermined who the new leader of QJBR may be, after al-Masri's death in 2010. The only prominent figure to emerge has been Al Nasser Lideen Allah abu Suleiman. Abu Suleiman was named Minister of War and has pledged that he will continue the path of the Jihad. Currently there is not much information on abu Suleiman concerning the extent to which he controls the QJBR. Not much is known about his origins, training, or background at this time.
Limiting Factors in Operations
Human intelligence (HUMINT) assets will need to be employed to track the current leadership, identify members, and interdict the QJBR's current and future operations. All intelligence assets will need to be coordinated by the S2X to maximize the collection effort throughout the theater of operation. Contact and coordination should be established with all U.S. intelligence assets (i.e. Marines, Navy, Special Forces, DIA), federal agencies (i.e. CIA, FBI, NSA), Iraqi forces (i.e. Army, police agencies, local leaders), and all coalition forces partner nations.
There are factors that could limit or negate certain operations. Prior to deployment, research must be conducted to identify the impact these factors will have on operations. Leaders tend to focus only on mission oriented information and often neglect certain critical cultural differences and the effect they can have on missions. We will discuss these factors in the following paragraphs and attempt to identify how to mitigate or even overcome them.
The religious culture must be taken into account when planning operations. We must become familiar with the differences in the religious beliefs of the populace in the area that we will be operating in. The differences in perception between the Sunni and Shi'a cannot be ignored. The balance of Sunni versus Shi'a within a geographical location also effects the commander's decisions concerning operations. They are critical factors that will impact how the populace thinks, acts, and interacts within a region. It shapes their viewpoints concerning the presence of U.S. and coalition forces. How we present ourselves when we are amongst the population will be crucial to mission success and future operations. Leaders must assure training is conducted for all soldiers based on the most recent cultural study of the region. This training will help to mitigate any action that could be viewed in a negative light by the local population. Failure to integrate religious belief and diversity into operational planning will severely degrade operations and increase the likelihood of mission failure.
Another crucial factor that must be considered is the economy of the region in which we will be operating. What is the primary means of income? Are services readily available to the local population? Do insurgent activities often degrade or disrupt the quality of life of the population? These questions are but a few that must be taken into consideration when researching the local economy. As with many cultures, the ability to provide for one's family is a point of pride and honor throughout the Islamic faith. If local males find themselves unable to adequately provide for their families, the likelihood that they will do tasks for insurgent groups promising compensation, will dramatically increase. Coalition forces will need to confer with the local leadership to assist them in their goals for economic recovery. Operations will be seriously degraded or deadly if the only consistent source of income is in working for the local insurgents.
Many regions are remote or underdeveloped in Iraq and Afghanistan. It must be understood that communications are vital to operations and will also be utilized by the local insurgency to coordinate attacks. To avoid blue on blue incidents and to counter the insurgent activity, a study of the communications infrastructure must be conducted prior to deployment. How are communications degraded by the operating environment? Is there a dedicated cellular network within the region, supported by remote towers? What is the major form of communication used by the local population? How do insurgent elements utilize the available communication systems to conduct their operations? A request for information will need to be sent to the outgoing unit to answer these questions. An historical study of the regions infrastructure should also be conducted to determine what limitations have been encountered in the past. With this information units will be able to mitigate and effectively coordinate communications within their area of operations (AO).
Commanders will need to take into account the dialect within their AO and plan appropriately. Requests for linguists and interpreters should only be made after a study of the region and the prevailing dialect, have been conducted. By taking the time to conduct the proper research, the commander will be able to requisition the proper personnel to operate effectively. Without the right interpreter, the commanders operations could be seriously degraded or completely disrupted.
Intelligence Operations
Interrogators will need to be properly trained according to theater policy and regulations. Leaders should attempt to obtain the most up to date requirements for the theater they will be entering. Using the updated requirements will allow all interrogation teams to plan and coordinate training to prepare them for the certification process upon arrival to the theater of operation. Certification for all interrogators will include a left seat/right seat and be evaluated by a senior interrogator.
All interrogation plans will be submitted for approval through the senior interrogator. Legal will review and approve plans if there would be any question on the legality of conducting an interrogation in that way. These steps will ensure that all personnel are properly prepared to conduct interrogations in accordance with the security agreement and federal guidelines. This will reduce the chances of illegal interrogations and premature release of identified insurgents.
Interrogators will familiarize themselves with the tactics and techniques of QJBR, so that they can identify possible detainees who are part of or have worked closely with this insurgent organization. Once identified, the interrogation team should conduct the necessary research to determine if there are any known links between the detainee and QJBR. This will assist the interrogator in the creation of the interrogation plan. The information collected on QJBR from these detainees, could provide vital information concerning future operations of the QJBR.
Human intelligence collection teams (HCT) will be required to obtain updated information on their assigned AO prior to deployment. Prior research and study of the AO will be crucial to the success of the unit's mission. This information will provide the team leader with the material necessary to effectively train their soldiers, prior to arrival in theater. The team leader will need to coordinate with the outgoing team to obtain the most up to date information on activity within the area.
Prior contact with the outgoing team should be made to ensure all equipment is in good working order. This coordination will allow the outgoing team to correct any deficiencies prior to the arrival of the new HCT. Teams should assure that all requests for equipment are submitted through their chain of command no later than 10 months prior to deployment, to assure arrival of equipment. A brief should be conducted with the supported unit, prior to deployment, to assure they understand the role and capabilities of the HCT.
HCTs need to be familiar with all activity in the area of operations they will be assigned. It is important they understand the insurgent organizations that work within their area and their affiliations. HCTs should be well versed on the QJBR tactics and techniques. Should QJBR activity be identified, the collection team needs to create a plan to find sources that would be able to answer the PIR relating to the group. The mission will require coordination with Iraqi Forces, the local Iraqi police chief, other coalition intelligence agencies, and maneuver units assigned to the area. The HCT can better inform and advise the local commander on the location, strength, and activities of the QJBR, by conducting prior coordination for gathering the intelligence. This will increase the commander's confidence in the ability of the HCT to answer their priority intelligence requirements.
The S2X shop will quickly identify and disseminate intelligence information to help guide the collection effort. All intelligence requests for information must be prioritized and answered quickly, to help prevent double reporting and misinformation. The S2X should coordinate for signal intelligence assets to assist in the identification of QJBR communication networks and capabilities. All signal data obtained will need to be immediately forwarded to the S2X analysts. The analysis and dissemination of all combined intelligence will be a key factor in the ability of coalition forces to quickly plan and coordinate operations. The S2X should coordinate signal support and unmanned aerial vehicle support to provide the maneuver commander with a tactical advantage during the operations. The operation should be monitored by the S2X to provide the maneuver commander with the ability to obtain additional assets or coordinate with local Iraqi forces quickly and effectively.
Summary
As we have seen the QJBR is a well organized and trained insurgent group. QJBR has shown the ability to quickly replace leaders and continues to attract new members. This insurgent group has become adept at blending in with the populace and striking without warning. This ability makes them especially dangerous to coalition and host nation forces. In order to completely eliminate this threat, all forces must actively seek out and identify QJBR activity.
All personnel must receive cultural awareness training, a legal brief on approved intelligence activities, and training on working with coalition and local forces. Cultural awareness is vital for intelligence personnel who will be dealing directly with the local populace. With a better understanding of the local culture, intelligence personnel can more effectively conduct their mission and approach community leaders with greater confidence.
All intelligence personnel will need to become subject matter experts on the population of their area, as most supported units will have received an abbreviated class on the culture. This will be a great selling point, during the capabilities brief to the commander, on how important the intelligence team is to their success. Every team member should be able to advise the commander of any shift in the views of the populace, prior to any planned mission or meeting. This updated information will assist the commander in making decisions and allow them to preserve and protect their combat power.
Personnel will need to track all QJBR activities and provide an operational picture to the supported unit. As intelligence personnel, it is our responsibility to provide the most accurate information and insurgent affiliations to the local commander. For example, if reporting shows that QJBR is now conducting meetings and training with the local militia, this information could point to a change in QJBRs tactics and techniques. The commander will need to be briefed with all relevant information and advised on possible courses of actions, based on the intelligence information. The commander may even have to shift operations to disrupt the QJBR from intimidating or infiltrating the populace.
