Profits And Dynamic Capital Structure Adjustment Finance Essay

Published: November 26, 2015 Words: 5316

A central question in the finance field is whether firms have a target capital structure which they attempt to achieve, as well as how capital structure reacts under the influence of

parameters such as profitability, tangibility, the market-to-book ratio, bankruptcy risk, time

period or firm size. Our goal through the whole process of the paper is to understand the

relationship between leverage and profitability in empirical tests of capital structure.

Prominent theories, such as the trade-off, pecking order and market timing theory, are

briefly described over the course of this paper in order to provide a better overview of the

existing ideas and with the goal of comparing empirical results with expected theoretical

predictions. By referring to other papers related to this subject, we present a wider range of

points of view and attempt to verify the statements made in these articles on our own data

sample, consisting of German firms.

Our paper makes an attempt of performing a regression by means of all the parameters

above with a regression model based on the one proposed by Frank and Goyal (2009) and

applied to the given data. This model was chosen not only to ensure comparability with

previous studies on the same subject, but also due to the fact that it accounts for most of the

factors that have been identified in existing literature (e.g. Frank and Goyal, 2003) to play a

significant role in firms. financing decisions.

Supplementary literature which influenced the trend of this paper is offered by articles of

Frank and Goyal (2009), Strebulaev (2003) and Elsas and Florysiak(2008). We follow the

approach proposed in these papers and deduct similar conclusions.

This paper is structured as follows: The influence sources are briefly described under

Literature Review.. The next section, Theory., discusses the main theories present

throughout the paper. Important features of the used dataset are mentioned in the

subchapter Data., with the expected outcomes presented in the subsection Description of

the Regression Analysis.. The results are displayed and interpreted in the Results. section,

while the implications are noted under Conclusion..

II. Literature Review

In this section we summarize the literature that has influenced our theoretical and empirical

work.

The paper by Frank and Goyal (2009) comes as a reaction to the existing literature in the

form of an innovative paper stressing out the fact that commonly used leverage ratios had

been misinterpreted. They examine the relation between profitability on the one hand and

debt and equity issuances on the other, as well as the effect of company size on capital

structure decisions.

Another significant recent contribution to the capital structure research is the work by

Strebulaev (2007), which stresses out the fact that the properties of leverage at refinancing

points differ dramatically in true dynamics and comparative statics.

In their paper, Kayhan and Titman (2007) examine different variables that influence the

capital structure based on historic data. They conclude that although firms behave as though

they have a target debt ratio, they deviate from this target, influenced by different factors,

such as: past profitability, financial deficit, leverage deficit.

Using a dynamic framework and a broad data panel, Drobetz, Pensa and Wanzenried

(2006) suggest that the traditional capital structure theories do not characterize the nature of

the adjustment process towards target debt ratios. They analyze this process by

documenting the effect of firm characteristic variables on the speed of adjustment to target

leverage.

The study by Frank and Goyal (2008) presents the theoretical background of the trade-off

theory and distinguishes between a static trade-off model and a dynamic process of capital

structure adjustment towards a target leverage ratio. In addition to that, it presents several

stylized facts and discusses ways to empirically test these models.

A commonly used method to verify the validity of a static trade-off model would be to

observe the financing behavior of firms, following external shocks to their capital structure,

as analyzed by Myers (1984), who also creates a pecking order model and comes to the

conclusion that the latter better describes the empirically observed relation between

profitability and the leverage ratio.

By comparing predictions of the trade-off theory to the pecking order models, Fama and

French (2002) succeed in finding both analogies and differences between the two; most of

the differences apply to book leverage, but they sometimes affect market leverage as well.

This paper is a confrontation between trade-off and pecking order theories. Using a

completely different approach, Rajan and Zingales (1995) write an empirical paper, which

studies the determinants of firm.s capital structure in the major industrialized countries.

III. Theory

The first step in understanding firm.s capital structure adjustment decisions was made by

the Modigliani-Miller irrelevance proposition in 1958. Before that there was no generally

accepted theory of capital structure. Our work is based on the following three most widely

cited theories: the trade-off, pecking order and market timing theories.

A. Trade-off Theory

The term trade-off is used in different ways by different authors to describe a family of

related theories, some stating that bankruptcy and taxes are being balanced (Kraus and

Litzenberger, 1973), for others it includes agency based arguments (Fama and French,

2002). In all of these theories a manager evaluates the various costs and benefits of

alternative leverage plans, while it is often assumed that an interior solution is obtained so

that marginal costs and marginal benefits are balanced.

The original version of the trade-off theory emerged when corporate income taxes were

added to the Modigliani-Miller irrelevance proposition (1963). This created a benefit for

debt financing by protecting the earnings and profits of firms using the so called tax shield,

with the cost of bankruptcy being the obvious counterbalance. According to Myers (1984) a

firm following the trade-off theory sets a target debt-to-value ratio and then slowly moves

towards this target, which is determined by balancing debt tax shields against costs of

bankruptcy. Further analysis of Myers definition reveals two different forms of the trade-

off theory: the static and dynamic trade-off theories. Accordingly, the static theory can be

defined by a single period model and a trade-off between debt and the costs of bankruptcy,

while the dynamic model states that a firm exhibits an adjustment behavior towards target

leverage and if deviations from this target occur, they are gradually removed over time.

In their paper, Frank and Goyal (2009) highlight the most important implications of the

static trade-off theory, stating that more profitable firms borrow more, repurchase equity

and experience an increase in both book value of equity and market value of equity. Among

the low profit firms there is more variation in the book and market equity. The fact, that

more profitable firms are predicted to have a higher leverage ratio, while empirically they

tend to have lower leverage ratios, is regarded as a defective characteristic of the static

trade-off model.

In order to better understand the effect of profitability on leverage, a dynamic model has

been developed, which allows profitability and leverage to be negatively related in the data

due to various frictions. A number of aspects ignored in a single-period model, are taken

into consideration by the dynamic theory, with the roles of expectations and adjustment

costs being of particular importance. In a dynamic model, the correct financing decision

typically depends on the financing margin that the firm anticipates in the next period.

An important advocate of the dynamic trade-off theory is Strebulaev (2007), who states in

his paper that expected profitability is positively related to leverage at the refinancing

points. However, he further reveals that in a dynamic economy, cross-sectional tests reveal

a negative relation. With infrequent adjustments, an increase in profitability lowers

leverage by increasing future profitability and thus the value of the firm. Similarly, a

decrease in profitability increases leverage.

B. Pecking Order Theory

In the research of firm.s capital structure, the pecking order theory was developed by

Steward C. Myers and Nicolas Majluf in 1984. It states that companies choose their sources

of financing (from internal financing to equity) according to the law of least effort, or of

least resistance. Therefore, internal funds should be the first to be used and when those are

no longer available then debt is issued. The next step, when debt issuance is not enough, is

the equity issuance.

The empirically observed inverse relationship between profitability and debt ratios could be

explained using the pecking order theory. It is an implication of the theory that companies

prefer internal financing; they adapt their dividend payout ratios to their investment

opportunities and try to avoid sudden changes in variable values. Due to the unpredictable

fluctuations in profits and investment opportunities the generated cash flow is not equal to

the capital expenditures. In the case of greater cash flow, the firm pays the debt or invests

in securities; should the cash flow be less than expenditures, then the firm draws down its

cash balance or sells securities, rather than reducing dividends. If external financing is still

required, then the firm will start by choosing debt, followed by hybrid securities

(convertible bonds) and then equity as a last resort. As a supplementary argument, issuing

costs are lowest for internal funds, low for debt and highest for equity. There is also the

negative signaling to the stock market associated with issuing equity and positive signaling

associated with debt.

Several studies on this topic have demonstrated that the pecking order theory is a good

approximation of reality. If we were to consider the conclusions of Fama and French (2002)

and several other authors, some features of their data were better explained by this theory

than by the classic trade-off theory. Frank and Goyal (2007) on the other hand critically

underline the fact that the pecking order theory fails where it should actually hold, namely

for small firms where information asymmetry is presumably an important issue. Other

critical voices like An alternate test of Myer.s pecking order theory of capital structure:

the case of South Korean firms by Ang and Jung (1993), run local studies which fail to

support the Myers.s pecking theory when interpreting the results on marginal and

sensitivity analyses.

C. Market Timing Theory

The market timing theory states that firms prefer external equity when the cost of equity is

low and debt when the cost of equity is high. Similar to the pecking order theory, the

market timing theory does not recognize the existence of a target capital structure as stated

by Huang and Ritter (2004). To make this suggestion even more solid, Baker and Wurgler

(2002) note that even if there was an optimum, the benefits of market timing are perceived

to be higher than the costs of deviating from this optimum.

While in both the pecking order and market timing theories managers are primarily

concerned about current shareholders, the latter rejects the necessity of the existence of a

rational expectations equilibrium, stating instead that managers may believe that the equity

of their firm is over- or undervalued by the market (Baker/Wurgler, 2002). As pointed out

in the same paper, this suggestion does not require an inefficient market or correct

predictions on behalf of the managers, only the fact that they believe they can time the

market.

The primary prediction made by the market timing theory is that as long as managers

believe their stock is overvalued, they tend to issue more equity. Conversely, Baker and

Wurgler (2002) observe that equity is repurchased or debt issued when the stock is

undervalued. Another important point in this context as seen in Huang and Ritter (2004) is

that firms may resort to equity or debt issuances even if they have no immediate financing

needs. This is explained by the fact that issuing overvalued securities is in itself a project

with positive net present value. Baker and Wurgler (2002) further indicate that temporary

fluctuations in the value of a firm can lead to permanent changes in its capital structure,

which is determined to a large extent by past financing decisions. In addition, there is no

target ratio which firms would aim to achieve.

The predictions of the market timing theory are supported by empirical evidence. Firstly, as

discovered by a survey of Graham and Harvey (2001), sixty seven percent of CFO.s

interviewed agree that over- or undervaluation of stock is an important factor when

considering issuing equity. Secondly, as found by Baker and Wurgler (2002) as well as

Loughran, Ritter and Rydqvist (1994) among others, there is a strong positive relationship

between the market-to-book ratio, which is used as an indicator for perceived over- or

undervaluation of a firm.s stock, and the propensity to issue equity. Nevertheless, the

market timing theory finds no precise connection between the leverage ratio and

profitability, which is why we do not consider the implications of this theory in our

empirical test.

IV. Model

A. Data

The sample we used in our paper comes from the annual financial statement data available

in Hoppenstedt for German exchange listed firms with unregulated capital structures,

excluding financials and utilities. The observation period for the sample is from 1987 to

2006 and the accounting standards used are: IAS, US-GAAP, "HGB-

Gesamtkostenverfahren", and "HGB-Umsatzkostenverfahren". For firms with both a

consolidated and an individual financial statement, the consolidated financial statement has

been selected. Market data comes from the Datastream database by Thomson Financial.

Financial statement data are deflated using the GDP-deflator with base year 2005. The

following variables have been used throughout the paper and in the capital structure

regression. We use the same data as Elsas and Florysiak (2008).

Distribution

Variable

N

Mean

SD

Min

Max

25th

50th

75th

99th

Debt ($ millions)

10082

1103.623

7226.356

0.06

145963.00

12.25

52.0

208.25

145963

Book equity ($ millions)

10082

394.616

2054.007

0.00

36801.00

9.75

31.5

114.50

36801

Market equity ($ millions)

10082

821.511

3963.241

0.59

67071.00

18.00

61.0

246.00

67071

Assets ($ millions)

10082

425.246

2713.176

0.00

67534.00

2.25

19.5

89.75

67534

Size

10082

18.2712

2.413945

10.31

25.70

16.81

18.4

19.73

24

Book leverage

10082

0.596

0.225

0.02

1.00

0.454

0.631

0.763

1

Market leverage

10082

0.452

0.254

0.00

0.97

0.246

0.450

0.654

0.945

Median Ind. Leverage

10082

0.430

0.140

0.03

0.83

0.348

0.451

0.529

0.692

Profitability

10082

0.093

0.159

-1.74

0.68

0.044

0.105

0.166

0.467

Tangibility

10082

0.286

0.234

0.00

1.20

0.103

0.243

0.407

0.955

Market-to-book

10082

2.179

4.290

0.39

97.26

1.053

1.331

1.923

18.222

Variable definitions:

Debt = Long-term debt + Short-term debt

Book equity = Common shareholder equity

Market equity = Outstanding shares X Closing share price

Assets = Book assets

Book leverage = Debt / (Debt + Book equity)

Market leverage = Debt / (Debt + Market equity)

Profitability = EBITDA/Total assets

Tangibility = Net property plant and equipment / Total assets

Market-to-book = Market value of assets / Book assets

Median Industry Leverage = Median market debt ratio at the time t, following Fama and

French (1997) industry classification

B. Description of the Regression Analysis

In order to assess the importance of several factors in determining the capital structure of

firms, a regression analysis can be utilized with leverage as the dependent variable.

The first step to this end is to identify which factors are particularly useful in explaining

how firms make their financing decisions and in what ways firms differ in their capital

structures. A paper published by Frank and Goyal in 2003 examines the influence of

several variables in the financing decisions of US publicly traded firms. A primary finding

of this paper is that the level of leverage in the industry in which the firm operates, the

market-to-book ratio of the firm, the size of the company as measured by the natural

logarithm of its sales, bankruptcy risk as measured by Altman.s Z-Score and the tangibility

of its assets are all significantly correlated with the firm.s leverage ratio. All this is

consistent with existing literature and widely used in similar regression analyses. Another

interesting finding of the same study is that the effect of corporate profits on leverage is not

particularly robust (though still negative, contrary to the predictions of the static trade-off

theory).

Now that several influencing factors have been identified, the next step can be taken, which

is to specify a regression. In order to ensure comparability with previous studies on the

same subject we try to set up a regression with similar characteristics to the ones widely

used in existing literature. Therefore we utilize a regression similar to the one specified in a

paper of Frank and Goyal (2009). The merit of this estimation is the use of leverage ratios,

something that is common in the previous literature. The regression model is as follows:

Included in the above model are all factors previously mentioned except of the bankruptcy

risk of a firm due to the lack of sufficient data in the database we used. In addition, a year

dummy has been included.

Using the above regression, we first try to formulate predictions as to what should be

expected according to capital structure theory. The median leverage of an industry should

be positively related to the leverage ratio of a firm in a trade-off context. This is justified by

the fact that firms in the same industry are, to a large extent, exposed to similar threats and

have to adapt to similar developments (Frank/Goyal, 2003). As further stated in the same

study, under the pecking order theory only an indirect link between the two is recognized,

which exists only to the extent that the industry median leverage serves as a proxy for the

firm.s financing needs.

The market-to-book ratio is expected to be negatively correlated with leverage, both in a

trade-off and in a pecking order context. According to the trade-off theory, this stems both

from the need to retain growth options and the fact that growth firms are riskier, losing

more value when they go into distress. The pecking order theory on the other hand suggests

that more profitable firms make more use of internal cash flows than of external forms of

financing, such as debt (Frank/Goyal, 2003).

According to trade-off theory, tangible assets are expected to have a positive effect on

leverage. This is attributed to the fact that assets like property and equipment are usually

easier to value compared to intangible assets, meaning that they can easily be used as

collateral (Frank/Goyal, 2003). In the context of the pecking order theory on the other hand,

tangibility is expected to have a negative correlation with leverage. Tangibility is associated

with lower information asymmetry, something that makes equity comparatively less costly

(Frank/Goyal, 2007).

Theory suggests that a company.s size is another important determinant of capital structure

decisions. We use the natural logarithm of sales as a measure for firm size, which seems to

be a better indicator than log of assets, as has been empirically shown by Frank and Goyal

(2003). The static trade-off theory suggests that larger companies are usually able to pile up

more debt, due to the fact that they are generally more diversified and have a lower default

risk. In addition, they usually have existed for a longer period of time and are well known

to debt markets, meaning that their agency costs of debt are lower (Frank/Goyal, 2003). All

these factors lead to the unambiguous conclusion, that in a trade-off context, firm size is

positively related to leverage (Frank/Goyal 2003 and 2007). The pecking-order theory on

the other hand, does not offer any clear predictions. It is often interpreted as predicting an

inverse relation between the two, something that is attributed to the lower level of volatility

in large firms. assets. This lower level of volatility makes equity issuances relatively

cheaper compared to smaller, more volatile firms (Frank/Goyal, 2007). However, this effect

is countered by the costs of adverse selection of existing assets, an effect which, due to the

large volume of the assets, may be significant. If the latter effect outweighs the former, then

a positive relation between leverage and profitability can be predicted, as noted by Frank

and Goyal in 2003 and 2007.

The effects of profitability on corporate leverage are also complex. The static trade-off

theory points to a positive relation between profits and leverage, as more profitable firms

can issue more debt and have more profits to shield from taxation (Frank/Goyal, 2009).

This positive relation between the two should be more emphatic in the case of book

leverage (Fama/French, 2002). On the other hand, the relation between market leverage and

profitability cannot be so easily predicted. This stems from the fact that profits can also be

used as a proxy for firm growth, as stated by Frank and Goyal in 2007, with higher profits

leading to an increase in the market value of the firm. If this effect is strong enough, then an

inverse relation between profitability and market leverage could be observed. The pecking

order theory, in the contrary, directly implies that increased profitability should result in

less external financing and hence, lower leverage, as suggested by Frank and Goyal (2007).

The market timing theory makes no clear predictions, as financing decisions also rely on

the current state of the market and the expectations of managers (Frank/Goyal, 2003 and

Baker/Wurgler, 2000).

5. Results

In this part, we present the results of the regression analyses we performed on the examined

panel data, as described in part IV. We first present the results of the leverage regressions

performed on the whole sample.

Table I

Time-Series Regressions for Book and Market Leverage

The sample consists of 1182 German firms with observations ranging in the period from

1987 to 2006. The table presents estimates of the following leverage ratio regression,

which has been derived from the seminal 2009 paper of Frank and Goyal:

whereLeveraget is the ratio of debt over debt plus book equity in column (1) and the ratio of

debt over debt plus market equity in column (2). The explanatory variables, which include

profitability, median leverage of the industry (IndMedianLev), the market-to-book ratio

(

, tangibility and size, are described in part IV and lagged by one year. The

regressions include year fixed effects. The coefficients have been rounded to 4 decimal

digits. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses below the respective coefficients. *:

Significant at the 10 percent level. **: Significant at the 5 percent level. ***: Significant at

the 1 percent level.

Explanatory variables

Book Leverage

(1)

Market Leverage

(2)

Profitabilityt-1

-0.1964***

(-15.48)

-0.2776***

(-19.61)

IndMedianLevt-1

0.0558***

(4.10)

0.0804***

(5.29)

M/Bt-1

-0.0032***

(-8.13)

-0.0066***

(-15.04)

Tangibilityt-1

0.1378***

(10.77)

0.0794***

(5.56)

Sizet-1

0.0263***

0.0536***

(12.72)

(23.23)

Constant

0.0849**

(2.21)

-0.5296***

(-12.37)

R2 Overall

0.1729

0.2247

Observations

8802

8802

The estimates of the above regressions generally comply with those observed in similar

analyses. In particular the results are overly similar to those reported in the paper of Frank

and Goyal (2009), from which the regression has been derived.

The coefficients for profitability are robustly negative for both book and market leverage,

something that directly contradicts the static trade-off theory, but seems to agree with the

pecking order theory. The findings are in line with those reported by Frank and Goyal

(2009) and Fama and French (2000). However, Frank and Goyal (2009) further elaborate

on this issue, offering an alternate explanation about the relation between leverage and

profitability.

Industry median leverage is found to have a highly significant positive effect on both book

and market leverage, a fact that supports the predictions of the trade-off theory and does not

contradict the pecking order theory. Frank and Goyal (2003) state that the median industry

leverage is one of the strongest and most consistent predictors of leverage.. In their paper

of 2009, they report a strongly positive effect on leverage. Our estimation has shown a

positive effect, significant at the 1 percent level, but the coefficients are lower than those

reported in the aforementioned study of Frank and Goyal. However, this difference could

be attributed to other factors such as the smaller sample size employed in our study or the

nature of German firms, in contrast to the behavior of their American counterparts.

The market-to-book ratio negatively affects leverage. The result is statistically significant,

consistent with the predictions of both the trade-off and the pecking order theories as well

as in line with the findings of Frank and Goyal (2009)

The degree of asset tangibility positively influences leverage. This finding is consistent

with the predictions of the trade-off theory, but seems to contradict the pecking order

theory. Frank and Goyal (2009) report similar results.

The estimated coefficients for firm size as measured by log of sales are positive and highly

significant for both book and market leverage. This is what was expected in a trade-off

context. Under a pecking order perspective the effect is not clearly predicted. Nevertheless,

the results make the case for the higher significance of the costs of adverse selection on

existing assets compared to the relative attractiveness of equity, due to lower volatility. Last

but not least, our findings are consistent with those reported by Frank and Goyal (2009) and

Fama and French (2000).

Table II

Time-Series Regressions for Book and Market Leverage sorted by profitability

Table II presents estimates of the previously discussed leverage ratio regression sorted by

profitability in ascending order and divided into the 25 and 75 percentiles, where

Leveraget is the ratio of debt over debt plus book equity in column (1) and the ratio of debt

over debt plus market equity in column (2). The explanatory variables, which include

profitability, median leverage of the industry (IndMedianLev), the market-to-book ratio

(

, tangibility and size, are described in part IV and lagged by one year. The

regressions include year fixed effects. The coefficients have been rounded to 4 decimal

digits. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses below the respective coefficients. *:

Significant at the 10 percent level. **: Significant at the 5 percent level. ***: Significant at

the 1 percent level.

Explanatory

variables

Book Leverage

Market Leverage

25th

75th

25th

75th

Profitabilityt-1

-0.1389***

-0.1658***

-0.1403***

-0.2443***

(-5.38)

(-4.51)

(-6.04)

(-6.45)

IndMedianLevt-1

0.2601***

0.0072

0.5168***

0.2476***

(7.74)

(0.28)

(17.09)

(9.30)

M/Bt-1

0.0008

0.0015

-0.0049***

-0.0140***

(1.32)

(1.34)

(-8.53)

(-12.15)

Tangibilityt-1

0.3230***

0.1983***

0.2352***

0.1187***

(8.64)

(8.84)

(6.99)

(5.14)

Sizet-1

-0.0015

0.0222***

0.0271***

0.0299***

(-0.34)

(5.00)

(6.82)

(6.53)

Constant

0.4059***

0.1169

-0.2644***

-0.2504**

(5.36)

(1.37)

(-3.88)

(-2.85)

R2 Overall

0.1171

0.0932

0.4092

0.2575

Observations

2521

2521

2521

2521

When sorting the sample by profitability and applying the leverage ratio regression on the

25th and 75th percentiles, we observe some patterns for the most and least profitable firms,

but these findings match our previous results and the results obtained by Frank and Goyal

(2009), with some minor variances.

The outputs for the profitability coefficient are negative and highly significant, supporting

our findings from the previous regression, but also contradicting the static trade-off theory.

By splitting the sample into two categories and analyzing the regression results, we can

observe that the profitability has a stronger negative effect over the leverage ratio of more

profitable firms while the effect over the least profitable firms is almost equal in both cases.

While the differences are not very significant, it shows that more profitable firms use their

additional income to pay off debts and thus reduce their leverage ratio. This is an effect

explained by the pecking order theory.

According to Frank and Goyal (2003), the median industry leverage is one of the most

reliable factors in the leverage decisions of publicly traded U.S. firms, with positive effects

on the leverage ratios. Here we observe highly significant results for the 25th percentile for

both leverage ratios and higher positive values than in our previous findings. The median

industry leverage has a strong effect over the leverage ratios of less profitable firms, due to

the fact that these firms are more sensitive and exposed to changes in industry leverage,

with the market leverage ratio experiencing the strongest effects. The data for the more

profitable firms display a low statistical significance, with lower values than that of 25th

percentile, because the leverage ratio of these firms is not so exposed to variances in the

industry leverage.

The market to book ratio is also considered reliable by Frank and Goyal (2003), with a

negative effect on the leverage ratio, which is also consistent with the findings by Rajan

and Zingales (1995), who show that the negative relation between leverage and market-to-

book exists in all G7 countries. Even if the output of the book leverage regression is

positive, it displays small and statistically insignificant numbers. With increasing market

value of the assets, the market leverage decreases, an effect which is stronger for the more

profitable firms.

The tangibility variable does not show any significant deviation from the previous findings,

having a positive influence over the leverage ratios. Firms in the 1st quartile experience a

higher influence of the tangibility ratio over their leverage, because an increase in

tangibility means greater expenditures and the less profitable firms have to use debt more

often than the more profitable companies.

The regression output for the size variable delivers values that are in line with our previous

findings and the findings provided by other studies, excluding the 1st quartile of the book

leverage, which shows a negative but statistically insignificant result. The values for the

other categories do not show significant differences, due to the fact that the size of the

company has roughly the same effect over their leverage ratio, independently of their

profitability.

By conducting two different regressions, one using the original sample and the other by

grouping the data, we can properly understand how each variable is influencing the capital

structure ratios. Of particular interest was the relationship between the leverage ratios and

the profitability, where the results match the findings obtained by Frank and Goyal (2009)

and also correspond with the pecking order theory. It is also noticeable that the variables

that are negatively influencing the leverage ratios, respectively profitability and market to

book ratio, are displaying stronger effects over the more profitable firms, while the less

profitable firms are more sensitive to changes of the positive variables, namely the median

industry leverage and tangibility, with the size coefficient being roughly equal for both

groups.

6. Conclusion

The goal of this paper was to provide an overview and analyze the ambiguous relationship

between leverage and profitability in empirical tests of capital structure. One selected

empirical test was analyzed and replicated, namely the regression analyses used by Frank

and Goyal (2009), to preserve the link to the existing literature on this subject.

We additionally split the sample into the 1st and 3rd profitability quartiles and perform the

two leverage ratio regressions, noticing some interesting patterns and observing more

details of the impact that various variables have on the leverage ratio.

We come to the conclusion that profitability has a negative effect on the book and market

leverage ratios, while the more profitable firms experience a stronger impact, due to the fact

that this increase in profitability is usually leading to a decrease in debt and an increase in

market value of assets.

This negative relationship is a contradiction to the static trade-off theory, which states that

more profitable firms tend to issue debt and repurchase equity, which would lead to a

positive relationship. A further study of the trade-off theory was done by Strebluaev (2007),

who elaborates on the dynamic trade-off theory by considering various frictions which are

ignored in the classic model.

Our observations match those of the specialized literature, which support the predictions of

the pecking order theory. Frank and Goyal (2009) offer additional explanations in this

regard, stating that the commonly used leverage ratios may be misleading due to effect of

already acquired debt and therefore they are usually misinterpreted. From our results, we

conclude that firms have no target leverage ratio as predicted by the trade-off theory.

However we belive that further research has to be conducted whereas the paper by Frank

and Goyal (2009) can be used as a starting point.