Manoeuvre Warfare, as a war fighting philosophy is not a 20th Century discovery. In fact, its lineage is ancient and can be traced back to the BC period. However, the reinterpretation of Manoeuvre Warfare in the last two decades has given it a new impetus for its adoption by most modern armies in an institutionalised form. It was seen as an antidote to theories that emphasized on attrition and presented a more economical and dynamic approach to warfare.
Although Manoeuvre warfare has been adopted as the basis for most of the
doctrine of Western armies, the Indian Army has been loosely following it in both theory as well as practice for decades now, but is still grappling to adopt it as basis of our war fighting philosophy. It will take more than rhetoric to put this concept into practice; there remains some ambiguity and confusion as to what exactly it entails. Many definitions exist and few sources are capable of succinctly and clearly defining what Manoeuvre warfare is and how one does it. Manoeuvre is more of a philosophical approach to campaign design and execution than an arrangement of tactical engagements. Art and philosophy are the most common descriptive terms encountered discussing the concept and definition of Manoeuvre warfare. At least one, and, frequently both terms appear in most definitions of manoeuvre warfare which leaves it to the interpretation and understanding of individual which is generally obscured by his basic psyche, experience and knowledge base available to him or his capability to grasp it. More often than not one acts on the lines of six blind men who wanted to describe an elephant and each used his imagination according to the part of elephant he was touching: -
So six blind men of Hindustan
Disputed loud and long,
Each in his own opinion
Exceeding stiff and strong;
Though each was partly in the right,
They all were in the wrong!
Applicability Of Manoeuvre Warfare
2. Manoeuvre is traditionally thought of as a spatial concept, that is the use of manoeuvre so as to gain positional advantage. The US Marine concept of manoeuvre warfare however is a "war fighting philosophy that seeks to shatter the enemy's cohesion through a variety of rapid, focused, and unexpected actions which create a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation with which the enemy cannot cope". [1] The US Marine manual goes on to say: "This is not to imply that firepower is unimportant. On the contrary, firepower is central to manoeuvre warfare. Nor do we mean to imply that we will pass up the opportunity to physically destroy the enemy. We will concentrate fires and forces at decisive points to destroy enemy elements when the opportunity presents itself and when it fits our larger purposes". [2]
3. When deciding the doctrine or war fighting philosophy that any nation should adopt the basic question one must ask is - "how can one achieve victory which is economic in terms of men, material and in quickest time frame?" Moreover this question has to be viewed in the light of various factors such as the nation's military and economic might in relation to it's potential adversaries, the likely future battlefield scenario and the likely duration of war. The Indian Army doctrine mentions some concepts of manoeuvre warfare in its chapter on Operational Perspective [3] but remains quite on manoeuvre warfare as our war fighting philosophy. Since most astounding victories associated with this concept have a mechanised background, it is often considered as word of mechanised domain. The most common example given in its support is of the "Blitzkrieg" or Rommel and Patton's gallop across Gazala and the plains of Sicily respectively. While everyone knows that the World War II Panzer leader, Erwin Rommel, was a daring practitioner of manoeuvre warfare, too few know that he learned and perfected his manoeuvre warfare skills as a light infantryman in World War I. Indeed, it can be argued that the German way of war in World War II was profoundly influenced by Rommel's World war I light infantry experiences and the book [4] that grew out of those experiences. This lack of historical and conceptual understanding further deepens the dilemma of its applicability in Indian context especially in mountains.
4. Keeping this in mind we must clearly understand if manoeuvre warfare solely applicable to conventional conflicts typified by massed formations of armoured vehicles? Or, are the principles and methods equally applicable to mountainous terrain. The key to manoeuvre warfare, as expressed by proponents like William Lind and Robert Leonhard, was the defeat of the enemy by attacking his critical vulnerability rather than going toe-to-toe with his strength. This implies that it is in difficult terrain like mountains where critical vulnerabilities are of paramount importance and play decisive roles in the success of operations, the manoeuvre warfare assumes significant importance.
CHAPTER II
METHODOLOGY
Statement of the Problem
1. Manoeuvre warfare is considered to be synonymous with mechanised operations and desert terrain by most of us, restraining us from tapping the max potential of this universal war fighting philosophy, whose applicability is irrespective of the type of terrain or the arm using it .The aim of this paper is to analyse the concept of manoeuvre warfare as the war fighting philosophy for Indian Army and examine the feasibility of its application in mountainous terrain in Indian context.
Hypothesis
2. Manoeuvre warfare is not a hard science and does not have a rigid list of theorems or formulae, which can define its applicability to a particular arm or terrain. It is very much applicable in Indian context, especially to mountainous terrain.
Justification of the Study
3. Inability to Accept Manoeuvre Warfare. Over the years we have developed an attrition-based approach to warfare and our military institutes teach tactics as science having set piece solutions with mathematical and fixed utilization of resources. Though we claim to accept most logical and workable solutions but nine out of ten excercises end up with same lessons and solutions being culled out in the end. Another factor, which contributes to our inability to accept manoeuvre warfare is our fascination to adopt westernised terms and concepts, which is acceptable till they are used as building blocks to enhance our operational efficiency. But when templated without giving a proper thought to the fibre of our society ,training and our basic approach towards life and philosophy [5] - results in mere lip service and resentment at grass root level where they are to be executed. The manoeuvre warfare is also taken as extension to this jargon by some. This makes most of us to think of maneouver as another fascinating word for "what we have always done" or some coin it as "common sense tactics".
4. Geo-Politico-Military Factor. India is wedged between two hostile neighbours having boundary disputes with both, which can lead to a potential conflict in future. With western adversary we enjoying vast superiority both in numbers and economy but the situation is not so very same with the eastern. All Indian philosophy and ethos are against any loss of any territory coupled with no first use of force, which places the military force at initial disadvantage of wresting the initiative before any conflict. This more or less propels India towards the theory of attrition warfare wherein territory is considered most important & superior force ratios are considered necessary to protect/regain it. India's worst-case scenario is a simultaneous two-front war. This nightmarish possibility is fuelled by the ever-deepening military nexus between China and Pakistan, ranging from continuing assistance in the nuclear and missile sphere to the presence of Chinese soldiers in Pakistan-occupied-Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan areas.
5. Battle Field Milieu. These potential situations when coupled with future battlefield scenario having nuclear backdrop, own political will and international pressure presents itself with high intensity, fluid, short term and intense battle which could be or rather will be in a reactive scenario. Such characterized conflicts can't be won just by attritionist approach. We need a philosophy, which provides us victory in shortest time frame with economy in men and material.
6. With 60 to 70 per cent of our borders resting on the high mastiffs of the mountainous terrain, it is easy to acquire a defensive mentality and orthodox approach to war fighting. This attitude stems from a blinkered outlook that any other approach to warfare is of no concern in this topography and that any war that has to be won will be nothing but a peak to peak slogging match. In the light of these, it is imperative that one takes a fresh look at our approach to warfare and reconsider the applicability of maneouver warfare to mountainous terrain to win the future conflicts with minimal losses & acceptable timeframe. We must understand that the manoeuverist approach to operations is as important to a commander in the high mountains as it is to a mounted general.
Scope
7. This paper carries out an analysis of modern works on the theory of Manoeuvre warfare and tries to establish link between various theories and figure out basic components of manoeuvre warfare . The scope will be limited to the changes need to be adopted by Indian Army to change itself to manoeuvrestic army and the concepts of the philosophy that can be applied to mountains bordering India.
Methods of Data Collection
8. Books, military journals and periodical have been referred to from Defence Services Staff College Library, online sources and personal subscriptions. Some contents have also been taken from the interviews of German generals after WW II which were available from Defence Sites after translations. My own understanding of subject which accrued from discussions with peers, seniors and the Guide DS on the topic has come handy in making few suggestions for the dissertation. The bibliography of sources is appended at the end of the text.
Organisation of Data Analysis
9. It is proposed to study the subject in the following manner:-
(a) understanding of maneouver warfare .
(b) Study the various styles of warfare.
(c) Study the theory of manoeuvre warfare and its essential elements.
(d) Study the relevance of manoeuvre warfare in the Indian Context.
(e) Suggested changes for application of manoeuvre warfare in the Indian context.
CHAPTER II
UNDERSTANDING MANOEUVRE WARFARE
"… Manoeuvre theory has nothing to do with vast numbers of men and machines charging down the countryside. Manoeuvre theory is about amplifying the force which a small mass is capable of exerting; it is synonymous with the Indirect Approach".
-Richard E Simpkin
Evolution of Manoeuvre Theory
10. Manoeuvre warfare is a philosophy for "fighting smart" to ensure success in war. The concept is as old as the first barbarian to attack his opponent from behind. Sun Tzu captured its essence in his classic work [6] . Yet only recently has a clear and embracing definition of this type of warfare been offered for modern tactics and operations. Two of the best works on modern manoeuvre warfare come from Robert R Leonhard [7] and William S Lind [8] . While both draw heavily on Sun Tzu, Richard Simpkin, Sir Basil Liddell-Hart and Second World War German and Ruussian theories, they synthesize these thoughts and produce what could be called the modern school of Manoeuvre warfare.
Modern Works On Manoeuvre Warfare
11. William S Lind & OODA Cycle. Lind's understanding of manoeuvre warfare theory is based basically on the research done by Retired Air Force Colonel, John Boyd, who studied the US success with the F-86 fighter aircraft in combat over Korea fighter aircraft and derived Boyd Theory, "Pattern of conflicts". He observed that fighter pilots who were able to observe their opponent, orient themselves to the situation, decide on a course of action and act upon that course of action faster than their opponents were usually victorious. The idea was that the pilot who went through his OODA loop (Observe, Orient, Decide, Act_also known as a BoydCycle) faster than his opponent was able to render his opponent's actions irrelevant and gain the upper hand in the dogfight. Lind uses this as base to conceptualise Manoeuvre theory and summarise it as- "Conflict can be seen as time-competitive OODA (observation-orientation-decision-action ) cycles." [9] He implied that the ground forces, which are able to consistently decide, move and fight faster, would quickly render the enemy's actions irrelevant and thereby destroy his cohesion. An enemy who finds his actions less relevant with each passing moment are likely to "panic or become passive and this is an ideal outcome for the victor, because a panicked or passive enemy can be annihilated or captured at the lowest cost in friendly casualties." [10]
12. To achieve such state friendly force's must have ability to conduct faster Boyd Cycles/OODA cycle .The various methods suggested by Lind are Decentralized Command and Control, Initiative at all levels of command to exploit the fleeting opportunities. Mission-Type Orders that tell subordinates what to achieve and not how to achieve it; the designation of a Main Effort to focus friendly forces to promote Unity of Effort and reliance on Reconnaissance Pull to Exploit Gaps and Avoid Surfaces in enemy defences. He further adds that Manoeuvre warfare means not only to Accept confusion and disorder but also successfully operates in it and warns to avoid all patterns, recipes and formulae i.e. to say Be Unpredictable and achieve surprise. [11]
13. Therefore, the essence of Lind's theory is tempo which is backed by Sun Tzu - " What is of the greatest importance in war is extraordinary speed; one cannot afford to neglect opportunity . . . An attack may lack ingenuity, but it must be delivered with supernatural speed'' and further explained by Richard Simpkin as - the operational rate of advance. [12]
14. Robert Leonhard and Art of Manoeuvre. Leonhard expands upon Lind's theory of manoeuvre warfare by looking beyond tempo to other methods of defeating enemy. But agrees with Lind on defeating enemy with the minimal necessary force. As defined by Leonhard, manoeuvre warfare "attempts to defeat the enemy through
means other than the simple destruction of his mass." [13] The 'other means' of Leonhard include -
(a) Pre-Emption which is the most economical and often most successful method to defeat enemy. "Indeed the highest and purest application of maneuver theory is to pre-empt the enemy, that is, to disarm or neutralize him before the fight." [14] This is in consonance with Lind's emphasis on tempo and Boyd Cycles.
(b) Dislocation is regarded as the next most preferred method, after pre-emption, i.e., which he describes as "…removing the enemy from the decisive point, or vice versa, thus rendering them useless and irrelevant to the fight." [15] Dislocation is further classified as either positional or functional dislocation. Positional dislocation involves making the enemy's location irrelevant through Manoeuvre while Functional dislocation refers to rendering an enemy's strength irrelevant.
(c) Disruption as the third method for defeating the enemy more economically. He defines disruption as attacking the enemy's Centre of gravity(COG), which he further explain using the King & Queen theory [16] -taking analogy from game of chess to he describe the understanding of of COG for attritionist as the queen or source of strength and for maneouvrist as king or the critical vulnerability. Which when addressed causes the enemy to lose cohesion and the will to fight. Disruption is closely linked to battlefield psychology and its target is not the enemy forces per se but rather the mind of
Essentials of Manoeuvre Warfare.
15. Other than the concept mentioned above; keeping in view the present battle field - simultaneity, Integrated battle approach between all three services, mental mobility of cdrs at all levels and high initiative with mastering the basic skills are other essentials demanded for a manoeuvrestic appch. There is a large gap between the philosophical concept and its practical application. Manoeuvre warfare is not a concept that can be practiced independently by operational units. It requires the support of entire army as well as each individual soldier for the required transformation.
Manoeuvre Vs Attrition .
16. In most situations, attrition warfare is best able to achieve the principle of concentration of force, unity of command, security, cooperation and simplicity. It is a comparatively simple way to wage war and requires little initiative of lower junior subordinates; battles are planned in detail by higher head quarters and junior officers merely carry out order. However this makes attrition war far more predictable, and is a form best suited to a large clumsy and poorly lead army.
12. By contrast, manoeuvre warfare regards fighting as only one way of applying military force to the attainment of a politico - military aim. True success lies in pre-
emption, or in decision by initial surprise. … Manoeuvre warfare draws its power mainly from opportunities and still more on winning the battle of wills by surprise or, failing this, by speed and aptness of response. [1] Manoeuvre warfare is thus concerned with amplifying the force which a small mass is capable of exerting and conveying a threat commensurate with the mission.
Field Marshal Montgomery and General George S. Patton, two of the premier Allied field commanders in the European Theater during World War II, illustrate in large measure the differences between firepower warfare and maneuver warfare. Patton tended to emphasize audacity, the offensive, speed, and the continual adjustment to changing situations while Montgomery stressed on balance, prudence, and planning. Patton frequently criticized Montgomery's aversion to taking risk; Montgomery's approach to war was indeed an effort to eliminate as much risk as possible. Comparing the two commanders leads to the deductive assessment that: Patton and Montgomery were two of the most effective allied commanders of the war who although faced with roughly similar conditions, practiced effective dissimilar methods of war.
contrast to attrition theory, which targets the enemy's physical forces, manoeuvre theory concentrates on outperforming the enemy's thought processes with the intent to destroy force cohesion.15. The manoeuvre theorist eyes the enemy closely and adopts whatever methodology works to preempt, dislocate, or disrupt him. This style of warfighting carries enormous consequences for doctrine, force structure, personnel requirements, and leadership.
The first characteristic of a manoeuvreist military is a tendency toward decentralization. The primary need is to work quickly through the OODA loop; passing information up and down a centralized chain of command is inimical to deciding and acting faster than the enemy. Manoeuvre theory produces a military notable for generating and then thriving upon confusion and disorder in enemy organizations. Because decentralized command arrangements depend upon local subordinate-unit initiative to solve the situation at hand, the enemy is likely to discern no regular pattern of operations. The manoeuvreist military disdains standardized or traditional solutions to problems. "There is no formula you can learn. When someone says, 'cut all the bull about theory and tell me what to do,' you can't. You can talk about how to think, and about some useful techniques. But you can't give new formulas to replace the ones...taught."16 A manoeuvreist military places a strong emphasis on the quality, trust, and independence of thought and action of and within its officer corps. Discarding a dependence upon formulas or fixed solutions requires lower-level leaders who can act individually based upon the situation, personalities, and intentions involved. A great degree of trust is required from senior leadership.
With the focus on the enemy's thought processes, as well as the requirement for high-initiative, creative, innovative, and trustworthy leadership, a manoeuvreist military tends to be "people-centered" in contrast to an attritionist military, which by nature tends to focus on technology and hardware. Manoeuvre militaries ensure that their officers are sufficiently educated in the profession of war, look with a close and stringent eye to promotions and other reward systems, and place emphasis upon rigorous historical study.17 As a corollary, they prefer less complicated technologies and weapons; technology is the trade--people and leadership are the professions.
When it succeeds, manoeuvre warfighting accomplishes its goal more decisively than does attrition. The collapse of the enemy, wrought through the destruction of mental, moral, or physical cohesiveness, is more dramatic. Panic, rout, or a resigned passivity are the hallmarks of an enemy defeated by manoeuvre warfare.
Hannibal's victory over the Romans at Cannae was an early example of tactical manoeuvre warfare. More recently, in U.S. history, the early successful campaigns of the Confederacy exhibited an ability to outthink opponents at the operational and tactical level and strike sharply at Union operational and strategic cohesiveness. Early in the Second World War, the Germans were exemplars of manoeuvre warfare, especially in their 1940 campaign in France; the French high command was literally paralyzed by the assault upon its awareness and control of the battle. During the war in Vietnam, the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong, manoeuvre warfare theorists to the core, applied their theories at the tactical, operational, and most notably the strategic level, where they effectively attacked their opponents' national cohesion and will to fight. In 1979, Vietnamese units effectively repelled an invading People's Liberation Army force, causing the leaders of China to reconsider their nation's attritional approach to ground combat.
Manoeuvreist high commands focus on the development of leadership, and that leadership takes care of much that belabors the attritionist organization. The advantages of manoeuvre warfare infuse energy, trust, efficiency, and innovativeness in an officer corps. Such a structure has higher morale, fewer discipline problems, and a better ability to solve unique "people problems" brought about by change, such as stressful social and moral conditions. The reduced reliance on technology to solve military problems usually causes required weapon systems to migrate toward the lower end of the complexity (and therefore cost) scale.18 Less affluent societies are well suited to this type of warfare; in fact, this can be the sole reason why they adopt manoeuvre warfare theory. When arrayed against an attritionist mindset, the manoeuvre theorist finds fertile ground on which to work and in the past has often been successful.
The disadvantages of manoeuvre theory, however, are also self-evident. The primary one is its strong dependence upon individual leadership. (Recall the impact of "Stonewall" Jackson's death on subsequent campaigns.) There are also immense and sweeping cultural differences between a decentralized manoeuvre military and a centralized attritional service. Establishing the latter involves money, people, time, and resources; developing the former requires something more rare, the development of military tradition, esprit, and education in the military art. For high command to relegate to its lower leadership crucial combat decisions implies a degree of interpersonal understanding and trust not easily achieved. Such trust and understanding must be forged within the framework of a mutual drive toward agreed-upon goals for the common good. Creating this frame of reference, this bonding of shared values and morals, is becoming exceedingly difficult in an amoral American society.
Manoeuvre warfare theory is not well understood. The very name misleads the casual inquirer to presume that it speaks of moving forces to fire more advantageously. Of the two theories, it is the more difficult to embrace, understand, or infuse. It deals in intangibles, where attrition is the theory of the tangible. Manoeuvre theory is art, not science; it has no formulas and little in common with engineering disciplines. It is therefore not well received in technologically oriented military organizations or societies. Also, manoeuvre theory does not play to the strengths of technology. It employs but does not feature them. If a nation is well advanced technologically relative to its potential enemies, and also wealthy, it may find manoeuvre theory unsuitable for its purposes. Further, it does not align itself with a traditionally chivalrous way of looking at war. Many Westerners view sneaking about hunting for the enemy's weakness and attempting to win at little cost, or even before the battle begins, as smacking of immorality, cowardice, and a general lack of fortitude.
Manoeuvre theory entails risk. There is more risk for high command because critical decisions are made by commanders actually at the scene, and because the objects of attack are the enemy's enigmatic "cohesion targets" instead of his very tangible, threatening, and visible armed forces in the field. There is also great risk if the battle develops and flows in ways that the high command did not foresee, or could not have.
Success with this theory is dependent upon the level of trust throughout the command structure, the ability of officers to devise creative and unorthodox solutions to problems. It relies on their capacity to discover, at every level of warfare, just what constitutes the enemy's critical weakness, the linchpin of his cohesion, upon which the least amount of force will exert the greatest leverage.
