From a rebellion for the land rights to a socio-political movement, posing a serious threat to the countrys internal security, the Left Wing Extremism has, indeed, come a long way. Presently, as published in the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) annual report of 2011-2012, LWE has swept through the tribal regions of central & peninsular India amounting to nearly 40% of the geographical area and 35 % of population.
2. LWE draws its inspiration from Marxist principles and Mao ideology. The generic term for LWE in India is 'Naxalism' as the first armed peasant uprising in 1967 took place in the village of Naxalbari, West Bengal, which marked the beginning of Maoist movement in India. This movement led by communist leaders like Charu Muzumdar was, however, crushed by concerted police operation backed by army (Op Steeple Chase I) in 1971.
3. The LWE was rejuvenated in 2004, when the splinter groups of People's War Group (PWG) & Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) merged together to form Communist Party of India (Maoist) or CPI (Maoist) with an ultimate aim of seizing power by armed struggle. They would then attempt to transform the political system completely and create new social order ending the exploitation of marginalized and vulnerable communities.
4. A quick scan of the problem reveals that LWE affected areas are severely underdeveloped, there is widespread poverty, unemployment, denial of justice and lack of basic amenities like schools and health centers. Economic-social-political exclusion and frequent displacement due to industrialization and mining has added to miseries of the tribals. Lack of governance and incapability of the government to address the problems has provided an opportunity to Maoists, to discredit the government and gather control over the people.
5. Having realized the deep politico-socio-economic dimensions, government which initially considered LWE as a mere law and order problem, has recently decided to adopt a multi pronged strategy. However, despite its efforts, government has not been able to contain LWE owing to a number of inadequacies in the strategy/policies.
Statement of Problem
6. LWE had emerged as a complex challenge straddling the social and economic fault lines of the Indian hinterland, with grave security implications. Despite adopting a multipronged approach, government has not been able to contain LWE, thereby necessitating an immediate review to arrive at more effective strategy.
Hypothesis
7. LWE has re-emerged in the recent years with its roots in the peasant movement of the yesteryears and has engulfed nearly one third of the country, posing a grave threat to its internal security. The protagonists, inspired by the Mao ideology, thrive on the disenchantment prevalent among the socially, culturally, economically and politically discriminated segments of population, inefficiency of governance, lack of administration and political institutions and non-implementation of land reforms.
8. The revolt of the deprived and dispossessed, exploited by the Maoists requires a holistic approach to deal with it, suitably coordinated by the central government and executed by the concerned states. The approach should comprise of four key elements. First is security that includes economic, cultural, social security to the people, physical security to the various institutions, projects and infrastructure. Second is development encompassing all round development to include human, economic and infrastructure development. Third is to carry out perception management to change the mindset, realign the indigenous people (tribals) of the LWE affected areas towards the national mainstream. Lastly, encourage surrender by the armed LWE activists and ensure their reintegration in the society and rehabilitation.
Methodology
9. The focus of this dissertation is to analyse the growing LWE menace in India to determine causes, drivers and present status of LWE and scrutinize the efficacy of government strategy employed to address the problem. The methodology followed shall be:-
(a) Part I. Introduces the LWE, brings out its genesis, ideology, its evolution into a revolution and the present status of the movement.
(b) Part II. Identify the causes.
(c) Part III. Identify the strategy adopted by the government.
(d) Part IV. Analysis of the strategy adopted by the govenment.
(e) Part V. Recommendations.
(f) Part VI. Conclusion.
Justification of the Study
10. The heightened levels of terror and violence perpetrated by the various Maoist groups is today posing a grave threat to the internal security situation in the country. The state government and the Central Para Military Forces (CPMFs) along with the police are unable to contain the rising violence being perpetrated by this movement. The areas affected by this movement include one of the most mineral rich states of the country which, if not secured in time would eventually prove detrimental to the progress of the country. The vast spread of the Naxalism has serious implications on the security of the country. Due to this shift in the security equations in the country and to bring peace in the affected regions, government has been taking steps but have not been able to contain or solve the problem completely. Therefore, it is imperative that the shortcomings are identified and a better holistic approach is arrived at, which forms the subject of the study.
Methods of Data Collection
11. Data for the study has been culled mainly from the books published on the subject. CLAWS, IDSA and SAIR articles/ journals/papers published on internet have also been referred to. Sources referred to are acknowledged at endnotes throughout the text and a compendium of the same is appended in the form of a bibliography.
CHAPTER I : LEFT WING EXTREMISM
Evolution
12. Much before independence, a section of leaders argued that communism and socialism were ideally suited for a society like ours, which is divided along religion, caste, and ethnic lines. They propagated that in order to emancipate the vast poor population, create classless and just society, it was the only way. This led to the creation of the Communist Party of India (CPI) on 26th December 1925. CPI is one of the oldest political parties in the country. Before independence, because of a ban on all communist activities by British authorities, the communists were not able to build a strong nationwide organization. However, two campaigns led by communists immediately before and after independence are worth noting. One was the "Tebhaga movement", led by peasant front of CPI "Kisan Sabha" in 1946 demanding increase of crop share of peasants from half to two-thirds. The second campaign was against the brutal repression of peasants by feudal landlords during the regime of Nizam in the Telangana region.
Inspiration
13. Indian Left Wing Extremism movement draws ideas from Marxism and Leninism and inspiration for armed struggle from Mao Tse Tung's thought process as under:-
(a) Marxism envisages establishment of a classless society.
(b) Leninism enunciated that violent revolution is essential to achieve such a society (Bolshevik Revolution of 1917).
(c) Mao Tse Tung's thought process envisaged revolution in several phases from the survey stage leading to the establishment of liberated zones which would coalesce in a widening arc of revolutionary struggle overrunning "enemy" in the cities. Protracted "Peoples War" was envisaged before the establishment of a new order (the Chinese Long March of 1948).
Naxalbari Uprising
14. Naxalbari is a small village in the Darjeeling district of West Bengal. During the spring of 1967, the landless peasants, supported by armed communist revolutionaries, forcibly occupied the lands belonging to their 'class enemies'. Even though the 'Naxalbari uprising' was a failure, it marked the beginning of violent left wing extremist movement in India and the terms 'Naxalism' and 'Naxalite' were born.
15. The communist revolutionaries later formed a party - the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) or CPI (M-L). Under the leadership of Charu Mazumdar, they defined the objective of the new movement as 'seizure of power through an agrarian revolution'. Their strategy was to eliminate the feudal order in the Indian countryside to free the poor from the clutches of the oppressive landlords and replace the old order with an alternative one that would implement land reforms. The tactics to achieve it was through guerrilla warfare by the peasants to eliminate the landlords and build up resistance against the state's police force which came to help the landlords. Gradually, they aimed at setting up 'liberated zones' in different parts of the country that would eventually coalesce into a territorial unit under Naxalite hegemony - a la Yenan of China.
The Intervening Period
16. Ironically, although the police crushed the uprising in Naxalbari in May 1967 within two months, the Naxal ideology gained rapid currency in other parts of West Bengal and India within a few years. By the early 1970s, the Naxalite movement had spread to Andhra Pradesh, Kerala, Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and Punjab. Srikakulam in Andhra Pradesh in particular became a mini `liberated zone' for a brief spell, when Naxalite guerrillas drove out the landlords and set up alternative institutions of administration in several villages.
17. The situation was alarming enough for the government to investigate into its causes. It set up a committee which prepared a report in 1969, entitled "The Causes and Nature of Current Agrarian Tensions". Report acknowledged that "The basic cause of unrest, namely, the defective implementation of laws enacted to protect the interests of the tribal's...". It further added, "unless this is attended to, it would not be possible to win the confidence of the tribal's whose leadership has been taken over by the extremists".
18. Instead of fully implementing land reforms to alleviate their grievances, as suggested by many impartial observers as well as previously mentioned committee of 1969, government chose the simplistic path of suppression of peasant grievances. It came down heavily on the Naxalite bases, villagers who supported them and resorted to the policy of setting up `strategic hamlets' (as the US did in Vietnam) where entire tribal villages were removed, so that the mass base of the CPI (M-L) could be dispersed.
Low Phase (1972 - 1980s)
19. LWE, after enjoying a high tide in its revolution from 1967 to 1971, witnessed a down cycle in 1970s and 1980s. This could be attributed to the leadership vaccum created with the death of Charu Mazumdar in April 1972, Ideological differences between the various factions (Some followed Maoist model of "Mass Line" concentration while others were for "Armed Struggle" like Russian Revolution), lack of external support, police action and land reforms by West Bengal government.
The New Phase
20. The different Naxalite factions and their leaders found an opportunity to chart out new strategies incorporating lessons learnt in the past, when Janta Party (an alliance of non-Congress parties) came to centre stage after the 1977 elections. Although, committed to the original strategy of eliminating the feudal order in rural India, various factions parted ways on tactical grounds. Few like Liberation group of the CPI M-L, concentrated in Bihar, decided to follow the parliamentary path of elections while others like the PWG in Andhra Pradesh and MCC in Bihar preferred to go back to the path of guerilla warfare. During the period between 1980 and 2004, these two different streams of the Naxalite movement drifted along with their respective tactics - often fighting among themselves.
Merger of PWG and MCC
21. In September 2004, the MCC merged with the PWG to form CPI (Maoist). This merger brought to culmination, the long process of centralization, provided quantitative growth and qualitative leap to the Maoists. Unified outfit, now had pan India presence and a more menacing look. The military strength of the both the organizations resulted in the formation of the People's Liberation Guerilla Army (PLGA). PLGA, as per the documents captured from the activists has three type of forces namely the Main Force (Decisive force well trained and modeled on the lines of professional army), Secondary force (Local/ special guerilla squads and district level of action teams) and Base force ( People's Militia or Jan Militia).
Operational Strategy
22. The CPI (Maoist) believes in the phrase of 'strategic self defence'. To combat the armed might of the state, it advocated 'tactical counter offensive' as the main feature of the military campaign. Mobilisation of the masses of the area is an important constituent of their strategy. To preserve both the forces and leadership, it deliberatively avoids direct engagements with the security forces. Offensive actions against the police are carried out, only when the chances of victory are high.
23. CPI (M) considers the masses as the centre of gravity and fulcrum of operations. Its document states " We must mobilize the people to support our armed forces enthusiastically and to fight the enemy together with them. The people are the eyes and ears of the army; they feed and keep our soldiers. It is they who help the army in the sabotage and in the battle. The people are the water and our army the fish."
24. The present modus operandi of the Maoists includes carrying out Propaganda (Aimed to win over the masses by continuously attacking and exposing the weak spots of the democratic set up), Raids (Raids on the police stations, armouries and industries), Ambushes (Ambush on the CRPF company at Chintalnar in Dantewada on 06 April 2010), Kidnappings ( Recent kidnapping of District Collector of Malkangiri in February 2011), Assassinations ( assassination attempts on Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh Mr C M Naidu), Improvised explosive devices (IED attacks on the police columns) and Extortion (Maoists have a well fined tuned levy system to sustain themselves). Perception management to influence the attitudes of the people of Maoists include employment of their cultural troops like Chetana natya mandali, Janta natya mandali and regular meetings at the village.
Present Status
25. Left Wing Extremism has now become major cause of concern for India. The current tally, as per the Home Minister Mr Chidambaram, works out at 223 districts across 20 states variously affected by Maoists activities. The Naxal leadership has exploited fault lines within these areas to develop the situation in their favour. Besides this, the ultra left outfits continue to attract the intelligentsia and young blood to its fold, thereby ensuring that it is the major player. While other organisations also exist, they are much smaller and would find it difficult to operate if CPI(Maoist) would be neutralized. The CPI(Maoist) aims to transform their People's Liberation Guerilla Army (PLGA), convert its full-fledged existing guerilla zones into base areas. Their armed cadre strength is estimated to be nearly 9000 to 12000 and they possess now variety of weapons mostly captured from the police. In 2011, various incidents costs nearly lives of nearly 700 people.
26. A large part of their finances come from extortion which is of the order of Rs 1000 to 1200 crore. The Maoists also have a large number of front organizations which they use to expand their reach and gather support of intellectual community and opinion makers.
27. Linkages of Maoists with the businessmen, political leaders, Maoists of Nepal, militants operating in the North East, anti India actors both state and non state based in Pakistan are a cause of serious concern today. In Bihar and Jharkhand, leaders of political parties Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP), Rashtriya Janta Dal (RJD) and the left parties have often received support from the Maoists and in return have either paid huge sums of money or offered 'concessions'.
28. The Maoists have been able spread their tentacles on the areas extending from border areas of Nepal along the eastern coast to Tamil Nadu approximately covering 13 states. The is often being called as 'red Corridor'. This region has the area of Ambhujmadh in the Dandkarniya region of Southern Central part of the country. This area of approximately 10,000 square kilometers, has thick jungles and inhabited by tribal population. It is interesting to know that as per available records, even the Britishers did not carry out the survey of the area and left this as an unsurveyed jungle area. Till date, this area has not been surveyed and the writ of the government does not run in the region.
29. The only civilized presence in the region is by Anand Van of Baba Amte from Chandarpur and Gadcharoli Area in Maharashtra and Rama Krishna Mission from Chattisgarh area.
CHAPTER II: CAUSES OF LEFT WING EXTREMISM
30. The activities of the Naxalites are in pursuance of their declared objective of seizing political power, through the power of their gun. In the process, they have widened their horizon and have established linkages with fraternal groups abroad, as well as with terrorist groups operating in India. In spite of their violent activities, their dogmatic, declared antipathy towards religion, rejection of parliamentary politics and an avowed commitment to armed struggle, the Naxalites enjoy sympathy and support among sections of the people probably because they are seen as 'performing' the duties that should originally have been carried out by the 'welfare state'.
31. The areas in which these Naxal groups are active are marked by widespread poverty, unemployment, lack of economic development, poor performance of institutions of civil governance, existence of powerful traditional structures of exploitation and an under-equipped and uneducated police force. In many areas, state institutions, including law enforcement agencies have virtually ceased to exist [31] . Naxalites have thus tried to fill the vacuum and exploit the failure of state governments on issues such as land rights, minimum wages, education and rights of tribal's through a string of front organizations of students, youth, industrial workers, women and cultural activists. In some of their strongholds, they have assumed many of the tasks of the state and run a parallel government, holding 'People's Court' to settle both civil and criminal disputes. There is, moreover, a collusive arrangement between sections of political leaders, businessmen, contractors, which help these groups to consolidate their roots in the region.
32. Therefore, they apparently have replaced the state and for the people they, thus, become the 'deliverers', where as the state is seen as having neglected and had, in a way, been partially responsible for their continued deprivation. Another probable reason for the Naxalites receiving people's support could be that they are seen as selfless, striving for the benefit of the poor and downtrodden and willing to lead a harsh underground life, at times, leading to death in clashes with the security forces.
33. The causes of this extremism have been summed up in the succeeding paragraphs.
34. Ideological Inspiration. The success of the communist revolutions in Russia under Lenin and in China under Mao, which aimed at creating a classless society, providing equal opportunities to all citizens, motivated their followers in India to develop such a revolution.
35. Leadership. The emergence of the revolutionary leaders like Charu Mazumdar, Kanu Sanyal and Jangal Santhal in West Bengal and Nagi Reddy, C V Rao, C Pulla Reddy and Seetharamaiah in Telengana who had the ability to move the masses have boosted the movement.
36. Land Reforms. The areas of West Bengal and Telengana were famous for big zamindars exploiting the landless workers. Inspite of the land ceiling act being in place for more than 50 years, it has not implemented by Bihar, Andhra Pradesh and many other states. Landlord culture thriving on landless workers, tribals and bonded labour still exists in our country.
37. Absence of Development. Virtual absence of civic amenities like health care, education, employed opportunities, drinking water and electricity have alienated the people of the LWE affected areas from the government machinery.
38. Frequent Displacement of Tribals. One of the main grievance of the tribals, which has led to their discontentment is 'Loss of land which in turn has led to loss of homes, livelihood and means of survival'. The Nehruvian development paradigm envisaged rapid industrialization of the country. Millions of tribals were displaced by big Dams, hydroelectric projects and public sector mining activity. While they constitute 8.08 percent of total population, they account for 40 percent of the 60 million persons displaced or affected by the development projects between year 1947 to 2000. To understand the gravity of the situation let us take examples of NALCO and Machkund Hydel Project in Koraput. In 1982, when NALCO set up its bauxaite extraction and refinery unit in Damanjodi in Koraput, 26 villages were directly and 690 villages were indirectly affected and most of them were tribal villages. In 1940, when Machkund Hydel Project in Koraput was developed, the tribals moved to Chitrakonda, only to be displaced again when Balimela Hydel Project came up in the year 1964.
39. Liberalization. India adopted the neo liberal economic policies in 1990s to accelerate the country's economic growth. One of the fallout of this shift was the changed National mineral policy 1993, which allowed the foreign direct investment (FDI) in the mining sector. The process of FDI was further eased with 100% FDI permission in 1997. This opened the floodgates to mining companies in especially mineral rich Chhattisgarh, Orissa and Jharkhand. With investments pouring in, permits were issued for mineral extraction on the tribal land in violation of Fifth Schedule and Supreme court judgements of 1997 ( Samata judgement) that forbids sale of tribal land to the non tribals. These diversions increased to 28,769 hectares in 2003-2004, an increase of 43% as compared to statistics of 1993-94. For instance, in Lohandiguda in Bastar, some 2000 hectares of Fifth Schedule land belonging to 10 villages was acquired by the government on behalf of the Tata Group's Rs 1000-crore steel plant.
40. Poor Rehabilation and Resettlement Policies. The rehabilitation of the people affected by developmental projects or violence has been the sore point till date. In the NALCO project at Damanjodi, the tribal families were paid a paltry Rs 6,700 per hectare. The land given as compensation was uncultivable. The employment that NALCO promised only helped the non tribals, as the tribals were found lacking the requisite skill. This left the people especially the tribals in these areas with nothing to survive. Similar, has been the outcome of various projects like the Sardar Sarovar project in Western India and the Balimela Hydel project.
41. Poverty. Poverty has been the common theme across all the tribal areas. For example, in Dantewada which has 78% of the tribal population has 52.28 % of the people living below the poverty line. Similar is the situation in Koraput, where four out of five persons live below poverty line. In Gadhchiroli district of Mahatrashtra, 55 % people live below poverty line.
42. Medical Set Up. Poverty manifests itself in high rates of hunger and malnutrition, which in turn leads to illness and starvation deaths. Besides, the failure of governance or administrative infrastructure, roots of the problem also lie in the structural changes that tribal economy has undergone over the last several decades resulting to destruction of their traditional livelihood and food systems. Denied access to forests and displaced from their land, their capacity to sustain their lives and livelihood has been severely undermined.
43. Injustice. Tribals have been the victims of atrocities since decades but rarely got justice. Police seldom address to their complaints. Data compiled by National Dalit Movement for Justice shows that from 2002 to 2008, only 20,000 cases of atrocities have reached court, out of which majority have been pursued under the milder Indian Penal Code or Protection of Civil Rights act. Around 81 percent of the cases filed by tribals are pending.
44. Lack of Infrastructure. Most of the strongholds of LWE and affected areas are poorly connected and inaccessible. The inaccessibility has resulted in their being under developed. Leave aside connectivity, Abujhmadh, the epicenter of the Naxals has not been surveyed yet. Further, look at the infrastructure in Dantewada gives an idea of poor infrastructure existing these areas. Out of the 1,220 villages, 1161 villages have no medical facilities and 214 villages do not have even a primary school. There are 34 Police stations, seven ICDS centres, 24 Primary Health Centres and 16 government secondary schools.
45. Unemployment. Unemployment in the LWE affected areas is the single largest contributor to the problem. Unemployment has been the outcome of various factors as discussed above ie the frequent displacement of the people owing to development, migration due to violence, lack of developmental schemes and poor governance. Unemployed youth failing to support their families fall prey to the Maoists who promise them employment and monitory support.
46. Ineffectiveness of Police and Inability to Implement the Police Reforms. The state police forces have not been able to contain the Naxals, owing to their organizational and operational inadequacies. Maoists with inferior weapons have been able overpower the police force. There have been incidences of looting of police stations. Regular ambushes and use of mines against the police has forced them to confine themselves to the police stations in these areas. Intelligence has dried up as the informers are easily identified and targeted by the Maoists. Further, 65 years since independence, Police Reforms have not been implemented till date, even after the Supreme Court ruling on the subject. Supreme Court in response to the petition filed by a retired police officer directed government on 22 September 2006, to comply with the seven directives to start the police reforms with an objective of providing functional autonomy for the police and enhanced police accountability for both the organizational performance and individual conduct.
47. Inadequacies of CPMF. Naxalities have been able to continually enhance their lethal capabilities and launch well coordinated operations. It has been seen that the CPMF have not able to meet the challenges due to the following factors:-
(a) Inadequate organizational structure at the functional level.
(b) Inadequacy in training imparted to police and CPMFs.
(c) Lack of coordination between the police and CPMFs.
(d) Non availability of reserves.
(d) Lack of effective leadership.
(e) Lack of actionable intelligence.
(f) Prolonged deployments.
(g) Lack of regimentation.
(h) Low morale and motivation.
(j) Political interference in working of Police and CPMFs.
(k) Rapid Expansion.
48. Failure of Nationalised and Cooperatives Banks. In a survey, it has been revealed that fully 40 % of the rural India is still dependent on the traditional money lenders. The rules and regulation governing the loans are so stringent and unrealistic that the tribals cannot avail the facilities.
49. Ownership of Maoists Operation. Another issue that has defeated all attempts of resolution is the ownership of anti Maoists operations. The Centre maintains that law and order is the state responsibility but the public opinion is otherwise owing to the severity and vast coverage of LWE. This dichotomy has not only led to political recrimination but also largely differing attitudes of the states.
50. Social Inequalities. In majority of the affected areas, caste system has added to the problems. In villages especially in Bihar and Andhra Pradesh, it is the Vaisya who is the moneylender and trades. The Bania collects the forest goods against the loans and thus has vice like grip on the tribals. In Andhra Pradesh, Reddys and Kammas, both landlord castes being the main political force have not allowed the land ceiling laws to be enforced.
Similar situation exists in Bihar where Bhumihar, Brahmin and Rajputs are holding land in the names of their dogs and cats. The Bureaucrats are being adequately bribed and involved in the nexus by these upper castes to ensure oppression of the tribals and dalits.
Chapter III : THE GOVERNMENT STRATEGY
51. The government has spelt out in the annual report of MHA of 2011 that it wants to deal LWE in a holistic manner, in the areas of security, development, right of local communities, improvement in governance and public perceptions. Government has decided on an integrated approach along with the state governments aimed at relatively more affected areas. Government has identified 83 districts in nine states for special attention. Central government has realized that LWE cannot be tackled with only police and security related approach.
Review and Monitoring Mechanisms
52. A number of review and monitoring mechanisms have been established in the context of the different aspects of LWE situation and measures needed to deal with it. These include:-
(a) A standing committee of Chief Ministers of states concerned, under the chairmanship of the Union Home minister.
(b) A review group under the Cabinet Secretary to review efforts on development and security fields.
(c) A coordination centre chaired by the Union Home Secretary to review and coordinate the efforts of States.
(d) A task force under the special secretary (Internal Security), Ministry with senior officers of Intelligence agencies to coordinate and monitor anti LWE efforts.
(e) An empowered group of officers has been set up by the government to over ride the existing instructions on implementation of various programmes according to the local conditions.
Capacity Building by State Government
53. LWE being the primary responsibility of the State government, following actions have been advised by the Centre to the State :-
(a) Augment police force and fill up vacancies.
(b) Incentives to personnel posted in these areas.
(c) Infrastructure development to ensure secure police station buildings in these areas.
(d) Development special commando force trained in the jungle warfare.
(e) Strengthening of the intelligence collection apparatus in these areas.
(f) Adherence to the Standard operating procedures.
(g) Ensure departments like health, education, drinking water, electricity and revenue are available and accessible to the people.
(h) Critical infrastructure to be identified and developed.
(j) Development of the positive environment by developing mechanisms for public grievance redressal and mass contact.
(k) Counter propaganda and publicity against the Maoists.
Measures by the Central Government
54. 'Police' and 'Public order' being the State subjects, maintenance of law
and order has been the states responsibility. It is further stated in the report that central government closely monitors the situation and coordinates and supplements states effort. The support includes the following:-
(a) Provision of the Central Armed Police Forces and Commando Battalions for Resolute Actions (CoBRA).
Sanction of Indian Reserve (IR) Batallions.
(c) Setting up of Counter Insurgency and Anti Terrorism (CIAT) schools.
(d) Modernisation and upgradation of the State Police and their
Intelligence network under the Scheme of Modernisation of the State Police Forces ( MPF) scheme.
(e) Reimbursement of security related expenditure of the states.
(f) Filling of critical infrastructure gaps in the LWE affected states.
(g) Assistance in the training of the State Police through the ministry
of defense.
(h) Sharing of intelligence.
(j) Facilitating interstate coordination.
(k) Assisting in special intra-state and inter-state coordinated joint
operations.
(l) Assistance in the community policing and civic actions.
(m) Assistance in the development through a range of schemes.
55. Besides this, Union government has initiated a number of development schemes. These schemes are :-
(a) Pradhan Mantri Grameen Sadak Yojna ( PMGSY). For the LWE affected states the norms have been relaxed ie bridge length relaxed to 75 mtrs and the population norm of 500 for habitations coverage to 250.
(b) National Rural Health Mission (NHRM).
(c) Asram Schools. Provision of 100% grant basis for hostels for Schedule Tribe girls and boys as well as Ashram schools in tribal Sub plain areas.
(d) Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA).
(e) Sarva Siksha Abhiyan (SSA).
(f) National Rural Drinking Water Programme ( NRDWP).
(g) Rajiv Gandhi Grameen Vidyutikaran Yojna (RGGVY).
(j) Integrated Child Development Services ( ICDS).
(k) Indira awas Yojna(IAY). The ceiling per unit cost has been increased to Rs 48,000 for the LWE affected districts.
(l) Scheduled Tribes and Other Tradtional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest rights ) Act, 2006.
(m) Panchayats ( Extension to the Scheduled Areas) Acts, 1996 (PESA).
56. The stipulation of 80% utilization of funds for further release of under Backward Regions Grant Fund (BRGF) has been revised to 60 % utilization of funds.
57. Surrender and Rehabilation Policy. The rehabilitation package includes a stipend of Rs 2000 for three years, vocational training, immediate grant of Rs 1.5 lakh and incentive for surrender weapons.
58. Assistance for the Victims of Violence. Government has announced an assistance of 3 lakh to the family affected. This assistance is in addition to the ex-gratia payment of Rs 1 lakh paid under Security Related Expenditure scheme.
59. Integrated Action Plan. In October 2007, the Union government announced that rapid socio-economic development in a comprehensive manner in eight districts in four states would be under taken as a pilot project. A Task Force, was then constituted on 12 February 2008 under the chairmanship of the Cabinet Secretary. Thereafter, on 24 November 2010, the Union cabinet approved a proposal to launch a programme known as the Unified Action Plan also known as Integrated action plan), at an estimated budget of Rs 13,742 to herald the rapid socio-economic development in selected LWE affected districts. It has addressed 60 selected districts till date. Scheme is being extend to 18 more districts. A sum of Rs 1090 crore has been released so far during the 2011-12.
State Government Initiatives.
60. The efforts of State governments of the affected states in addressing the LWE have been rather disjoint and biased towards police actions. No major success has been achieved by any of the states barring Andhra Pradesh. In Bihar, Nitish Kumar has been able to improve the law and order situation and reposed the faith in governance. State Auxilliary Police (SAP) has been raised and its strength is presently 5000 . 'Aasdwar' project has been effectively implemented in the Jehanabad district eroding the Naxal base.
61. In Jharkhand, government has concentrated its efforts to police actions under various code names Eagle, X, Shikar and Hill Top, all of them being failures. In Maharashtra government has made some headway. A Gaon Bandh Scheme has been launched in which a sum of Rs 2 lakh is given to village for development, if it banned Naxalism. State police have tied up with the Southern Command of Army for training of SRP Force. The Chief Minister in 2009, announced 1,300 crore plan for the six districts of Vidharbha to fight the Naxal menace.
62. In Madhya Pradesh, government has decided to raise Hawk force, on lines of Greyhounds of Andhra Pradesh. They have given police officers in LWE affected areas powers of executive magistrate and higher allowances. Special training of police is being organized in Andhra Pradesh Police Academy. Government has proposed construction of 2700 km of road at a cost of 201 crores in the Naxal affected areas.
63. In Karnataka, government has launched a 60 crore rehabilitation scheme for improving the situation in the Maland district. Grama Raksha Samitis are also being planned involving the villagers. Andhra Pradesh is the only state which has been able to tackle effectively the Naxal problem following the dual policy of using the police force and undertaking development. Greyhounds, armed vigilante group "Green tigers" and special teams have been raised and employed effectively to weed out Naxals. Besides, this government has taken adequate measures for integrated development of the naxal affected districts.
CHAPTER IV: ANALYSIS OF GOVERNMENT STRATEGY
64. It is evident that government has taken adequate actions for tackling the problem of LWE but still it has not been able to neither effectively contain or solve the problem. Government claims of adopting a multi pronged approach to deal with the problem holistically, but close investigation reveals that government has been focusing only on two fronts ie development and security. In fact, an expert panel constituted by the planning commission, which submitted its report in April 2008, viewed that the state response had been largely military-oriented. This is further evident from the kind of security related measures being taken by the government.
65. K Srinivas Reddy during a Seminar on " The Maoist Challenge", in January 2007 at Delhi, mentioned that " the 'militaristic approach' adopted by the centre and state governments in assessing the field level situation, is perhaps extremely convenient to the ruling parties, since a military statistics - driven assessment would emphatically lead to planning on a military plane". [31] Thus, the successes of the government are assessed on the numbers of rebels killed/arrested/surrendered, or incidents of violence and exchange of fire, or numbers of weapons looted from the security forces/recovered from the guerillas.
66. Acceptance of the LWE as a political problem has been another centre's hitch. Initially, government considered it as a mere 'law and order' problem, subsequently agreed to recognize it as a movement with socio-economic dimensions. The Planning Commission Expert Group in April 2008 observed that "…the Naxalite movement has to be recognized as a political movement with a strong based among the landless and poor peasantry and adivasis." yet centre refrains from publicly admitting that it is a political problem and need to be dealt with on a political plane. [32]
Implementation, Monitoring of Schemes and Leakages
67. It emerges from the investigations that the implementation of the various schemes has been tardy, monitoring very weak and with number of leakages. For example, in April 2008, nearly five years after the RSVY scheme was launched, of total Rs 6615 crores earmarked only Rs 2850 crores could be claimed by the affected states. [33] The tardy implementation was acknowledged by the Parliamentary Standing committee on Home Affairs in Lok Sabha on 26 April 2007 " The committee feels that there is no perceptible change on the socio economic front…There needs to be an effective monitoring mechanism on the implementation of these schemes with the involvement of various ministries and agencies."
68. Besides, siphoning off funds / leakages is a significant contributing factor in the benefits not reaching the targeted groups. The situation, indeed reminds of statement made by former Prime Minister Late Mr Rajiv Gandhi, who said "Of every rupee spent by the government, only 17 paise reached the intended beneficiary". Speaking from Bundelkhand, Uttar Pradesh, about the implementation of and rampant misappropriation of the NREGS, Member of Parliament , Mr Rahul Gandhi said that," Now the situation is even worse". He further said that he saw job cards of 50 people "with the same serial number and not even one card had the entry of work". [34]
69. SREs. The SRE schemes are implemented on reimbursement basis. Initially, only 50% was being reimbursed to the states but in 2005, MHA decided to implement 100% reimbursement policy and also revised the guidelines for the including the districts under SRE. In spite of the above, the affected states have not been able to spend the allocated funds. In the case of the MPF allocations, too, the utilizations has not been full. For instance, of the Rs 1190.63 crores allocated in the budget for 2007-08, till 07 March 2008 only 834.96 crores could be spent by the states. [35]
70. Inconsistency. The centre categorically states in the 14- point policy, unveiled on 13 March 2006, that 'there can be no peace talks with the Maoists unless they agree to abjure violence and arms'. However, government has lacked consistency on the issue since then as evident from the various statements of Home Minister. On 19 September 2005, Home Minister said, "If they drop arms, it is good. But if they want to carry arms and still talk ..we have no problems". [36] However, the same was denied by the Home Minister, later saying that, " I have not used these words. Besides I am too practical to know that they will not lay down arms". It thus brings out clearly that MHA has moved significantly from the hard line position, there is inconsistency in dealing with the Maoists and that governments demand of Maoists to 'give up' violence signals its helplessness.
Response of Affected States.
71. The response of the various State governments, with an exception of Andhra Pradesh, has been found to be lagging and reactive. [37] There has been no unanimity in the perception of the various states on the Naxalites issue. Thus, while States such as Chhattisgarh and Tamil Nadu have proscribed the CPI (Maoist), West Bengal has refused to do the same. Karnataka has not yet banned CPI (Maoist). It is pertinent to note that except CPI (Maoist), no other Naxalite group has been proscribed in any of the states or by the Centre.
72. The coordination between the police and the intelligence agencies of the affected states has been far from satisfactory. Moreover, in the last few years various states have either shown inaction or focused on militarily fighting the Naxalites rather than trying to address the problem on the socio-economic plane.
Protective Laws
73. The Provisions of the Panchayats ( Extentions to the Scheduled Areas) Act, 1996 (PESA). PESA envisaged that the nine states within the Schedule Five areas would enact their own legislations devolving power to their respective tribal communities as well as amend pre existing laws to bring to them in harmony with PESA within a year. However, it is seen that the implementation of the PESA has been tardy, there has been weak role of Governors who have been vested with exclusive powers, sale of land from the tribals to the non tribals continues and acquisition of the land from the tribals alienating the tribals continues. PESA was applicable to nine states which have areas under the Fifth Schedule of Constitution, AP, Chhattisgarh, Gujrat, HP, Jharkhand, MP, Maharashtra, Orissa and Rajasthan. Except Jharkhand none of the states have enacted state legislation to give effectiveness to the provision of Act.
74. In Andhra Pradesh, despite strict laws out of 65,875 cases filed in the court only 26,475 have been decided in the favour of the tribals whereas in Orissa out of 105,491 such cases, only 61,431 have been in the favour of tribals. [38] The above figures are indicative of the nexus of tribal land grabbers and bureaucrats to scuttle the avowed intentions of the law. Similarly, the discretionary powers abused by the sub collectors, Tehsildars and Revenue inspectors, in conniving with the vested interests to encroach more and more government land, by way of harassing the tribal and Dalit families by instituting false cases against them, extorting bribes from them and distributed Patta on the encroached land to ineligible persons.
75. The Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006. The joint review carried out by the Ministry of Tribal Affairs and the Ministry of Environment and Forest in nine states in the year July- August 2010 under the chairmanship of Shri N C Saxena revealed that state governments had lacked commitment in empowering their tribal populace. It revealed that most of the rejection of the applications from the tribals was made hastily without verification, area mentioned in the titles was far less than the area occupied and particular vulnerable Tribal groups and nomadic tribes have not been given priority as required under Rule 8(b) of the Act. Besides, this Ministry of Tribal Affairs revealed that until 30 September 2010, 12 states had not made any distribution of land entitlements against the said act.
75. Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. Inspite of the Act existing for so long, the extent of crime against scheduled tribes in the LWE affected states has been very high as evident from the table below.
76. Bonded Labour System Act, 1976. According to the survey conducted by Ministry of Labour in 2004, Scheduled tribes are being bonded as plantation workers in Karnataka, as agriculture labourers in Orissa, silica and sand stone quarry workers etc.
77. Child Labour Act, 1986. A report published by NHRC observes that a state having larger population living below the poverty line have higher incidence of child labour. Correlating this with the fact that in the LWE affected states, majority people below the poverty line are Scheduled tribes, It can be safely said that Scheduled tribes has high prevalence of child labour.
78. Resettlement and Rehabilitation Policy. National Policy on Resettlement and Rehabilitation (NPRR), 2007 was formulated for Project affected families. It is a landmark step by the government but suffers from various lacunae yet to be addressed. First, it is not backed by any legislative and statutory powers. Second, its ceiling for declaring an affected zone of 500 or more families in plains and 250 in hills has no bases, moreover, opinion of the government in this regard is required who itself is land acquiring agency in such cases. Third, it propagates a survey of the affected area after it has been declared an affected zone, which actually should be the start point for any project. Fourth, no specific responsibility has been delegated for carrying out the survey of the affected area. Fifth, the most striking aspect of the rehabilitation package of the NPRR is the absence of any kind of compensation or relief to the share croppers who are invariably the actual cultivators but who have no record of right on the land they cultivate. Finally, there is no provision of ensuring compensation for the acquisition of common pool resources like communal grazing grounds, playgrounds and water bodies. [39]
79. Para Military Forces. On 6 April 2010, the killing of 76 CRPF personnel in an ambush by the Maoists in Dantewada stunned the nation and questioned the preparedness, motivation and training of the Indian Police and CPMFs. Central government has formulated a number of policies, spent crores of rupees on modernization of the CPMFs and state police yet not have been able to contain the violence. The CPMFs has been broadly not been able to deal with insurgency due to its continuous expansion and change in the character of the LWE struggle.
80. State Police. Police is the strong arm of the state government, its strength and efficiency is essential for the Governments credibility. Police has yielded unparallel results in Andhra Pradesh and Punjab in counter insurgency operations. However, police in other states have been unsuccessful in tackling Naxalism due to lack of mental and physical robustness, lack of soldierly and disciplinary traits, lack of knowledge of field craft, poor tactics and firing skills besides the fact that they are ill equipped.
