Of all the countries in the sub continent, the one country, which India would like to influence the most, is Afghanistan. No other country in the immediate neighbourhood of India allows the kind of leverage on Pakistan, as Afghanistan can. This is a fact well understood by both, India and Pakistan, and hence figures significantly in their dealings with that country.
2. Afghanistan - a historical perspective. The history of Afghanistan is said to be written in blood. Afghanistan has been in turmoil throughout its history. The actual history of Afghanistan begins when it emerged as a separate kingdom in the mid- eighteenth century under Ahmed Shah Abdali. When the British ruled India, they tried to bring Afghanistan under their fold. Having failed to bring Afghanistan under their rule, they created it as a buffer to check the Soviet influence southwards.
3. The last four decades. The last four decades have especially been convoluted, for Afghanistan. It commenced with the overthrow of King Zahir Shah by the then Prime Minister Daoud Khan, on 17 Jul 1973. Daoud Khan was in turn, later assassinated, by the communist officers led by Gen Abdul Qader on 27 Apr 1978. Noor Mohd Tarraki who was in prison till then, was made the President of Afghanistan and Haffezullah Amin, the Prime Minister. Though both of them formed the Marxist government, the power struggle between them only grew as time went by, resulting in Amin becoming the more powerful of the two. On 14 Sep 1979, President Tarraki, who enjoyed more support from Moscow, was killed by Hafeezullah Amin, much against the liking of Soviets. The Soviets, sensing a threat to their hold over the country from Amin and his policies, moved into Afghanistan somewhere between 21 and 25 Dec 1979, and installed Babrak Kamral, who was in exile till then, as the President after assassinating the incumbent President, Hafeezullah Amin.
4. Indian Interests in Afghanistan. Indian interests in Afghanistan, as well as those of other players in the issue, stems from Afghanistan's geo strategic location. While strategic containment of Pakistan and safeguarding of interests of the Hindus and Sikhs settled in Afghanistan played heavily on the minds of earlier Indian leaders; harbouring/ training of terrorists in Af- Pak border as well as India's economic interests in Central Asian Region have added to the country's interests in Afghanistan in recent years. India has been closely involved in Afghanistan, especially in the last three decades. Indian efforts have met with successes as well as setbacks in this period, as much as the Afghans saw their fortunes swing, because of the successive regimes in Kabul.
AIM
5. The aim of this service paper is to discuss the Indian stance vis á vis Afghanistan, and its engagement with that country since the Soviet intervention in 1979, and analyse the effect of India's efforts till date.
INDIAN ENGAGEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN
6. India's engagement in Afghanistan cannot be seen in isolation as that of the recent years. Rather, the Indian involvement in Afghanistan has to be viewed in three distinct phases. First, India's reactions and role soon after the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in late Dec 1979. Secondly, the period immediately after the withdrawal of Soviet forces in Feb 1989 and finally the Indian effort in Afghanistan post ousting of Taliban from power in Oct 01.
Phase I - The Soviet Intervention
7. Countries, the world over, with the exception of the Soviet Bloc, were united in condemning the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan in Dec 1979. This included those who were non-aligned. Afghanistan, being itself a non-aligned nation till then, was seen to have been taken over by one of the super powers.
8. Indian Reaction. When Soviet forces rolled into Afghanistan, India was under the caretaker government of Mr Charan Singh. The Indian government's response was that India always "opposed any outside interference in the internal affairs of one country by another". In the UN general assembly session to discuss the Afghan issue, India took a stance that the Soviet Union had sent troops at the request of the Afghan government, and that, India believed that Soviet Union would withdraw its troops from Afghanistan when requested by the Afghan government. In fact, India was the first non-Soviet bloc representative to speak essentially in favour of the Soviet position. While referring to the Afghan event, India's official statement, therefore, chose the word 'development' rather than "intervention".1
9. Effect of India's Stance. India's stand in the UN General Assembly caused shock and surprise amongst a large number of non-aligned countries. It did hurt India's international stature and politically isolated it from its South Asian neighbours. India was seen as not playing its rightful role of a major regional player in the resolution of the issue. India, on its part, managed to isolate the Afghan issue from the mainstream of Indo- Soviet relations, so that the two countries could agree to disagree on this issue, without impairing their wide ranging cooperation.2 In the overall calculus, India managed to strengthen her ties with the then USSR which would prove very valuable in years to come, though at a limited cost of losing its credibility in the region.
10. A place where India's stance cost dearly was in the hearts of the Afghan people. For a fierce Afghan, foreign presence in his soil was tantamount to the biggest insult to him, and hence, most of the Afghans resented the Soviet presence in their country. The Afghans were hence, disappointed with India's response to the Soviet intervention. However, India's historic ties with that country and its hugely popular culture managed to absorb some of the ill feelings, and hence, Afghans remained generally friendly and warm towards India even during the Soviet era.
Phase II - Post Soviet Pullout
11. During their presence in Afghanistan, the power struggle within the governing council, coupled with the guerrilla warfare of the US trained and armed Mujahedeen
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1Arundhati Roy, Soviet intervention in Afghanistan - Causes, Consequences and India's Response (New Delhi: Associated Publishing House, 1987), p.123.
2 Ibid, p 60.
groups extracted a heavy price on the Soviets in the 80s. The Soviets, having realised that they could not hold on to Afghanistan, declared their decision to pull out their troops in late 1988 and by 05 Feb 1989 completed its withdrawal from Afghanistan.
12. Indian Policy Alignment. Though New Delhi by and large forfeited its political mileage in Afghanistan during the period of Soviet intervention, it did remain
in touch with those political elements opposed to the Soviet-backed regime including, in addition to the moderate political forces, anti-regime guerrilla leaders such as Ahmed Shah Masoud.3 Towards the later period of the Soviet intervention, as the pressure on the Afghan government was being built up by the Mujahedeen groups, India aligned herself clearly with the Northern Alliance, made up primarily of the Tajiks, with Ahmed Shah Masoud and Prof Burhabuddin Rabbani as their leaders. Having realised that the Pushtun factions led by Gulbuddin Hekmatayar and Pir Syed Ahmed Gilani would have a pro-Pakistan stance, the best possible alternative for India was her continued support to the Northern Alliance during its battles with the Pushtun factions for gaining control of Kabul.
13. After the Soviet troops had left Afghanistan, India, according to former foreign Secretary, JN Dixit, followed a three pronged policy course: -
(a) Maintain contact with leaders of all groups including Sibhatullah Mojadadi, Burhanuddin Rabbani, Gulbuddin Hekmetyar and Rashid Dostam so that eventually it could deal with whosoever came to power.
(b) Continue to provide assistance in the economic and public health spheres to the extent feasible.
(c) Explore possibilities, in collaboration with states like Russia and Iran, of stabilising the situation in Afghanistan.3
14. The period immediately after the withdrawal of Soviet forces, saw intense power struggle between all the factions to gain a position of dominance, through
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3 Partha Pratim Basu, "India and Post Taliban Afghanistan". India Quarterly, Jul - Sep 08, p.100
1991 and 92. India managed to maintain its relevance through all the fighting, as finally, it was Burhabuddin Rabbani, a Tajik who ultimately became the President in Jun 1992. Hekmatyar, a Pushtun was appointed as the Prime Minister in 1993. Rabbani remained in power as the president till 1996, much against the liking of Pakistan.
15. Taliban. The emergence of Taliban was the most decisive phase in the equation between India, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Pakistan was able to develop an effective counter to India's influence in Afghanistan by the creation and nurturing of the fundamentalist organisation of Taliban. Within a short span of two years, the Taliban, taking advantage of the never ending power struggles in Kabul, rolled into the capital city and defeated the forces of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, who was then controlling the defence forces. By end Sep 1996, Kabul was in the hands of the Taliban. Both President Rabbani and Prime Minister Hekmatyar escaped from Kabul leaving behind the control of the country to the Taliban. This marked the end of Indian interests in Afghanistan, after a long period of beneficial relations. India was forced to shut down its embassy in Kabul and withdrew its diplomatic presence from the city.
Phase III - Post Taliban
16. The Sep 11 attacks on WTC in New York in 2001 can be termed as a turning point in the contemporary world history. The event strengthened the US resolve to root out terrorism. The first casualty in this offensive was the Taliban rule in Afghanistan as they refused to hand over Al Qaeda leaders holed up in their country. Within a span of two months, US led NATO forces installed an interim administration consisting of 29 members representing the major ethnic groups in Afghanistan, after overthrowing Taliban from power.
17. Indian Involvement in Re-construction of Afghanistan. India was quick to reopen its Embassy in Kabul after the interim government took over under President Hamid Karzai. India, however, limited its efforts in Afghanistan to non military involvement, which was the logical step to follow as the multilateral forces in Afghanistan were under the NATO leadership and not under UN mandate. India realised the importance of winning back the hearts of the Afghans and saw huge potential in the rebuilding of Afghanistan. Accordingly, India pledged 1.3 billion $, a huge amount by any standards, for undertaking the proposed reconstruction of Afghanistan. Additionally, 1 million tonnes of wheat was also pledged as aid. However, only a portion of it could be dispatched, as Pakistan did not allow transit rights to the shipment. India revitalized the Indira Gandhi Children's Hospital by sending a team of doctors and setting up of camps for artificial limbs. 4
18. A delegation of the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) visited Kabul in Feb 02. The delegation included representatives of Ashok Leyland, Mahindra and Mahindra, Hero Cycles, Hindustan Dorr Oliver, Usha International, and so on. Subsequently, the CII set up its office in Kabul.
19. India resumed air services with Afghanistan wef Jan 02. Additionally, India gifted three Airbus 300 B4 aircraft worth 7 million $ to Ariana Airlines. India also leased a team of 12 pilots, instructors and trainers to Ariana. India agreed to offer assistance in the field of health, education and training facilities. An agreement of bilateral cooperation was signed between India and Afghanistan when President Hamid Karzai visited India in Feb 02. The broad details of the Agreement are as follows: -
Health. Rebuilding of health infrastructure, which included construction of six medical care centres and mobile medical facilities as well as rehabilitation of some of the existing medical facilities
(b) Education. Rebuilding of educational infrastructure (six schools and polytechnics), rehabilitation of some of the existing educational institutions as well as supply of teaching aids.
Public Transport. Provide 50 buses/ other vehicles and material support for reviving public transport facilities in Kabul and other cities.
Industry. Rehabilitation of existing Industrial park in Kabul and
construction of a new Industrial Park.
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4Maj Gen Samay Ram UYSM, AVSM, VSM Retd. The new Afghanistan Pawn of America (New Delhi: Manas Publication, 2004), p.164.
Information Technology.
Setting up of computer training and maintenance facilities.
Computer hardware and software support for the Afghan Government Ministry.
Combined effort from the Indian IT and construction industry to rebuild Afghanistan using IT for survey, assessment and executing housing/ infrastructure projects.
Energy.
Examine projects for co-operation specifically for development of rural areas.
Examine avenues of specific co-operation in the field of renewable energy resources.
Undertake feasibility studies to projects in water and power sectors by a composite Indian team.
Training.
(i) Impart training to government officials from various Afghans ministries related to capacity building and human resource development at various training institutions in India.
(ii) Training certain sections of the Afghan Police in Indian training academies.
Road Construction. Indian Border Roads Organisation (BRO) to develop roads in the country.
(j) In addition, the Shiromani Gurudwara Prabhandak Committee (SGPC) has also been invited to help in the repair of the Gurudwaras and other Sikh shrines in Afghanistan.5
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5 Ibid. pp 165-167.
20. India extended further assistance to Afghanistan during Indian Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh's visit to Kabul in Aug 05. New projects in the field of health and agriculture were signed. A new initiative on 'Small Development Projects' was launched to work with local communities in development projects. Another significant announcement was the building of new Afghan parliament building by Indian CPWD with grant allocated by GOI. Close to 4000 Indian's were to be engaged in Afghanistan in all the civil projects put together.
21. Pakistani Reaction. Pakistan has been watching with growing unease, the increasing role of India in its backdoor. Some of those concerns were articulated by the Pakistan Army chief, Gen Ashfaq Parvez Kayani when he said that, India remains the primary threat to Pakistan and the focus of the Pakistani military. He spoke of the peace, security and stability of Afghanistan as the main element of Pakistan's "strategic depth", and said Pakistan had a more "legitimate" expectation in the matter of training the Afghan security forces than India.6 Ahmed Rashid, a well known Pakistani journalist who has been covering Central Asia and fundamentalist movements like Al Qaeda and Taliban for the last 25 years, in his widely acclaimed book - "Descent into Chaos" brings out the following: - "India's success in Afghanistan had stirred up a hornet's nest in Islamabad, which soon came to believe that India was "taking over Afghanistan". India had implemented a 500 million US $ reconstruction strategy that was one of the best planned from any country. It was designed to win over every sector of Afghan society, give India a high profile with the Afghans, gain the maximum political advantage, and of course undercut Pakistani influence. Indian companies were directly favoured and won major road-building contracts, including the contract for the road from Kandahar to the Pakistani border. When India reopened two consulates in Kandahar and Jalalabad that has been shuttered since 1979, Pakistan accused Indians of using them to undermine Pakistan by funding Pashtuns, Baloch and Sindhi dissidents. Meanwhile, there were no high-profile Pakistani-funded projects that Afghans could see, although Pakistan's private sector traded massively with Kabul."
22. Opposition to Indian Efforts. Pakistan, through ISI and the Taliban has been active in opposing Indian efforts of reconstruction in Afghanistan. Bombing of
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6 www. the hindu.com .
the Indian Embassy in Kabul on 07 Jul 08 was the most direct attack aimed at dissuading Indians from further involvement in Afghanistan. Though it could not break the will of the Indian government, the unfortunate loss of 38 lives including that of the Indian Defence Attaché cannot be forgotten. Kabul immediately accused the ISI of carrying out the attack and suspended all future talks with Pakistan. Within days, both New Delhi and Washington also accused the ISI of complicity. On 12 Jul 08 Admiral Mike Mullen and CIA deputy director Stephen Kappes arrived in Islamabad to show Gen Kayyani and the political leadership, the evidence they had of ISI complicity with Taliban forces of Jalalluddin Haqqani in carrying out the bombings. Attempts by Pakistan Prime Minister Syed Yousaf Gilani to shift the ISI to the Interior ministry was met with the fury of Gen Kayyani and the ISI chief, and thus the proposal was shelved.7
23. There have also been a number of attacks on Indian nationals involved in the rebuilding process as well as on the progress of Indian efforts by the Taliban- ISI combine. A second attack on the Embassy in 09, kidnapping and killing of members of Indian Border Roads Organisation involved in construction of roads in Afghanistan and an attack targeting a hotel and guesthouse that was used by Indian nationals were amongst the infamous ones. India has so far been able to stay on in its reconstruction process primarily due to the goodwill which it has created as well as the dire necessity of these activities which have been realised by the Karzai government.
24. Turning of Tide in Afghanistan. Taliban was regrouping in the law- less areas of NWFP since 2002 and, as the US seemed to be pre-occupied in Iraq, they started stepping up attacks. By end of 2005 Taliban was making audacious attacks on NATO troops in Afghanistan. NATO countries were increasingly getting wary of the ground situation in Afghanistan and were by now looking at avenues to withdraw their troops.
25. Diplomatic Set back. Pakistan has been pushing hard to remain in the driver's seat on Afghan policy. At their insistence, India was kept out of the Istanbul
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7 Ahmed Rashid. Descent into chaos. The world's most unstable region & the threat to global security. (Penguin books. 2008), p.406.
meeting leading up to the 28 Jan 10 London conference. The Afghanistan conference in London went on unexpected lines for India. India did not anticipate that the British would accept the Pakistani line that Islamabad could deliver peace by negotiating a deal with the Taliban. At least for now, Pakistan appears to be winning by hard-selling the line that without the involvement of the ISI, re-integration will remain a non-starter.
26. Afghan Peace Jirga. The London conference was followed by a much hyped peace jirga which ended on 04 Jun 10 in Kabul with a call for making peace with the Taliban by integrating them in the political mainstream. In a 16- article declaration, the jirga called on the Afghan and NATO led international forces to release Taliban prisoners against whom no solid evidence was available. The Taliban were urged to renounce violence and cut off their ties with Al Qaeda terror network. As per the organisers of the jirga, there was no alternative to making peace with the Taliban since neither the US led NATO forces nor could the Afghan army guarantee security to Afghans.8
27. Effect on Indian Efforts. The peace overtures towards Taliban by the Afghan administration is a clear set back to India's efforts in that country. For India, global approval of the reconciliation process implies that Pakistan, with its ISI
and army, is likely to take a leading role in Afghanistan. Pakistan can be said to have brow-beaten India in this issue and did manage to put a question mark on world leader's minds regarding India's supposed non-relevance in Afghanistan. As London conference showed, Islamabad got its way. Since January London conference, there is a growing perception that the West, including US is asking India to scale down its activities in Afghanistan as the Indian presence in the form of reconstruction projects is resented by Pakistan. The US, which is already in the withdrawal mode, has succumbed to the Pakistan's blackmail tactics and is ready to concede any demands if it helps to get it out of the deepening Afghan quagmire. A senior European diplomat, admitted that Europe does not want "too much of India" in Afghanistan as it would make that country a theatre of Indo-Pak rivalry and will complicate the exit plan to that extent.8 US Special envoy for Afghanistan and _________________________
8Ayesha Abdullah, "Choreographers' Acts - Is India losing the new Afghan game?". Strategic Affairs- Jun 10
Pakistan, Richard Holbrooke had reportedly told the then NSA, during his last visit to India, that India would have to be removed from all decision-making on Afghanistan, on Pakistan's insistence.
Way Ahead for India
28. Pakistan is likely to extract a heavy price from the US, if it manages to help them in bringing the Afghan situation under control. A Taliban takeover, aided by
Pakistan after the exit of NATO forces, is a veritable nightmare for India's foreign policy-making and strategic establishment that has nurtured its influence and relations with the Karzai regime. In spite of the Taliban reconciliation plan, India has not given up trying to persuade Washington to see the Afghan situation from its perspective. The Afghan issue is reported to have figured prominently in the inaugural India- US strategic dialogue held on 02 Jun - 03 Jun 10. Officially, there was an attempt to project a congruence of interest in creating "a stable, sovereign, democratic and pluralistic Afghanistan". India and US agreed to explore opportunities for coordination on civilian assistance projects that advance Afghan self sufficiency and build civilian capacity.8
29. Road Map. There are two schools of thoughts as to the road map for India post Peace Jirga. The first says that Afghanistan is a graveyard, and India has had a good run there for the past decade. But if the US security cover goes with the prospect of a Talibanised power structure in Kabul, India should reduce its presence, get its people out, and keep a modicum of influence to prevent the country from becoming a pre-9/11 anti-India space. Significantly, India hasn't taken on new infrastructure projects in Afghanistan lately. But another school says India should not only maintain its presence but add different dimensions to it. India's goal therefore should be to prevent a Taliban return. Recent opinion polls put India's popularity rating among Afghans at 71 per cent, in extreme contrast to only 2 per cent for Pakistan. But the bottom-line is that India is on its own in Afghanistan.9
30. In case India decides to stay on, India needs to support Karzai through a period when he will surely be making existential deals to ensure a life after the US.
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9Indrani Baghchi, Diplomatic editor TOI. www. defence.pk/forums
For India, Karzai is a better bet than the Taliban. There are supporters in Karzai's circle like Asadullah Khalid (erstwhile governor of Kandahar) and Gul Agha Sherzai (Nangarhar) whom India can help. India will also have to step up its engagement with the Pushtuns. Since 2001, India has been doing precisely this, and it's no coincidence that India's enormously successful small projects are scattered through the Pushtun provinces. But the Pushtuns will always have naturally Pakistani leanings, which have to be factored in as well. 9
31. India's immediate challenges in Afghanistan therefore, will include, other than securing its citizens, dealing with US perspectives on India's role in the country, and winning back Pushtun sentiments. India's biggest challenge in engaging with the Taliban would be its linkages with anti-India terrorist groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba. A differentiation needs to be made between the various groups of the Taliban in terms of the extent of the linkages with such groups.
32. Another alternative, though with limited options, still available to India, is what India's former Foreign Secretary JN Dixit suggests in his book, "India's Foreign Policy-Challenge of Terrorism", that, we could function in cooperation with Central Asian Region states, Iran, Russia and China to generate political pressure to stabilise Afghanistan, as none of the countries above would like a radical Islam state bordering them. How receptive would be China, to India's reasoning needs to be seen.
CONCLUSION
33. India's fortunes in Afghanistan has seen a number of ups and downs starting with the Soviet intervention in that country and the subsequent tacit support of the Indian government, to the latest peace jirga and possible integration of Taliban in the Afghan government. India has been active in its efforts to have its foot print in Afghanistan primarily to counter the Pakistan effort to install a pro-Pakistan government in that country, which would increase its strategic depth. India's interest and efforts in Afghanistan is in direct contradiction to that of Pakistan. Pakistan being the natural neighbour of Afghanistan always resented India's influence in that
country. However, India has been by far able to maintain a healthy relation with the various Afghan regimes barring the pure Taliban rule from 1996 to 2001.
34. The Indian stance during the three phases brought out in the paper displays the maturity and foresightedness with which the country has been handling the Afghan issue. While the crucial Soviet support to Indian economy in the 80's guided the foreign policy then, the support to non-Pushtuns through Northern Alliance was a pre-requisite to avoid Pakistan influence in Afghanistan, during the fight for the country post Soviet withdrawal. India stood vindicated in its support to Northern Alliance when US forces installed an interim government under Hamid Karzai, a Pushtun, with heavy support from elements of the Northern Alliance after defeating Taliban in 2001.
35. India may take comfort from the fact that not all Taliban is pro-Pakistan. Aditya Sinha, Editor-in-Chief New Indian Express wrote in his editorial on 03 Jul 10, about what Abdul Salam Zaeef , the Taliban ambassador to Pakistan had to say about his host country. Abdul Salam Zaeef, an influential and intelligent Taliban wrote in his memoirs written in Guantanamo Bay thus, "Pakistan was known among the prisoners as Majbooristan, the land that is obliged to fulfil each of America's demands. Pakistan, which plays a key role in Asia, is so famous for treachery that it is said that they can get milk from a bull. They have two tongues in one mouth, and two faces on one head, so they can speak everybody's language; they use everybody, deceive everybody..."
36. Finally, the Indian hope will rest on all the good work it has done till date in Afghanistan, and that, the Taliban elements in the likely coalition government recognises the danger of the double edged sword of Pakistan policy as Abdul Salam Zaeef did. A lot will depend on the current Afghan government's ability to remain together and prevent a complete takeover of their country by the Taliban. However, if the Taliban succeeds in Afghanistan completely, with all moderate voices drowning in their extreme Islamisation of the country, then one can expect a repeat of what happened in India, after the retreat of the Soviets from Afghanistan. There will be far too many of unemployed jihadis in Pakistan who would want to continue their jihad. The new constitution and the will of the people may be the only straw left for achieving a semblance of governance in Afghanistan. For India, this may be a wise time to pause; and watch how the new dispensation works out, and take measured steps in light of the unfolding events.
Wellington (P Sasi Kumar)
Sep 10 Lt Cdr
Word Count
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2. Total effective words - 3983
