The individual components of the proposed question have been debated for the past sixty-five years by some of the greatest modern historians. Germany is estimated to have lost over five million military personnel during the period 1939-1945. [1] Such a loss must be accounted for. For the purpose of this essay, the work of Burleigh and Wipperman [2] will be examined in order to help to define Germany's racial ideology and then the works of Ian Kershaw among others are hoped to answer whether this ideology in fact led to the loss of the Second World War. Kershaw's views will be taken into consideration from his plethora of books written on this subject. However, to deeper analyse the reasons for Germany's loss and to help define as to whether they are connected to the racial ideology it held, it is important to consider other historians' reactions to Kershaw's work. In particular, reaction to the Soviet campaign will be given greatest credence.
Racial Ideology itself must be defined since failure to do so creates an inability to assess the extent of the consequences on Germany's war effort. In this essay, Germany's ideology will in fact be assumed as Hitler's racial ideology. Therefore, the 'extreme functionalist' viewpoints of historians such as Götz Aly [3] will not be considered. It would not be wise to further debate whether it was Hitler's or others within the regime that created such an extreme racial ideology, as this does not help illuminate the possible reason for Germany's war loss any deeper. Extremities aside, the exact nature of the ideology is still a hotly debated topic. Burleigh and Wipperman [4] list several proponents of racial discussion such as Kant, Hegel, Von Treischke, Darwin and Nietzsche some of which clearly Germany and Hitler had adopted by the time of the Nuremburg Laws from 1935 and the sterilisation of the German Mulattoes by 1938. In order to determine Germany's racial ideology we can consider two different methods; research historians' opinions concerning German racial ideology and the interpretation of 'Mein Kampf', if one agrees that it was Hitler's opinions which dictated the execution of ideology into practice.
"Hitler presupposed the existence of 'higher' and 'lesser' classes, a notion common to virtually every racial ideologists since the late eighteenth century" [5] state Burleigh and Wipperman. "Hitler claimed that the Aryans alone were the culture creating race". [6] Examples of such implementation of classes can be seen in the persecution of the Jews as well as the euthanasia 'T4' project, which sought to rid Germany of mentally ill citizens. Hitler advocated "the acquisition of outlying colonies" and believed that he was "acting in the sense of the almighty creator: by warding off the Jews, I am doing the Lord's work". [7] This defining of part of Hitler's racial ideology allows us to be confident when stating that the measures implemented which may or may not have brought about Germany's defeat were in fact created due to Germany's racial ideology. Paul Weindling states "Thus it can be seen that race, while intended to be a unifying ideology, was ultimately divisive as the circle of degenerates was so enlarged". [8] This point will be expanded during the discussion on the consequences of racial ideology on the war effort. However, at this time this quote is intended to demonstrate another string to the racial bow; that is, the ideology was supposed to achieve unification and hence strength and not weakness as later transpired.
Hitler's hatred of the Soviet Union was in part racially motivated. In a pamphlet circulating in 1941, as mentioned by Forster we learn "They are the embodiment of the infernal, of the personified insane hatred of everything that is noble in humanity. In the shape of these commissars we witness the revolt of the subhuman against noble blood". [9] Although the reliability of Hitler's own propaganda creates its own problems when trying to evaluate its meaning, this is clearly evidential of a distinct racial ideology. Having established that Hitler's actions in Soviet Russia and in fact domestically were possibly a result of racial ideology, it is possible to discuss with meaning whether such actions resulted in the loss of the Second World War.
According to Kershaw, "Hitler's twin ideological obsessions, it is universally recognised, were lebensraum and anti-Semitism". [10] Whilst lebensraum was intended to create space for Aryans through expansionism, it is clear that the extermination of Jews, cripples, Slavs and others would also create the 'living room' needed. And so this section will investigate Hitler's racial policies (as a result of his ideology) which caused Germany's downfall.
Even a brief scanning of Hitler's anti-Semitic pre-and post 1939 policies demonstrates potential harm to German efficiency. 'Krtistallnacht' on 9th November 1938 and the preceding expulsion of Polish Jews weakened the German economy and therefore could only strengthen any allied position against Hitler. 20,000 Jews had been sent to concentration camps which wasted vital resources which would have been needed during the Soviet expedition. More importantly, the deportations that followed and the creation of extermination facilities put a strain of the economy and hence in turn, the war effort. Kershaw [11] in his profile of Hitler dedicates a number of pages to the extent of the Final Solution and the resources needed for such a policy. Whilst it cannot be officially estimated as to the effect of the extermination of Jews on the German war effort, events such as 'Aktion Reinhard' in October 1941 and the further construction of the death camps at Auschwitz and Treblinka in 1942 will certainly have made an impact. The transportation of death-sentenced Jews from all over Nazi-occupied Europe also interfered with Germany's chances of success in the Second World War. Even if the exact holocaust numbers are to be argued over, there is no question that the Jewish population, which was unused by the Wehrmacht, coupled with the tens of thousands of personnel needed to police, transport and kill them, would have been useful to Hitler's military campaign.
Although the Americans were sympathetic to the Jews and opposed Germany's racial ideology, they did not in fact join World War Two for this reason. America joined the war in immediate response to Pearl Harbour on December 7th 1941. On 11th December Germany and America declared war on each other which was another key factor in Germany's demise. This will therefore be discussed shortly when detailing other reasons as to why Germany lost World War Two. Whilst previously it was argued that racial ideology may have been an insignificant factor in Germany's demise, one can now state confidently that this is no longer true. Although Kershaw does not actively state the answer to this question, his focus on racial ideology itself and that it led to the events such as the renunciation of the Nazi Soviet pact and the more obvious extermination of the Jews implies racial ideology had a major role in the World War Two result. The second and most important factor interfering with Germany's war capability brought about by racial ideology was the Soviet Union expedition. As mentioned, it was Hitler's racial policy to cleanse Germany and thus Europe of the Bolsheviks. Indeed McDonough comments "The decision to attack the Soviet Union…was taken more because it fitted with Hitler's own territorial and ideological aims than for sound strategic reasons". [12] The consequence of such an attack and the war that followed from 1941-1945 are generally regarded as the main reason for Germany's loss in the Second World War by historians such as Clark [13] , and Stahel [14] . Since it has been established that the war with Russia or 'Operation Barbarossa' can be seen to have been instigated due to racial ideology, a conclusion that racial ideology did in fact cause Germany's loss due to this war would be premature but not necessarily incorrect.
However, other possible reasons accounting for Germany's defeat must be stated since even from a brief understanding of the period between 1939 and 1945, one would not be chastised for ignoring racial ideology as one of the main causes. As noted, Hitler's renunciation of the Nazi-Soviet Pact and attacking of the Soviet Union on 22nd June 1941 in 'Operation Barbarossa' was a major factor in Germany's eventual defeat, due to having to fight on at least two fronts. In addition, the British resistance at Dunkirk particularly during June 1st-4th 1940 had a negative impact on Germany's war effort. Linking the mistakes at Dunkirk and the Soviet campaign demonstrate a key point as to why Germany may have lost the Second World War.
Hitler himself and the decision making in the German war-machine would be this reason. The confusion within the German chain of command directly affected Germany's war effort with the army relatively neglected. Layton notes "The consequence of all this (confusion) was that after two years of war and with the armed forces advancing into the USSR, Germany's economic mobilisation for total war just had not achieved the expected levels of armaments production". [15] Layton has identified two key reasons as to why Germany lost the Second World War one of which is wholly disconnected from racial ideology. Firstly, there was little coordination between the Ministry of Armaments, the Economics, Finance and Labour ministries and the Office of the Four Year Plan; with the responsibilities between departments blurred. Further to this, Layton quotes laughable figures detailing German armament during the war; "amazingly Germany's air-force had increased from 8290 in 1939 to 10,780 in 1941 while in Britain over the same period has trebled to 20,100". [16] It is this lack of strategy and failure to effectively mobilise for a war on two fronts which must be a strong reason as to Germany's loss.
Ian Kershaw shared his commonplace structuralist views in a recent online interview regarding Hitler's invasion of the Soviet Union. Through the structuralist mindset, we can argue that Germany lost the Second World War due to the quest for lebensraum in the Soviet Union which did not come as a consequence of racial ideology. He states, "But the political, military decision came much later and that decision comes more or less following the great victory over France...The war in the East was always going to happen sooner rather than later because of the pressure of time". [17] Kershaw brings up an interesting point. Although the eventual invasion of the Soviet Union was inevitable (possibly due to ideological aims), it is the timing which was forced about due to matters not spoken about in the original ideology in works such as 'Mein Kampf''. And it is the timing and the refusal to withdraw which was certainly a major factor in Germany's ability to win the Second World War. Gerhard Weinberg when reviewing Kershaw's 'Fateful Choices', agrees: "This decision, over-determined in a way by Hitler's ambitious plans of conquest is again one whose significance for the course of the war as whole will not be challenged by anyone". [18] There is no doubt that Hitler's racial ideological aims played some part in the initial campaign, however, his quest for power and the poor strategic decisions taken at the time due to perceived necessity to do so cost Germany dear. And yet contrastingly strongly with this notion is the anti-Bolshevik pamphlet highlighted by Forster [19] circulating in 1941 discussed earlier. The pamphlet, presumably in line with Hitler's thoughts shows racial contempt for the Soviet Union and does not list strategic and other non-ideological ideas for the invasion. However, due to the fact that this was essentially propaganda, it cannot be assumed that Hitler's invasion was ideological at this point.
Whilst Hitler's invasion of the Soviet Union and the economic and military deficiencies created by such an effort can be argued to have been a result of racial ideology, the mistakes made at the battle of Dunkirk and the achievements the by Allies are exempt from such a category. Hitler famously allowed the Allies to recover from the battle of Dunkirk by allowing three days of respite. He had been assured by Goering that the Luftwaffe was equipped to continue to the barrage from the skies. This turned out to be a key error as the evacuation saved some 330,000 troops to fight another day. Kershaw comments "It is conceivable then that if the British Army had been destroyed at Dunkirk, there was no army to speak of left in Britain". [20] Although Kershaw argues that the battle of Dunkirk was not the most important factor in the war, it is seen as an error by Hitler which was clearly not brought about by racial ideology.
Although as highlighted in this essay the reasons as to why Germany lost the Second World War are many, the invasion of the Soviet Union will and should always remain at the forefront of the historian's mind. However, this creates its own problems when answering the question pertaining to racial ideology. Debating whether Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union was a product of racial ideology is essentially discussing the different arguments between intentionalists and structuralists. If Hitler invaded due to deep racial and ideological reasons, then most certainly racial ideology is a major factor in Germany's losing of the Second World War. On the other hand, if the assault began due to a strategic decision or in fact a mistake on Hitler's part (with racial ideology not in mind) then it is the events themselves and not the ideologies which ought to be studied when assessing Germany's demise. In reality, although modern structuralists and intentionalists debate more frequently concerning the Holocaust, we can use this middle ground when determining how great an impact racial ideology had in the outcome of the Second World War. It would be reasonable to argue that foreign policy was governed to some extent by racial ideology. However, expansionism was not solely undertaken to fulfil such a mantra. Again, even though the attack on the Soviet Union and in fact the Second World War was necessary for the dominance of the Aryan race, each stage should be considered one part at a time. This is leaning towards the structuralist view which arguably is the most rational having considered all the sources and giving a nod to Kershaw's immense knowledge and weight of opinion on the subject.
As mentioned, this essay has been somewhat condensed to focus on the Soviet invasion since it is the most relevant to racial ideology and the outcome of the war. America's intervention has not been conclusively linked in any way to the racial policy of Germany. Indeed, Hitler's Final Solution and establishing of concentration camps has also not been conclusively proven to have had a major impact on the war. Although the Allies disagreed with Nazi ideology, their reasons for declaring war differ dramatically. For example, it was Germany's refusal to withdraw from Poland and that consequently caused Britain to enter the theatre of combat. Hitler's mistakes during the war also greatly hampered their chances of triumphing. Ignoring the Soviet invasion and the mistakes made initially waging war on a somewhat passive opponent; Germany's and particularly Hitler's mistakes against the Allied forces were a notable factor. In fact, Germany had failed to prepare effectively for a truly European conquest. However, if racial ideology was irrelevant, it could be argued that Germany would not have diverted troops to the Eastern Front thus making victory in the west much more likely. In summary, the proposed question cannot be answered to satisfy all sides of the historians' spectrum concerning racial ideology. It is challenging to identify Germany's racial ideology and most importantly whether it was wholly factored into the decisions made. In addition, even if racial ideology is clearly defined and each key event is designated to be racially motivated or not, the other factors in Germany's loss could be argued to outweigh such events. Whilst the sources available, particularly those from Kershaw, are informative regarding the individual components of the proposed question, one is left slightly jaded by the absence of true committal.
