Chanakya identified military might as a critical factor of national power. With India preparing herself for war on two and a half fronts, it is necessary to restructure the armed forces in terms of size, organisation, equipment and doctrine. He also gave out the organisation of armed forces and how the various constituents had to be amalgamated to fight.
Chanakya on War
Campaign Planning. Chanakya listed out eight factors that had to be considered before setting out on a campaign. The king was advised to give due weightage to these factors to arrive at a comparison between his own capabilities and that of the enemy. The factors as applicable to the king and the enemy were listed as following:- [58]
Power.
Place of campaign.
Time or the season for marching towards battle ground.
When to mobilise forces.
The possibility of revolts and rebellions.
The likely losses, expenses and gains.
Likely dangers to include internal and external treachery.
The factors of force, space and time had been taken into consideration. Chanakya insisted upon the king to analyse the gains and losses that were to be accrued at the end of the campaign. He was of the view that a campaign must be undertaken only if the gains far outweighed the losses. The king was advised to analyse the costs, gains, it's immediate and long term consequence and its worth. [59]
Types of War. Diplomacy, open war, concealed or psychological war and clandestine war were the four forms of warfare enunciated by Chanakya. Economic and cyber warfare have been added to the four forms. In conducting defence of the state, Chanakya talked of physical defence as well as maintenance of internal cohesion. [60]
Military Organisation. Chanakya described the types of forces, structure, leadership, training and modes of fighting in great detail. He elaborated on the organisation and mobilisation of army during peace and war. He listed out the responsibilities of the military leaders in organising the forces, training of troops and conduct of war. He described the types of forces that were needed for battle and how best each type could be used for decisive results. [61] However, in modern armed forces, not every aspect as enunciated by Chanakya can be incorporated. The principles given out by Chanakya have to be adapted in the modern context.
Rule of Acquired Territory. The king was advised to initiate measures in accordance with dharma for administration of the captured territory. The locals were to be treated with respect and given all protection. Law and order and local customs were to be maintained. Any official found incurring the displeasure of the people was to be removed. [62]
USA tried to force changes in Iraq after the Gulf War. Administration of the country was not planned. The image of coalition forces changed from liberators to exploiters of the nation's resources. Chaos spread across the country. Coalition forces withdrew in December 2011 under not very flattering conditions.
Future Role of Armed Forces
The primary role of the Indian Armed Forces is to safeguard territorial integrity and unity. Secondary role has been assigned as internal security and aid to civil authority. [63] The tasks of the armed forces would include deterrence, dealing with sub conventional threats, participate in peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief or national reconstruction. Deal with out of area contingencies and provision of aid to civil authorities.
Prolonged deployment of the armed forces in internal security duties affects their combat potential alienates the local populace. There has been an increase in the involvement of Central Police and Para Military Forces to tackle insurgency, however, Army is likely to continue to be called out to tackle internal security situations till the time these forces are suitably trained and equipped for the task.
Keeping the role and tasks in mind, the defence forces need to be prepared for non-traditional threats, threats across the entire spectrum of conflict, enhance the training and decisiveness of troops and improve the network centric capabilities. [64]
Comparison of Conventional Forces of India, Pakistan and China
India- Pakistan. Aggregate military capabilities between India and Pakistan clearly favour India. At 1.3 million, India's active troop strength is almost twice that of Pakistan. [65] India can deploy 3 armoured divisions, 22 infantry divisions, 7 independent armoured brigades and 6 independent infantry brigades against Pakistan's 2 armoured divisions, infantry divisions, 7 independent brigades and 10 independent infantry brigades. India's three armour-led offensive corps face only two equivalent corps on the Pakistani side. The balance of air power reveals similar disparities with Indian Air Force(IAF) being numerically and qualitatively superior. As for naval capability, ratios are similar with Indian fleet almost twice the size of that held by Pakistan. [66]
India- China. With more than 2.2 million active and 800,000 reserves, close to 6,000 aircrafts and nearly 1,000 naval ships against India's 1.3 million active and 1.74 million reserves, 2,500 aircrafts and 175 naval ships, China holds a considerable numerical and qualitative advantage in military power. [67] Geopolitical realities entail that in the event of any hostilities, both sides would be capable of bringing only a part of their forces to bear. Inhospitable terrain precludes mechanized warfare. IAF operating from lower elevations would enjoy both range and payload advantages over their Chinese counterparts. The terrain existing on the Indian side would limit the scope of operations. India's proficiency in mountain warfare, capabilities of IAF, China's Malacca dilemma would insure that India could hold its own if attacked.
India- Alliance of Pakistan and China. If India were to fight a war against China and Pakistan at the same time, her active strength of 1.3 million against a combined strength of just over 3 million would be inadequate. Since both China and Pakistan would keep adequate forces on the Taiwan and Iran fronts respectively, the effective strength that would be deployed against India would be in the range of 2-2.5 million. IAF and Indian Navy too would be outnumbered and forced to fight in penny packets. The lines of communication stretching from Gujarat to Arunanchal Pradesh would be vulnerable to disruption. The stockpile of missiles would be grossly inadequate to engage strategic targets in both the countries. To deal with such a scenario Indian Armed forces need to expand in terms of quantity and quality.
Nuclear Capabilities of India, Pakistan and China
India, China and Pakistan are established nuclear power. Pakistan justifies the expansion of nuclear stockpile as a necessity to deter India's superior conventional capabilities. India's nuclear capability is designed to counter dangers emanating from the conventional superiority enjoyed by the Chinese.
India is in process of developing ballistic missile defence. When the system is deployed, the deterrence posed by the nuclear capabilities of Pakistan will become less effective. Similarly the capability of China to inflict destruction on India will be reduced. This coupled with the deployment of triad will provide a deterrent capability to India. The armed forces need to be capable to fight in a nuclear backdrop.
Changes Required in India's Operational Philosophy
India's foreign policy is based on Panchsheel and Non Alignment. India's engagement with both China and Pakistan has been aimed at peaceful resolution of outstanding disputes. India has the capability to negotiate with Pakistan from a position of strength based on military and diplomatic capabilities. However, when dealing with China situation is different. In military terms attaining a favourable balance of power would entail developing a military both in terms of size and technological capabilities.
Proactive Operations. The Armed Forces have to maintain a high level of readiness for war in varied terrain conditions and operate across the entire spectrum of conflict. The future wars will be short and intense and a decision would have to be obtained earliest. This necessitates taking a proactive approach. Maintenance of forces at high degree of defence preparedness would entail enhanced allocation in defence budget. The defence procurement procedures will have to be streamlined and greater impetus given to R&D in defence sector.
The peace time location of the armed forces would have to be moved closer to the borders in order to achieve a favourable mobilisation differential over the enemy. The infrastructure in the border areas would have to be upgraded to support the military operations.
A strong political will and high levels of readiness will deter Pakistan from supporting acts of terror on Indian soil. On the Chinese front, it would send across the message that early resolution of the border disputes is necessary and would enable India to negotiate from a position at par with the Chinese.
Flexible Response. Flexible response was a strategy implemented by Kennedy to replace Eisenhower's policy of Massive Retaliation. Flexible response required mutual deterrence at all levels, giving USA the capability to respond to USSR across the spectrum of warfare, not limited only to nuclear arms. Importance was also placed on counterinsurgency and the development of unconventional military forces, unconventional tactics, and "civic action" programs. [68] Chanakya too had proposed a flexible approach in dealing with the adversary. He had proposed numerous methods of furthering the interests of the state ranging from the force posturing, open war, secret war, diplomatic war and use of allies to deal with the adversary. In 1999, by keeping the Kargil conflict limited to the areas of incursion, India not only achieved the political and military aim, she also gained recognition as a responsible nuclear weapon state. Relations with USA improved and the sanctions imposed after the nuclear tests were lifted. On the other hand reputation of Pakistan took a downturn and it became isolated in the international arena. When India mobilised her armed forces (Yana) in response to the attack on parliament, international pressure forced Pakistan to take action against various terrorist groups. In response to the terrorist attacks in Mumbai on 26/11, India chose to fight a diplomatic war. Pressure was put on Pakistan by the international community and it had to take actions against the terrorist leaders and groups. Therefore, it becomes clear that the response to any situation is required to be flexible and the method selected should bring maximum gains for the country.
Special Forces capable of striking at terrorist training camps across the borders and taking out specific targets need to be raised to provide the requisite flexibility in response. Adequate forces including Central Police Forces and Para Military Forces have to be earmarked for rear area security at all times including war. The inability to dominate the Kashmir Valley during the limited war in 1999 resulted in the terrorists recovering from the stranglehold and subjecting the state to one of the worst levels of terrorism.
Develop Deterrence. The destructive power of nuclear weapons could deter a more powerful adversary. Bernard Brodie in 1959 wrote that a credible nuclear deterrent must be always at the ready, yet never used. [69] Thomas Schelling stated that the capacity to hurt another state was to be used as a motivating factor for other states to avoid war. In order to coerce or deter another state, violence had to be anticipated and yet be avoided by accommodation. [70] However, if armed conflict were avoided at the price of diplomatic concessions to the maximum demands of the adversary, it cannot be claimed that deterrence has succeeded. [71]
The development and deployment of ballistic missile defence by India and China would reduce the deterrence posed by nuclear arsenal of the adversary. The deterrence would lose its potential if the decision makers in any country become irrational. Armed forces must be prepared to safeguard the national interests, therefore, it would be essential to develop conventional military capabilities matching the adversary and be capable of fighting in a nuclear environment.
Revolution in Military Affairs(RMA). Chanakya was of the opinion that the enemy must be attacked from unexpected directions. [72] Major accretions in air power and battle field transparency will enable the armed forces to achieve RMA. Integration of satellites, AWACS, UAVs etc to look deep within the enemy territory would enhance transparency and Air power can strike deep. Technology would bring in the capability to execute air landed and amphibious operations on large scale and ability of the navy to project power in support of air-land offensives would turn the flanks of the enemy. [73]
Net Centric Warfare. High technology weapons, sensors, communications and information technology will impact all types of military operations. Net centric warfare requires highly complex planning and coordination, near real time and total situational awareness, decision support systems, colossal data-base and information-exchange capabilities to tackle both friendly and hostile situations. The armed forces need to focus on IT and Information Warfare (IW) in a big way. [74]
Nature of Warfare. The capabilities of the armed forces have an impact on the way war would be fought. Pakistan having realised its lack of capability in the conventional domain resorted to proxy war. After initial hiccoughs, India has mastered the capabilities in dealing with proxy war.
China's underbelly is its economic growth and democratic aspirations of the people. While India is not in a position to match China toe to toe on the conventional battle field, it needs to develop capabilities to exploit the Chinese vulnerabilities by waging economic, information and cyber wars.
Jointness in Operations. India Pakistan war in 1971 and the two Gulf wars demonstrated the importance of coordination amongst the three services. Despite achieving a decisive victory in the only war the three services fought in a synergistic manner, jointness remained confined to the boundaries of the training institutions in India. Kargil Review Committee recommended setting up joint structures at the earliest. The government accepted the recommendations after some changes and implementation instructions were issued in mid 2001. An integrated defence headquarters and joint command were been formed. However, the establishment of the post of Chief of Defence Staff(CDS) remains unimplemented. [75]
Participation of Military Leadership in Planning Process. Success in military campaign would require close cooperation amongst the three services and also between armed forces and the government. It would be essential to integrate the armed forces from the initial stages of decision making. The creation of the post of CDS would facilitate the interaction between the armed forces and the government. CDS would also be able to coordinate aspects of doctrine, procurement of equipment, training and logistics amongst the services.
Restructuring Armed Forces to Meet the Two and a Half Front Threat
Threats and challenges, national aspirations and desired capabilities are some of the factors that need to be taken into account to formulate the organisation of defence forces as well as the manner of transformation. The restructuring should ensure that the military continues to remain professionally strong and should cater for optimisation of doctrine and concepts, efficient management of internal conflicts, enhancing human resource, focussed logistics and modernising the training methodology.
Expansion of Armed Forces. The Army should raise strike formations for operations in high altitudes and also adequate expeditionary forces. Naval power will have to be based on at least four Carrier Battle Groups (CBGs) to dominate the three seas that surround India even when one of the aircraft carrier is docked for maintenance. Fleet expansion will be necessary to support the operations of the CBGs. The Indian Air Force will have to be expanded to support land and sea battles in addition to strategic targeting. This would require 60-65 squadrons equipped with fourth and fifth generation aircrafts. The support operations by air force would entail raising of additional transport and helicopter fleets. The government must sanction additional strength to the armed forces for this.
Battle Groups Concept. To enhance the integration and jointness in effort, re-orbatting of armed forces should be carried out based on theatre of operations. All the forces operating in a theatre should be grouped under a theatre commander. The forces that would be participating in operations in a sector should be based within the sector in the same station and as part of the formation under which they would be fighting. The level of integration should be brought down to brigade. The battle groups of army and the squadrons of air force should train together to evolve common procedures and practices.
Modernisation. Though modernisation is in progress, Army, IAF and Navy are operating large number of vintage equipment. India's failure to create a viable military industrial complex in the private sector and poor R&D performance is offset by access to Russian, European, Israeli and US technologies. This is a weakness that an aspiring power must overcome.
The modernisation of the armed forces should be carried out with due diligence based on the role envisaged, interoperability, ease of maintenance and reliability. There is a need to create an organisation to coordinate these aspects amongst the three services, DRDO and the ministry. This organisation should function under the Chiefs of Staff Committee(COSC) till the time post of CDS is created.
Reduction of Static Forces. The number of troops deployed to hold ground should be reduced by increasing the density and quantum of fire. Employing mechanised and motorised infantry in conjunction with armoured units in mobile defence will create a large number of reserves that can be deployed for offensive or defensive tasks in the sector based on the situation. Mobile warfare is ideal for operations in nuclear backdrop. Some of the infantry formations that are freed from defensive role in the plains can thereafter be deployed along the Northern borders.
Marine Corps. Amphibious forces can project from an unexpected direction. Amphibious capability will enable India to threaten Karachi and Baluchistan, and also the Eastern flank of China. While navy would need to acquire several ships and crafts, army would need to raise amphibious formations that can subsequently be converted into Marine Corps on the lines of US Marines. These capabilities will also help in any out of area contingencies.
Air Power. Air power enables operations and observation in strategic depth. For destruction of targets in air, land and sea, the air force should be equipped with fourth and fifth generation fighter aircrafts. In addition to fighters, support fleet to include AWACs, aerostats, UAVs and air to air refuellers must be procured in adequate quantity. IAF must develop capabilities for aerospace warfare as well.
Blue Water Navy. To exploit the Malacca dilemma of China, Indian Navy will have to develop blue water capability. The navy will have to operate at least four CBGs. In addition to the three seas, CBGs may have to be deployed to safeguard national interests in Africa and Persian Gulf regions. Long range patrolling and surveillance capability will have to be acquired to safeguard the national assets in the high seas.
Airborne Assault Divisions. Transport fleet of IAF should be expanded to provide strategic mobility to the army. India must raise airborne assault divisions. To provide strategic reach to the army and deploy forces anywhere at short notice. These divisions could be employed to capture air heads in Tibet or threaten strategic lines of communication and force Chinese offensive to recoil. [76] Necessary logistic support will have to be kept prepared all times and must be containerised for speedier operations.
Internal Security Duties. The probability of conventional war taking place is low. However, counter terrorist operations are a reality. There have been demands to handover the operations against Naxalites to the army. Combating insurgencies provides valuable combat experience to the troops and junior leaders. The Rashtriya Rifles and Assam Rifles raised for counter terrorist operations in J&K and North East are para military forces manned by army personnel. There would be a requirement to raise more forces on similar lines to deal with Naxalites. These forces could be given a dual role, primary being to combat insurgency and secondary being conventional military operations. Thus, India would be able to maintain a healthy force ratio against both China and Pakistan under all contingencies.
