Modus Operandi of the Terrorists and the Present Situation
1. Almost all terrorist groups, are very active in recruiting from rural areas, where the presence of security forces is scarce or inconsistent. Although the insurgents across Jammu and Kashmir claim to be fighting on behalf of the civilian population, none has made efforts to provide any social services or security to villages in the Valley. Their sights have been set on both security forces and civilian targets. Violence against the population, regardless of religious orientation, is commonplace. Terrorist organizations in Jammu and Kashmir have commonly targeted non combatants: To further instil fear and publicity and therefore coerce the locals' loyalty, terrorists have, in many cases, mutilated their victims. Such incidents have helped further sap widespread support from the locals. small groups of terrorists infiltrate an operational area of security forces, fortify themselves in a favorable position, and proceed to kill as many security personnel as possible before being cut down. Kashmiri militants generally put up a fight when their group is stiffened by a few mercenaries. Left to themselves, they prefer to hit and run. Although the use of suicide bombers has not been widely implemented in J&K, the LeT has shown itself to be skilled in the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs). The targets of these land mines and other explosives include military convoys and other vehicles belonging to security forces, as well as civilian targets,people-centric operations.
2. Countering Terrorism. This is carried out by the army separately for each of the following stages as under:-
Recruitment stage. Checking recruitment in the rural and urban areas , preventing indoctrination of the local youth by overground workers and the madarsas.
Exfiltration and infiltration stage. Three tiered deployment of army and BSF on LC along with the anti infiltration obstacle system.
Reception stage. Intelligence in the form of HUMINT and ELINT to neutralise / trap fresh groups by Rashtriya Rifles who have succeeded in infiltrating across LC.
Deployment stage. Road opening, Cordon & search operations, convoy protection , search and destroy missions and pseudo gang operations.
Weaknesses of the Security Forces
3. The heavy-handed tactics of a purely military approach to terrorism was resulting in inadvertent civilian deaths and collateral damage. This, coupled with the consistent difficulty of determining the location of terrorists among the population, was causing increasing alienation and discontent. Interservice quarrels in 1993 following the creation of a Unified Headquarters (UH) in J&K caused additional setbacks. Created to coordinate counter terrorism operations among the army, paramilitary, and police forces, the UH was ineffective and counterproductive. As India's oldest paramilitary force, the Border Security Force (BSF) wanted to place the Rashtriya Rifles under its command. The RR units, staffed by regular army personnel, looked down on the BSF's abilities and dismissed such notions. Furthermore, early RR battalions lacked cohesion, as they were assembled by amalgamating soldiers from different battalions.Northern Command also began the challenging task of reorienting soldiers to counter terrorism operations by adapting a apolitical approach that concentrated on the population rather than on the militants. Language differences, unit traditions, and a high degree of equipment variance at the battalion (or even the company) level were all barriers to successful early deployments in the Valley. It was not until after the Kargil War that Northern Command was able to act on lessons learned from early mistakes.
Structures And Processes Evolved
4. Northern Command has since been heavily involved with additional civic and developmental operations. Following the success of its initial large-scale operation, the Indian government approved funding for additional projects. In the early years following the end of the World War II, the Indian Army composed a doctrine for counter terrorism operations, using as a foundation the British experience in Malaya. Since then, the doctrine has been refined by putting theories to practice and adapting them to alleviate problems common across the spectrum of operations. Further lessons were learned through the army's experiences against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka and the North-East insurgencies.The Indians quickly recognized that the very nature of counter terrorism operations is one of constant unpredictability. Lieutenant General Ray writes: The only certainty is uncertainty. Low-intensity conflict is all about high-speed change, chaos, and disorder. It demolishes in one stroke all traditional military concepts applicable to general war. The contradictions are simply too many. To successfully and consistently combat insurgent forces, counter terrorism forces must create and maintain a secure environment that can be regulated with relative ease. This requires the deployment of all intelligence police para military army and all security forces and civil agencies operating across the region.
5. According to Indian doctrine, there are five important steps must be taken to successfully conduct counter terrorism operations: separation of civilians from insurgents the use of a linear grid system physical domination of an area of responsibility (AOR) restraint in use of airborne and land-based firepower civic action (winning the hearts and minds).
6. The first step to successfully carry out counter terrorrism operations is to isolate the insurgents from the local population. This allows security forces to effectively screen the locals for insurgents. As the threatened regions of J&K are vast and require large numbers of security personnel, the Indian Army has regulated its counter terrorism operations through the use of a grid system. The police para military and the government machinery can play a very active role in this grid system. An army battalion's AOR is essentially demarcated by the level of insurgent activity and the ease with which operations can be carried out (because of such factors as terrain and size of local population). The large grid can then be further divided into smaller sections that can then be monitored easily by a company- or platoon-sized unit of soldiers. The fact is that there are a very few joint operations, if they are conducted they are coordinated at the highest level division and above.
7. As counter terrorism operations are often conducted on the platoon level (or sometimes even squad level), the implementation of such a system allows a unit not only to observe its AOR more consistently but also to dominate it. At the functional level however there are lots of gaps in intelligence. All security forces follow a top down approach. The intelligence is shared only at the highest level , the result is that by the time it reaches at the lower level it is too late. The lower ranks within the state police force have a sympathy towards the terrorists such that when they speak on radio they are referred to as " chachere bhai" meaning cousin brother. With a strong physical presence in an area and vigorous patrols conducted during both day and night, security personnel are able to observe and regulate a given village and the access it has to its surroundings. Soldiers cultivate human intelligence (HUMINT) through a cache of local assets and agents. Direct familiarity with the villagers can help soldiers detect the presence of any unusual or suspicious persons.
8. The Indian Army made a conscious decision to severely curb the use of airborne and artillery-based firepower while conducting counter terrorism operations to minimize collateral damage and corresponding casualties. The excessive escalation of firepower during firefights has severely disrupted the local population and caused a much higher unintended casualty rate. Two unsuccessful counter terrorism campaigns-the U.S. military in Vietnam and the Soviet Army in Afghanistan-yield examples of the negative consequences that result from the continued overuse of heavy firepower in civilian areas. it is of vital importance to actively engage and promote interaction between the security personnel and the civilian population. Counter terrorism operations must, of necessity, be an intimate mix of military operations, civic actions, psychological operations, and political/social action.
9. Media Relations. Good media relations can also effectively "showcase" counter terrorism operations, providing increased comfort to the local population and even intimidating terrorist groups. Active and continuous interaction with both local and international media groups can serve as a force multiplier. Keeping the population informed can only help to alleviate any alienation within it. This is a double edged weapon the same information provided can be projected by the media in any manner. The restriction imposed on the security personnel is justified but the security forces here lose out due to the intense intelligence network of over ground workers who use media as a tool to project security forces in a bad light by blowing up any collateral damage or operations out of proportion before the PRO can issue details of operations.
10. Operation SADBHAVANA. The brainchild of Lieutenant General Arjun Ray was a large-scale venture aimed at improving life for the civilians in J&K. The plan called for constructing schools, hospitals, and community development centres and providing water and electricity. The project also included tours for locals to different parts of the country and the improvement of roads and bridges across the state. The project was widely acclaimed and declared a success. It is important to note that these civic actions were conducted on a significant scale and in a transparent, genuine manner. The government determined that worthwhile facilities for the population had to be properly planned and initiated, with proper follow-through to start winning hearts and minds. A clear and visible difference in the lives of the locals was also needed if they were to begin trusting security personnel. Otherwise, the feelings of alienation would foster further anti-Indian sentiment. Although a just and a humble cause , it has not achieved the desired end state, it has created some amount of corruption at each level mainly for the big SADBHAWNA projects. The local politicians asking for such construction activities in their respective areas of interests, the contractors increasing the cut for getting a contract, useless Micro Hydel Projects being constructed just to fill up the completion report and to book the expenditure of the funds allotted.
11. To counter the threat of insurgency in valley a Unified Command was created in 1993 to give a co-ordinated and planned response. Since the setting up of the Unified Command in J&K in December 1996 (after the elections to the State Assembly in September 1996), with the Chief Minister of the State as the Chairman and the General Officers Commanding Corps as Security Advisers, there has been much better co-ordination in the fight against militancy. But with the passage of time, the meetings of the command were occasional as no one really had any time. A 1999 assessment of the functioning of the unified command stated that several dissimilar security agencies operated with no coherence of objectives.
12. The Unified Command, also termed the Unified Headquarters (UH), in Kashmir comprises the Army, Border Security Force (BSF), Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) and the state police. The state Chief Minister is the chairman of the Unified Command. The General Officer Commanding (GOC) of 14 ,15 and 16 Corps are security advisors to the chairman.
13. In July 2001 the State Security Council was constituted to have effective co-ordination among various security agencies dealing with Pakistan-backed militants in the State. The Council replaced the Unified Headquarters. Army's Northern Command chief is the Advisor of Chief Minister in his new capacity as State Security Council head.
14. Civil Military Liaison Conference It is held annually and is attended by top officials from the State Government and Army Headquarters Western Command to thrash out issues of mutual interests and resolve these speedily. These CMLCs provide the right platform for quick decision making at the top level settling the non-strategic and non-security related issues pertaining to revenue, compensation, development etc. promptly. Chaired by the Chief Minister there is a need for further strengthening the relations between civil administration and army for the larger interests of the people. While Unified Command meetings provide for addressing the security related issues, the civil matters could be easily worked out at the CMLCs. These can be further improved by regular interactions between the representatives of the Army and Civil Administration at Divisional Commissioners levels so that issues of lesser magnitudes could be sorted out there for final decision at the CMLC as this mechanism will prove fruitful in quick decision making.
Present Status of Civil Military Relationship at the Functional Level.
15. Based on the survey the results can summarized as under the following heads :-
(a) Beurocracy and Army:- 80 percent of the officers feel that there is a difference in experience and perception of newly inducted IAS officers and the old experienced ones . 90 percent officers feel that there is a high degree of resistance in state level civil officers to act in a situation beneficial for counter terrorism operations to be safe. 90 percent officers feel that there is a non comprehension of the environmental constraints of civil officers by Army. 90 percent of the officers feel that there is a misunderstood supremacy perception by DC/SDMs over the Army. They have biased views on counter terrorism operations by Army and it results in lot of them blaming Army for Human Rights violations.
(b) Local Political Leadership:- They have an apolitical army image , have mistrust of the army leadership in any town and they try to utilise and exploit it for their vested interests , in terms of some major SADBHAWNA project undertaken in their constituency. Irrespective of the above mentioned reasons both the army and the local political leadership have mutual apprehensions of each other so the relationship here too is not so healthy
(c) Police and Army. J & K police is today not in a healthy state. The recurring demands from a number of people to reform and restructure the state police have been stonewalled by vested interests of politicians & bureaucrats. The outcome is , the performance of the police, particularly in the event of a crisis, leaves much to be desired. Practical issues of protocol and precedence in the uniformed forces between the army and the police . A Superintendent of Police who is equivalent to a Major in the Indian army wants to interact only either at the brigade or division level . This results in a turf war between them at the functional level. There appears to be an apparent lack of tactical knowledge in the IPS / State cadre officers, they are not adequately trained to participate in counter terrorism operations but by virtue of being in Valley they try to put more of spoke rather than assistance at the lower level. This is also due to the fact that at the lower ranks they allegedly have some sympathy towards the terrorists. The interaction at the SHO and the JCO level simply does not exist . To show their supremacy in matters of law they at times make incorrect use of IPC/Act in lodging FIR against apprehensions.
(d) Army and the PMF. The deployment of BSF has been slightly reduced on the LoC , the units however have been allocated road opening tasks in low priority areas. The CRPF battalions have been deployed for the security of vital installations in towns bridges and the VIPs. Lack of adequate funds for maintenance , good leadership, initiative and training are the reasons for under tasking and under performance. No joint operations are conducted with them due to lack of coordination and non matching of the radio sets . Their deployment in low priority areas for road opening decreases the manpower stress on army
(e) Judiciary at District/Sub Level. All the officers feel that there is no interaction of the army officially other than court hearings but at the level of company commanders they do maintain some communication within whose area of responsibility they reside.
